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HAROLD E. HURST
By ROBERT B. YEGGE:
T is with solemn sorrow and a deep feeling of personal loss
that this issue of the Denver Law Journal is dedicated to
Harold Emerson Hurst - teacher, colleague, friend - who died
on December 18, 1972.
In 1956, I first met Professor Hurst as his student at the
University of Denver College of Law. As my teacher in Criminal
Law and Constitutional Law, I came to know of his dedication
to, respect for, and professional commitment to the law.
Hurst had joined the College of Law faculty in 1947 as an
Associate Professor and was advanced to Professor in 1950.
He was appointed Acting Dean on May 1, 1958, and became
Dean of the College in September 1961.
Dean Hurst was early committed to interdisciplinary studies
after earning the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1936 and the
Bachelor of Laws degree in 1938 from the University of Colo-
rado, and the Master of Science in Government degree in 1940
from the University of Denver as an Alfred P. Sloan Fellow.
During the years I knew Dean Hurst, he actively pursued his
research interest and writing in the development of scientific
methods of proof and the use of empirical facts in the judicial
process.
In June 1965, Hurst submitted his resignation as Dean of the
College, choosing to return to teaching full-time. It was my
pleasant task to continue the work of a man who had guided
me as a student and teacher.
Seldom does one find a colleague with the unshatterable
determination of Harold Hurst. Among many other things, Pro-
fessor Hurst actively contributed to the establishment and con-
tinuation of the Summer Minority Program. He was doggedly
dedicated to this pioneer effort. Even in his last year when in
poor health, he remained a true colleague, unwilling to shirk
responsibilities, and determined to assume his full load.
To his wife, Esther, his daughters, Janet Marie and Pamela
Ann, his son, Harold Frank, and his three grandchildren, this
dedication is offered as a grateful remembrance of a friend.
*Dean, University of Denver College of Law.
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HAROLD E. HURST
By JoHN PHiLLiP LINN*
N dedicating this issue of the Denver Law Journal to the
memory of Harold Emerson Hurst, the students of the Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law express their affection and
admiration for a beloved professor, who administered to the
needs of the students and of the University for a quarter of a
century.
The present student body and, indeed, a majority of all
alumni of the College of Law, had the opportunity to come un-
der the influence of the teachings of Professor Hurst. Over the
years he taught many subjects to many students, and to each
class he brought an unusual scholarship, enriched by experience
and mature contemplation.
By nature, Professor Hurst was a gentle and reflective per-
son, a man of quiet persuasion. In an unhurried, deliberate,
fair-minded manner he examined and evaluated the difficult
legal and social questions propounded in the classroom. His care
in analyzing complex and controversial constitutional issues
attracted even the attention of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Professor Hurst cared deeply for the law and for a dis-
ciplined approach to legal reasoning, research, and writing. His
own incisiveness instilled students with a keen desire to be
equally precise, concise, and clear in their thoughts and ex-
pressions.
During his tenure as Dean of the College of Law, Professor
Hurst sought with great courage and imagination to establish
a center for leadership in the law. A man of great modesty,
Dean Hurst had no need for pretense or personal publicity. He
distinguished himself as an administrator in the same quiet
manner that he established his stature as a teacher.
Dean Hurst and his charming wife, Esther, will long be
remembered as gracious representatives of the College of Law.
Many demands were made of them, but they gave unstintingly
of themselves to bring credit to the University of Denver.
As an administrator and mentor at the College of Law,
Professor Hurst gave his whole heart and intellect. His leader-
ship and his teachings are a rich heritage for those of us who
were his students, colleagues, and friends.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
VIDEOTAPE TRIALS: RELIEF FOR
OUR CONGESTED COURTS'
By JAMES L. McCRYSTAL**
INTRODUCTION
A salient hallmark of the modem historical era has been
rampant technological growth, a phenomenon which has
radically altered the very structure of human existence. To-
day, technological sophistication touches almost every aspect
of our lives. One area of paramount importance to society,
however, has remained relatively unaffected by the dramatic
changes in material culture: the trial process. If John Marshall
or Abraham Lincoln were to visit a modern courtroom, they
would experience a comfortable familiarity with the proceed-
ings. If, on the other hand, the doctors who attended these
famous jurists at their deathbeds were to visit a modem hos-
pital operating room, they would doubtlessly express a high
degree of incredulity and perplexity with respect to the modern
techniques employed therein. This hypothetical comparison of
the medical and legal professions is presented only to illustrate
the fact that, in large part, the litigative process has remained
an island sanctuary in the midst of the modern technological
revolution.
This is not to say that our judicial system has enjoyed no
benefits from technological developments. Indirectly, technol-
ogy has enhanced the search for truth through its effect upon
evidentiary concerns via modern scientific inventions (such as
radar and x-ray machines) and techniques (blood-grouping and
ballistics testing, for example). The tasks of court administra-
tors and managers have been significantly eased through the
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of James L. Young,
Director, Ohio Legal Center Institute; Dean David Link, University of
Notre Dame School of Law; and James L. McCrystal, Jr., student, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame School of Law. Special appreciation is extended
to Scott Anderson, Jr., and Thomas L. Roberts, students, University of
Denver College of Law, for their generous contribution to the prepara-
tion of this article.
* Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Erie County, Sandusky, Ohio; Ph. B.,
John Carroll University, 1940, J.D., University of Michigan, 1943.
[The author was the presiding judge at the McCall trial described in the
article and one of the draftsmen of Superintendence Rule 15 set forth in
the Appendix - Ed.]
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use of computer programming for scheduling and data collec-
tion purposes.1 Though such instances are numerous, the fact
remains that once the bailiff raps his gavel and announces,
"Hear ye, hear ye, this court is now in session," the trial
process which ensues is presently conducted in substantially
the same manner as it has been for the past several centuries.
To a great extent because of this hoary process, court
docket congestion is a serious problem of our times. The
steadily increasing magnitude of court congestion is threaten-
ing to inundate the legal process.2 In the last few decades,
several devices have been employed to relieve court conges-
tion. Modern liberalized rules of discovery and pleading have
helped to shorten trials and promote settlements out of court.
Another method to ameliorate the burden on the courts has
been the alteration of fundamental legal rights, removing de-
cisionmaking responsibilities from the court and jury (work-
men's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance are
examples). Comparatively little attention and effort, however,
have been directed to streamlining the trial process itself in
a manner which permits retention of the jury system through
the expedition of the jury trial procedure itself. This article
will address the latter alternative and discuss the potential
advantages to be derived from the integration of one modern
technological invention-that of videtotape - into the trial
process.
Videotaping has already been introduced into the legal
system for limited uses (depositions, demonstrative evidence,
and records for appeal)," but, in the author's opinion, its ad-
vantages have not as yet been fully exploited. The purpose
of this article is to draw attention to the potential benefits
to be gained from the use of videotaping in lieu of testimony
at trial in a way which will expedite and fundamentally im-
prove conventional trial court methods. Discussion will focus
on actual experimentation with a videotape trial conducted
in Ohio, and the changes in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
precipitated by this experiment.
I Adams, The Move Towards Modern Data Management in the Courts,
23 FLA. L. REV. 250 (1971).
2 H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHH1OLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Des-
mond, Juries in Civil Cases-Yes or No?, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 104 (1964);
Comment, Abolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternatives. 15 DE
PAUL L. REV. 416, 417 (1966); Comment, The Streamlined Jury System,
36 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 90-92 (1962).
3 See pp. 465-66 infra.
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I. SUBSTITUTIONAL USES OF VIDEOTAPE
The videotape process is a recent technological advance-
ment, first put to use on a practical scale by the television
industry in the mid-1950's. 4 Although its employment soon be-
came commonplace in television, the videotape technique was
introduced into the legal arena only in the last few years. In
this brief span of time, however, utilization of the videotape
in the legal process has found several outlets.5 In alcohol-
related driving offenses, for example, videotapes of defendants
are made at the time of arrest and later presented to the jury
at trial as a type of demonstrative evidence, enabling the jurors
to witness the behavior and demeanor of the defendant as
he was at the time of his apprehension.6 In criminal trials,
videotapes of defendants have been successfully introduced
into evidence.7 Significantly, and no doubt a presage of changes
on a broader scale, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
modified 3 years ago to permit the recording of depositions
by other than stenographic means.8 This rule faced an early
challenge in a case involving the use of a videotape deposition
and was upheld as the court approved this modern method
of recording depositions.9 Several states now allow videotape
depositions to be used at trial in lieu of the traditional written
type.10 The videotape recording method has appealed to some
judicial administrators as a potentially effective means by
4 Comment, Videotape: A New Horizon in Evidence, 4 JOHN MARSH. J.
PRAc. & PRoc. 339 n.1 (1971).
5 For a well-documented treatment of the various uses of videotape in the
legal system, present and potential, see Comment, Judicial Administra-
tion - Technological Advances - Uses of Video-tape in the Court Room
and Station House, 20 DE PAUL L. REv. 924 (1971).
6 Kane, Videotape Recording, 50 JUDICATURE 272 (1967).
7 State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1970); Paramore v. State, 229 So.
2d 855 (Fla. 1969), noted in Stewart, Videotape: Use in Demonstrative
Evidence, 21 DEF. L.J. 253, 256 (1972).
s FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b) (4). Effective on July 1, 1970, the rule provides:
The court may upon motion order that the testimony at a
deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means, in
which event the order shall designate the manner of record-
ing, preserving, and filing the deposition, and may include
other provisions to assure that the recorded testimony will be
accurate and trustworthy. If the order is made a party may
nevertheless arrange to have a stenographic transcription made
at his own expense.
9 Carson v. Burlington N., Inc., 52 F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971), noted in
Stewart, supra note 7, at 259.
10 See, e.g., OHIo R. Civ. P. 40(B) in Appendix; Blews & Patterson, On
Trial: Videotape, 46 FLA. B.J. 159 (1972); Wong, Mare States Allow the
Use of Videotapes in Court as Substitutes for Live Appearances by Wit-
ness, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1972, at 28. Also, as the Carson case,
supra note 9, implies, a rule which allows recording of a deposition by
"other than stenographic means" may be construed to permit recording
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which to prepare the official trial record. Experiments con-
ducted in the state of Illinois testing the efficacy of this no-
tion have led to positive results." The preceding examples
illustrate the fact that a growing segment of the legal com-
munity is receptive toward the adoption of modern technological
devices into the legal system as a means to bring about im-
provements in conventional trial practice. In sum, the advan-
tages of videotaping in the context of the courtroom setting
have been recognized by several jurisdictions, and although
the practice is by no means catholic as yet, these technological
inroads appear to be of no light moment. Rather it seems
that the practice signals a far more widespread usage in the
future.
The uses of videotape described above, however, are limited
in character and do not work any profound change upon the
nature of the conventional trial system. They are mere sub-
stitutes for, and additions to, traditional modes of presenta-
tion of evidence and the preparation of trial records. At present
they promise no real departure from the methods of the past.
Although these uses allow a fact finder a broader base upon
which to evaluate proffered evidence, they only comprise a
substitute for and refinement of conventional evidentiary meth-
ods. These limited applications of videotape have not wrought
and do not promise to effect any fundamental change in the
age-old conduct of trials.
II. ENT=E TRIAL BY VIDEOTAPE
In 1971, this author suggested that, as compared to the
present restricted uses of videotaping in the courtroom, the
videotape recording method could yield far greater benefits
for the trial process if utilized for the examination of all wit-
nesses in a civil suit.1 2 Rather than using videotape on a piece-
meal basis as a substitute for parts of the testimonial process,
it could supplant that process entirely. In other words, the
whole trial (with the exception of voir dire, opening state-
ments, and closing arguments) could be conducted by videotape
as a means to expedite trials in a manner which would ulti-
mately lead to enhanced efficiency in the litigative process and
by videotape. Since some states have similar rules, the use of video-
tape depositions promises to increase in the future. See, e.g., ALA. R.
Civ. P. 75.
11 Madden, Illinois Pioneers Videotaping of Trials, 55 A.B.A.J. 457 (1969);
Sullivan, Court Record by Video-Tape Experiment--A Success, 50
CHI. B. REc. 336 (1969), in 41 N.Y.S.B.J. 695 (1969).
12 McCrystal, Videotape Trials, 44 OHIO B. 639 (1971).
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thus serve to decrease docket backlogs and relieve the present
overwhelming burden on the court system. To investigate the
efficacy of this idea, it was proposed by this writer that a pilot
videotape trial be conducted in order to afford the bench and
bar an opportunity to evaluate the suggestion. The proposal
was soon given the means of its accomplishment through a
generous grant from the Ohio Judicial Conference. All, then,
that was lacking was a legal controversy, ripe for litigation,
in which all participants would consent to the trial of the case
in this experimental (albeit for these parties, final) mode. An
ideal dispute was found, and in November of 1971, the concept
of videotape trials had its first day in court.
A. McCall v. Clemens: The First Videotape Trial
McCall v. Clemens,13 became the first case in legal annals
to be tried almost in its entirety through the medium of video-
tape. The plaintiff, McCall, was walking upon a city sidewalk
when he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant,
Mrs. Clemens, who had lost control of her car. Liability, having
been admitted, was not at issue. McCall alleged in his com-
plaint that he had suffered serious injury to his left shoulder,
arm, and hand. The trial was restricted to the resolution of
a single issue: the nature and extent of the plaintiff's alleged
injuries and the amount of compensatory damages. Being an
uncomplicated and relatively simple action, McCall was ideally
suited to the needs of an experimental test of the utility of
the videotape trial proposal.1 4 As a personal injury suit in-
volving a moderate claim, it was the type of case which typical-
]y consumes a substantial portion of docket time in many civil
courts. Success with this kind of action, therefore, could well
presage a significant impact upon docketing in the future. In
addition, it is with this type of case that trial lawyers most
often express grave doubts with respect to the quality of a
trial conducted by prerecorded testimony. Thus, the McCall
case provided a testing ground for the misgivings which typical-
ly arise in the trial attorney's mind when confronted with the
idea of videotape trials.
Four witnesses testified in McCall: the plaintiff, a police-
man, a doctor, and a hospital records librarian. All of the tes-
timony was gathered and recorded 1 to 2 weeks in advance of
13 No. 39,301 (C.P. Erie County, Ohio, Nov. 18, 1971). This case first
received national attention following the publication of Gunther, Is
Videotape the Answer for our Crowded Courts?, TV GUIDE, MAR. 25, 1972,
at 6.
14 Murray, Comments on a Videotape Trial - From Counsel for the Plain-
tiff, 45 Omio B. 25-27 (1972).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the actual trial. Each witness was examined in the presence
of the parties, the attorneys, and the videotape technician.
15
The format of the examinations closely resembled that of the
present-day deposition, however, the crucial difference was
that the testimonial process was conducted as if it were taking
place before the court. Questions were necessarily restricted
to those tending to elicit evidence legally admissible in a
court of law. In other words, the narrower trial concept of
relevance operated to restrict the form of questions and the
content of answers to admissible testimony, as opposed to the
broader concept of relevance to the subject matter as now
applies to the taking of depositions. Objections to the questions
and answers were made immediately as they arose according to
conventional trial practice (the videotape operator noting the
precise moment of the objection for future reference). How-
ever, in the absence of the trial judge, no rulings were made
concerning the objections at the time of the recording session.
The day after all of the testimonial evidence was completed
and recorded, the judge met with the two attorneys to view
portions of the unedited master tape in order to rule upon the
objections. Using a digital counter device on the recorder, the
videotape operator located on the master tape the questions
and answers to which objections had been raised. The court
viewed this selected footage and heard arguments of the at-
torneys with respect to the objections and rendered its rulings.
If the objection was overruled, the question and answer re-
mained on the tape, but the objection was deleted. If the ob-
jection was sustained by the court, the question, the answer, and
the objection were all ordered deleted from the finished tape
which the jury later viewed. In the presence of the court, the
trial tape was prepared from the unedited master tape. The
trial tape was, of course, shorter than the original master tape
because only those questions and answers which the court
deemed admissible were retained. The unedited and complete
master tape, containing all questions, answers, and comments
of counsel, was filed with the court and preserved for the pur-
pose of appeal should either party later challenge the pro-
ceedings. Following preparation of the trial tape, the court
rendered its instructions to the jury which were recorded and
made part of the trial tape.
15 The doctor's testimony was originally taken on videotape as a deposition.
When I learned of the excellent results, I then asked counsel for
both parties if they and their clients would agree to complete the entire
trial by videotape. All concerned consented, thus allowing the first
videotape trial to be conducted.
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The actual trial commenced at 9 o'clock on the morning
of November 18, 1971. The jury was impaneled in the usual
manner with the attorneys conducting the voir dire in the
presence of the court. Given the novel character of the pro-
ceedings the attitudes of the prospective jurors concerning their
perceived ability to render a fair and impartial verdict on the
basis of recorded testimony was investigated thoroughly. After
the jury was seated, both attorneys personally delivered their
opening statements. At the close of those statements, the video-
tape monitors were turned on, and the jury viewed the testi-
mony that had been recorded well in advance of the trial. 16
Normal recesses were taken, and when the testimony was con-
cluded, the two attorneys delivered their closing arguments
in person. Thereafter, the court's instructions were shown on
videotape, and then the jury retired to consider its verdict.
The full courtroom presentation and jury deliberation took
only 1 day, commencing at 9 o'clock in the morning and end-
ing with a verdict at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 1'7 If conducted
in the usual manner, this action could easily have consumed
2 days' time. The recorded testimony ran approximately 2
hours and 40 minutes, and the jury was able to view it with-
out interruption. The court never viewed the entire testimony
and needed only 15 minutes to rule on counsels' objections.
Except for voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments
(which were recorded for inclusion in the trial record), the
complete presentation of the dispute to the jury was accom-
plished through technological means.
The reactions of the principal actors and participants in
this unique experiment were, on the whole, positive and favor-
able, and this pilot trial generated much discussion in the
legal community.'8 The advantages of trial by videotape are
many and varied. Following a brief consideration of them, we
will turn to a discussion of what McCall portended for the trial
process in the state of Ohio, in particular, and what it may
portend for the United States in general.
B. The Advantages of Videotape Trials
The McCall experiment and other ventures involving the
use of videotape in the trial context have demonstrably shown
16At the time of the trial when the jury viewed the videotape, one wit-
ness, the doctor, was in Hawaii.
17 The jury returned a verdict for $9600. No appeal was taken.
18 McCrystal, Ohio's First Videotape Trial: The Judge's Critique, 45 OHIo
B. 1 (1972); Murray, supra note 14; Watts, Comments on a Video Tape
Trial-From Counsel for the Defense, 45 OHio B. 51 (1972); Sym-




that many benefits are to be gained from the proper utiliza-
tion of this innovative technique within the judicial system.
Advantages accrue to each actor in the trial process, and cumu-
latively, these benefits may be said to work a fundamental im-
provement upon conventional trial practice. Although some
problems remain to be solved in the future, even at this early
experimental stage, the videotape process has already proven
its worth and inestimable value to those who have witnessed its
working firsthand.
At this point in time, the concept of the videotape trial is
still at an early stage of development. As of the date of this
writing, only the McCall experiment and four other trials in
Ohio have been conducted completely via the medium of video-
tape. In view of the nascence of the idea, no empirical data
exists from which to generalize findings concerning the merits
of videotape trials vis-a-vis the conventional trial scheme. There-
fore, the purported advantages outlined in this section are not
as yet amenable to documentary support, but rather derive
primarily from the author's 21 years of experience as a trial
judge and his involvement in the McCall experiment. 20 Given
this state of affairs, the discussion is necessarily rather intui-
tive in content, informal in tone, and certainly more suggestive
than conclusive, and does not purport to represent a truly
definitive statement on the merits of the idea. Rather, it is
admittedly hoped that this somewhat cursory listing of ad-
vantages to be derived from the videotape trial technique will
stimulate interest in the idea among the members of the legal
community, leading to further experimentation and more thor-
ough investigation of the possible ramifications of the idea
within our system of justice. More definite answers and the
resolution of possible doubts can only be provided through the
trial and error of actual experience.
The numerous advantages of the videotape trial are per-
haps most profitably demonstrated as they relate to particular
participants in the trial process. Therefore, we shall now con-
19 To this author's knowledge, the other videotape trials which have been
conducted as of the date of this writing include one in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Judge Francis Talty presiding) and two in Summit County,
Ohio (Judge James Barbuto presiding). The latter two, one civil
and one criminal, were conducted simultaneously by the same trial
judge. For descriptions of them, see Bandy, Summit Jury Pioneers Trial
by Television, Akron Beacon Journal, Aug. 2, 1972, at A-12, col. 1;
Akron Juries See Trials on Edited Video Tapes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14,
1972, § L, at 55, col. 3. A second videotape trial conducted by this author
was Swain v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., No. 39,494 (C.P. Erie County, Ohio,
Jan. 24, 1973).
20 For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the advantages poten-
tially derivable from videotape trials, see Morrill, Enter - The Video-
Tape Trial, 3 JoHN MARsu. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 339 (1971).
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sider what the videotape trial does and can mean for the fol-
lowing six groups of persons: court administrators, the trial
courts, the jury, the trial attorneys, witnesses, and the appel-
late courts.
1. The Court System and Its Management
The traditional American jury system has been the object
of much critical scrutiny in recent years and appears to be
losing support among a discernible segment of the bench and
bar.2 1 This negative assessment of the jury system in modern
times is largely a function of the tremendously overburdened
and crowded dockets in large urban areas which lead to de-
lays between complaint and trial inimical to the concept of
speedy trial. As society becomes increasingly more "litigation
prone," this problem promises to reach even more serious pro-
portions. The videotape procedure could offer significant ame-
lioration of this problem in several ways.
The videotape method could prevent many disputes from
ever reaching the trial stage. The taping of all the testimony
and evidence prior to submitting it to the jury should result in
a greater probability of settlement since the evidence will then
hold no unknown elements. After a copy of the trial has been
prepared and the court has ruled on all of the objections, the
attorneys and parties will be in a position to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of their case. realistically and definitively by re-
viewing what the jury will actually see (as opposed to what
the attorneys expect the jury to see) should the matter proceed
to trial. Settlement talks should become more realistic, because
certain variables which now prevent pretrial resolution, such
as the effectiveness of a key witness' presentation, will be
known in advance. Thus, deliberations concerning settlement
will be limited to what the jury will actually see and possible
uncertainties as to what the evidence will adduce will have
no place in such discussions. Presently, for example, attorneys
often postpone truly serious settlement negotiations until after
a key witness has testified and his testimony can be evaluated
or until a ruling on an evidentiary matter crucial to his case is
made. With videotape, this can be done well before the jury
is impaneled, and more importantly, the necessity of a judge
spending several valuable days presiding over what turns out
to be a needless judicial exercise should be avoided. Rather
than guessing at the strength of each side's case, lawyers will
be able to bargain from a knowledgeable position.
"i Sources cited note 2 supra.
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Since matters will not be set for trial until the videotape
is completed, the length of trial will be known in advance.
Such knowledge will dramatically enhance the scheduling proc-
ess, leading to firm settings for hearings and trials and a more
efficient use of the court's time and facilities. Delays result-
ing from overly conservative estimations regarding the anti-
cipated length of trial will be averted.
When a dispute reaches the trial stage, many other ad-
vantages of the time-saving variety will derive from the video-
tape procedure. No in-trial time will be expended for bench
or chamber conferences, for settlement negotiations, or for rul-
ings on motions. There will be no last minute delays in waiting
for late witnesses or for procuring necessary real evidence.
Recesses to allow the attorneys to prepare closing arguments
or for the court to prepare its instructions will not be neces-
sary. The ever-present specter of mistrial caused by misconduct
of witnesses or counsel which now inheres in the trial process
will be avoided altogether, since the testimony will be ruled
upon and edited prior to its submission to the trier of fact.
The cumulative result of all of these benefits will be smoother
trials. Distractions will be largely eliminated, fostering con-
tinuity, and maximizing the jury's opportunity to reach a re-
sult consistent with the evidence.
Although courts will necessarily incur expenses in procur-
ing and maintaining the necessary equipment, and of course,
training and paying its operators, there still would be a net
economic savings. 22 Since videotape trials can be held in small
viewing rooms, as opposed to the larger courtrooms required
for traditional jury trials, the costs of physical facilities could
be significantly reduced. Additionally, the preparation of the
record for appeal will be simplified. The only additional effort
at trial would be the recording of the voir dire, opening state-
ments, and closing arguments.
2. The Trial Court
Videotape trials, as clearly illustrated by the McCall case,
will effect a drastic reduction in the amount of time which an
individual trial judge must devote to hearing a case in most
instances. The judge need not preside over the presentation of
all of the testimony but need only hear that testimony related
22 The cost of videotaping trials is less expensive than most persons
would first imagine. For example, the Ohio Judicial Conference grant
to conduct the McCall pilot trial was $1000. The actual total cost for




to objections or motions raised by counsel. Of course, where
the court is required to rule upon a motion for a directed
verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it must
view all of the relevant testimony. However, in view of the
fact that the taped trial will take much less time to view than
it now takes to hear an entire case, a time saving will ensue
in this instance as well.
At present, when objections are raised or motions made
during the course of the trial, the court is ordinarily compelled
to render its ruling at once under pressure to expedite the
proceedings. The videotape procedure will render the on-the-
spot ruling unnecessary. When such objections and motions
are recorded on videotape, the court may view them at its
convenience in chambers with increased temporal latitude
within which to evaluate the merits of the particular issue.
Allowing the court ample time to consider its decisions, with
no delay to other participants in the matter, should signifi-
cantly reduce incorrect rulings and resultant prejudicial error,
leading to increased fairness to all concerned and fewer ap-
peals. The same circumstances and reasoning apply to jury
instructions.
Since there is nothing that the attorneys and the judge
can do while the trial tape is being shown to the jury, there
is no reason why they should remain in the courtroom. A
supervisory person in the court's control (such as the bailiff)
can attend to and observe the jury in order to insure that no
conversations occur and that the proceedings are properly
conducted. At recesses, this supervisory person can discharge
the court's traditional duty of admonishing the jury with re-
spect to their behavior when out of the courtroom. Fewer
judges could handle a greater trial load since the court's
presence is required only during the opening and closing phases
of the trial. Additionally, a single trial judge could actually
preside over more than one trial simultaneously. 2 Thus, more
than one trial may be set for an individual judge during a
particular time slot without causing a conflict. Realization of
these savings of the court's time will enable far more cases to
be tried to juries.
3. The Jury
The videotape technique will simplify the task of the jury
in several important respects. A prominent advantage is created
by the fact that prospective jurors will be called only for trials
23 See Summit County cases, supra note 19.
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in which the need for them to return a verdict is certain. No
longer will jurors be summoned to sit patiently through a long
trial only to have the case taken from it by a directed verdict.
Under the proposed procedure, the jury will be called only
after the court has overruled motions for a directed verdict
and the necessity of its verdict is a certainty.
Total jury time will be shorter and what is heard during
that time restricted to purely evidentiary matters and argu-
ments of counsel. No time will be unproductively expended in
waiting for tardy witnesses to appear, for the judge to rule
upon motions or objections, or for bench or settlement con-
ferences to conclude. In short, none of the traditional interrup-
tions now experienced at trial which the jury is asked to
endure patiently will plague the videotape trial. Such dis-
tractions will be eliminated, and the jury will have advance
knowledge as to exactly how much time it will take to hear
all of the evidence.
In addition to great patience, we presently require jurors
to display an omniscient ear and a selective memory. It is with
respect to these expectations that the videotape trial will fun-
damentally improve conventional trial practice. During almost
every trial, objections are raised to questions and answers.
Ordinarily, certain of these objections will be sustained by the
court and the relevant testimony ordered stricken from the
record and the jury admonished to put out of mind that which
it has experienced. The jurors are expected to hear and retain
all of the questions and answers, but when an objection is
sustained, they are expected to forget the objectionable ma-
terial. To ask a juror to erase a segment of his experience
upon demand is to require of him an act beyond human ca-
pacity. This problem is avoided entirely by the videotape meth-
od because only that testimony which has not been objected
to by counsel and that testimony objected to but deemed ad-
missible by the court are shown to the jury. The jurors can
concentrate fully upon remembering all of the testimony which
they will view. There will be no admonitions to the jury, in-
structing them to disregard and forget certain testimony se-
lectively and upon demand. The absence of delays and avoid-
ance of interruptions during the presentation of evidence will
function to enhance continuity of the trial and avert distrac-
tions, and thus, maximize the jury's opportunity to digest the




The videotape procedure will allow greater and more ef-
fective use of the jury view, now an expensive and time-con-
suming practice. Since views or out-of-court experiments can
be recorded and shown to the jury in court, travel to the scene
is obviated, and the delay in trial necessitated by a view is
minimized. A more complete view of a scene or any matter
in controversy can be given to the jury on videotape. Such
a view will also be from a single point of view, as determined
by counsel, and each juror will see exactly the same picture,
thus enhancing uniformity of observation of important demon-
strative evidence. Also, a jury view as presently conducted
often fails to portray fully how a disputed incident occurred
for the reason that conditions during the view differ from those
which existed at the time of the event in question. Given video-
tape, the scene can be recorded when conditions most closely
approximate those in being at the time of the event in dis-
pute. The jury's understanding of the events relative to the
scene can be further enhanced by the integration of testimony
and the use of diagrams, charts, and closeups in the view
segment of the videotape. Additionally, since the jurors never
go to the scene, the problem of misconduct of a juror during
the view is eliminated.
The order of the presentation of evidence by videotape
is amenable to a control and structuring not always achievable
under present trial practice when an unforseen circumstance,
such as the sudden unavailability of an important witness,
arises. All testimony will be in context and ordered clearly
and logically to enhance understanding of the issues which the
jury must resolve by its verdict.
The above discussion highlights some of the advantages
enjoyed by the jury when the videotape trial method is em-
ployed. Some minor problems of a mechanical nature remain
to be solved.24 However, the positive attributes of a video-
tape trial from the point of view of the jury would appear to
represent a significant improvement of trial practice in a way
which will enhance the evaluative and deliberative processes
and, as a result, lead to more logical, consistent, and uniform
jury verdicts.
4. The Attorneys
Attorneys will benefit from the videotape trial method in
24 See Watts, supra note 18, at 52-53. For an excellent discussion of the
technical capabilities of videotape and its potential value for the legal
profession,.see Stone, Use of Videotape in the Legal Profession, 45 OHIo
B. 1213 (1972).
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various ways. First, the attorneys can conduct the taping at
a mutually convenient time and place. This allows greater
flexibility in scheduling their individual daily calendars. This
procedure also allows them to examine witnesses in the order
best suited to develop the issues inherent in the dispute, not
in the manner dictated by the availability of witnesses at trial
time. Even if witnesses cannot be examined in the preferred
sequence, the order of testimony can be rearranged with the
permission of the court in the editing process so as to present
the evidence in the most understandable fashion. The attorney
and witness both are able to maintain continuity because tes-
timony is not interrupted by the recesses which often occur
in live trials. As mentioned previously, effective and full use
of the advantages of the jury view can be more routinely
utilized under the videotape system in order to impart to the
jury a fuller understanding of the events involved in the con-
troversy.
The element of surprise is virtually eliminated by this
method of presentation. Pressure associated with the omni-
present possibility of surprise will not be a factor, and the law-
yers can attend more closely to what the evidence will show.
Knowing the full content of the evidence in advance will also
allow more time for the preparation of objections, motions, and
briefs for evidentiary questions, directed verdicts, and similar
questions which ordinarily arise during the course of a court-
room trial. Opening statements would involve comments by
the attorneys concerning only what the evidence does show,
not, as at present, what the attorney expects the evidence to
show. With respect to closing arguments, attorneys will have
ample time to prepare and perfect this important phase of
the case and not be limited to a hurried drafting prepared dur-
ing a recess. These qualities of the videotape trial will tend
to reduce pressure upon attorneys and, thus, minimize the
likelihood of a fatal mistake at trial. In addition, the person-
ality of the advocate will assume a diminished importance in
the trial context, tending to reward careful and thorough pre-
trial preparation, and making reality conform more closely to
the ideal that theatrical talent of counsel should be extraneous
to the proper resolution of a legal dispute.
The effective use of expert witnesses would be furthered
by the videotape technique. Their cost, for example, would
likely be reduced because the expert's testimony could be re-
corded at his convenience in his office or laboratory. Also,
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lawyers with specialized knowledge could be employed to
examine a particular expert. Trial counsel could then familiar-
ize himself with the esoteric aspects of the case in less time,
since the examination of the expert witness could be conducted
by a lawyer already equipped with the expertise necessary
for thorough and proper examination. Adoption of this special-
ized use of attorneys would lead to a wider participation in
trial practice within the legal community.
5. The Witnesses
Witnesses would also, of course, benefit from the expanded
scheduling flexibility offered by the videotape method. The
time of their appearance can be arranged to meet the demands
of their personal schedules. Also, doctors can testify in a
hospital or their offices, where records are available, requiring
minimal interruption of their professional duties. Incapacitated
and very elderly persons can testify in their homes without
having to make the trip to the courthouse. Instead of the dull
and dry spectacle of a lawyer reading a written deposition of
the testimony of unavailable witnesses into the trial record,
the jury has the advantage of viewing such a witness with the
opportunity to observe his demeanor and comportment. In
short, witnesses can testify under circumstances most favor-
able to them and under conditions in which their testimony
is likely to be best presented.
Testimony can be taken and preserved at a time much
closer to the transaction or occurrence at issue. The usual de-
lay from complaint to trial which often hinders a witness's
memory, rendering his testimony inconclusive, will be avoided.
In personal injury actions, for example, the use of videotape
makes it possible to record testimony relating to liability at
a time when the memories of the witnesses are fresh, while
the medical testimony relating to the nature, extent, and per-
manency of injuries can be recorded at a much later date
when the experts are best equipped to give a proper prognosis.
Thus, testimony can be taken at the time when it will be most
useful and effective, rather than as dictated by the trial date.
Witnesses could actually testify at the scene of an acci-
dent in order to demonstrate more clearly for the jury just
how the event occurred. Rather than, as today, relying on a
jury view or diagram, supplemented by in-court testimony,
the entire procedure can be accomplished more expeditiously
and completely by combining both the view and the witness
offering explanatory testimony in the same recorded sequence.
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The atmosphere during the videotape witness examination is
more relaxed as compared to the courtroom witness stand.
Therefore, witnesses will testify in a more natural manner,
free from nervous tension resulting from the atmosphere of
the courtroom which can tend to cause forgetfulness and mis-
takes necessitating the ordering of a mistrial. The probability
of nervousness destroying the worth of a reliable and important
witness can be substantially reduced as a result of the more
relaxed atmosphere in the videotape procedure.
The witness will literally be the center of the jury's at-
tention as he fills the screen of the videotape monitor. Normal
courtroom distractions will be absent (including those which
some attorneys intentionally create), allowing the jury to
attend solely to the evidence at hand with increased concen-
tration.
6. The Appellate Court
The videotape trial promises to be of inestimable value
with respect to sustained appeals leading to new trials. The
appellate court would view unedited portions of the master
tape which had been the subject of rulings on objections. On
remand, the trial tape can merely be re-edited to conform with
the directions of the appellate court and viewed by a new jury.
Thus, the tremendous expense and time required by a new
trial can be substantially avoided. The appellate court need
not be concerned with the possibility that a party's case could
be destroyed by the loss of an important witness' testimony.
In addition, the appellate court would be in a much stronger
position to rule upon a matter appealed which is within the
discretionary power of the trial court. Abuse of discretion
would become more apparent as the appellate court literally
steps into the shoes of the trial court in hearing testimony.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF VIDEOTAPE TRIALS
As a result of the overwhelmingly favorable response to
the McCall experiment,25 the Ohio Supreme Court, on January
15, 1972, submitted to the state General Assembly the following
proposed addition to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 40 - Pre-recorded testimony - All of the testimony and
such other evidence as may be appropriate may be presented at
a trial by videotape, subject to the provisions of the Rules of
Superintendence.
2"
25 The Director of the Ohio Legal Center Institute observed the McCall
trial and labelled the experiment an "unqualified success" with "a far
greater potential than anyone had envisioned." McCrystal, supra note
18, at 2. See also articles cited note 18 supra.
2(; OHio R. Civ. P. 40 (Supp. 1972).
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Meeting with the legislature's approval, the rule was adopted
and became effective on July 1, 1972. Thus, the State of Ohio
became the first American jurisdiction in which the employ-
ment of videotape to present all of the trial testimony and
evidence has been explicitly approved. On September 1, 1972,
Superintendence Rule 15, "Testimony and Other Evidence Re-
corded on Videotape,' 27 was promulgated by the Ohio Supreme
Court. This rule dictates the implementation of Ohio Rule of Civil
Procedure 40 and regulates by detailed direction the manner in
which testimony is to be taken, presented, and preserved in a
videotape trial. Effective January 5, 1973, Superintendence Rule
15 was amended, and the supreme court issued two additional
rules related to the use of videotape in courtroom proceedings:
Superintendence Rule 10, "Verbatim Transcripts; Recording De-
vices," providing for the use of videotape as the official trial
record, and Superintendence Rule 11, "Improper Publicizing of
Court Proceedings," prohibiting, on pain of contempt, unauthor-
ized uses of mechanical recording devices in and around courts
during sessions. This article will conclude with a brief con-
sideration of Superintendence Rule 15. Salient points from the
following subsections of the rule will be highlighted: (1) scope
of the rule, (2) depositions, (3) presentation of evidence solely
by videotape, (4) transcripts, (5) equipment, (6) assessment of
costs, and (7) disposition of videotapes filed with the court.
(See Appendix for full texts of the rules.)
Subsection (A) defines the scope of the rule and clearly
demonstrates Ohio's commitment to videotape trials by direct-
ing application of the rule to all courts of record in the state
and to all appellate courts in the review of cases which contain
vidotape evidence in the record of appeal.
28
As will be seen later, other subsections of the Superintend-
ence Rule require the courts to provide storage facilities, cer-
tain minimum equipment, and competent operators. All Ohio
trial courts of record must, under the rule, be prepared to
hold videotape trials. This preparation may involve a substan-
tial reallocation of the court's resources of space, personnel,
and money.
Superintendence Rule 15 (B) prescribes the manner in which
videotape depositions are to be taken, filed with the court,
and prepared for presentation at trial.29 The subsection begins
with the authorization of the recording of depositions by video-
27 OHIO SuPT. R. 15 (see App.).
28 Id. at 15(A).
29 Id. at 15(B).
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tape, outlining the type of notice that must be given, officers
capable of taking the deposition, and the method of certification.
In general, these requirements are the same as those for the
recording of a deposition by traditional methods, i.e., steno-
graphically.
30
At this point the similarity with previous procedure dis-
appears."' If no objections are made by any of the parties
during the deposition, the officer, upon request of any party,
shall file the tape along with the certification with the court.
However, if objections were made and a party so requests, the
officer will file the tape with the trial judge for the purpose
of obtaining rulings upon the objections. The rule, however,
provides that an audio sound track of the deposition is suffi-
cient for this purpose.
The trial judge will then rule on the objections. He may
view the entire videotape or only those parts to which objec-
tions have been raised. The trial judge's rulings and instruc-
tions for editing will be returned with the videotape to the
officer and notice of the same given to the parties. The officer
will then edit the videotape according to the judge's instructions,
eliminating all references to objections. This being completed,
the officer will then file with the court both the original and
the edited tapes.
Except upon an order of the trial judge, the videotape
filed with the court will not be available for inspection or
viewing prior to trial. However, the clerk of the court may
release the tapes to the officer of the deposition in order to
make a copy for a party.
Any objections not previously raised nor waived may be
made at trial, but only before the testimony in question has
been presented to the jury. If the objection is sustained, the tape
will be edited to conform to the judge's ruling.
Subsection (C) is applicable when Rule of Civil Procedure
40 is invoked and the entirety of the testimony and evidence is
presented by videotape. :-2 Such a trial, consisting of only video-
tape evidence may be held under agreement of all of the parties
and with the consent of the trial judge, or the court may in its
discretion order the trial conducted by videotape. :':  The best evi-
dence rule and the limitations normally placed upon the use of
:1"Id. at 15(B) (1-5).
3 Id. at 15(B) (6-9).
32 Id. at 15 (C).
3: Id. at 15(C) (2).
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depositions are inapplicable in such a trial. 4 Additionally, no ob-
jections will be entertained during the presentation of the
testimony.
35
Subsection (C) also provides that neither the attorneys
nor the trial judge must be present in the courtroom while
the jury is viewing the testimony.36 However, the trial judge
is not to leave the courtroom without instructing the jury as
to their duties and responsibilities or without leaving the jury
in the charge of an official of the court. The judge, however,
still has the same duties and responsibilities as he would were
he in the courtroom.
Subsection (D) confers discretionary power upon the trial
judge to designate the means to be utilized in the preparation
of the official transcript) 7 Any recording techniques permitted
by Superintendence Rule 10 may be employed to preserve the
proceedings. If the record is made by videotape, a party who
desires to inspect the transcript may do so by requesting a
copy (at his cost), or in lieu thereof, he may view the official
tape. To expedite this viewing process, the party must desig-
nate (by reference to the event, tape reel number, and time
counter reading) the portions of the tape which he wishes
to view.
Subsection (E) of Superintendence Rule 15 specifies the
equipment to be used and the facilities the court must pro-
vide for videotape trials.3 1 In order to reduce inconsistency, the
Japanese standard one-half inch videotape and its recording
and playback machines are designated for use. Any party re-
cording testimony on an incompatible tape must pay for the
conversion to the standard tape. The court must provide play-
back and reproducing facilities. It may, however, purchase,
lease, or contract for the availability of the equipment when
needed at its own option. It may also train its own personnel
or contract for the services of a competent operator. The
court, as a minimum, must have a videotape player and mon-
itor, having a 14-inch screen. They need not be color. The court
is also responsible for proper maintenance of the equipment,
including the periodic playing of a test tape.
Subsection (F) sets out by whom the various costs of a
34 Id. at 15(C) (1). This provision applies only to trials where all of the
testimony is by videotape.
35 This rule is in contrast to that for videotape depositions only. Id. at
15(C) (4). Compare with Id. at 15(B) (9).
36 Id. at 15 (C) (5).
37 Id. at 15(D).
3
8 Id. at 15(E).
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videotape trial are to be borne. "' As a general rule, it can
be said that the cost of the videotape upon which testimony
is recorded shall be borne by the proponent of the testimony,
if the original, or the requesting party, if a copy. All other
costs, except that of playing the tape to the jury, which is an
expense of the court, will be treated as costs in the action.
Subsection (G) provides for disposition of videotapes filed
with the court.4" Ownership remains with the proponent of
the testimony. Thus, tapes may be reused, providing they are
of acceptable quality. In general, the trial court may authorize
the release of the tape upon final disposition of the cause,
whether before trial, after trial when no appeal is filed, or
after final appeal.
CONCLUSION
The successful McCall experiment and the resultant change
in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure signal a radical change
in the trial practice of the future. In the belief of some,
the videotape trial offers advantages over conventional trial
procedure, which not only aid in the relief of overburdened
urban dockets, but which also significantly improve upon the
administration of justice. The jury's task is simplified and
made realistic by requiring the jury only to concentrate upon
and remember all of the evidence presented to it. The psycho-
logical impossibility of selectively forgetting upon demand no
longer plays a part in videotaped jury trials. Not only will
time be saved at almost every step up to and through trial,
but also courtroom histrionics for which the legal profession
is not infrequently admonished will be totally eliminated. Tes-
timony can be gathered and preserved when it promises the
maximum value. The court has increased opportunity to weigh
the merits of objections and motions in making its rulings.
Attorneys will not suffer from extraneous pressures emanating
from the imperative to make extemporaneous decisions of trial
strategy and tactics while in the heat of a courtroom contest.
Witnesses' testimony will be elicited in an atmosphere more
conducive to the telling of truth in a natural, more relaxed
manner. Appellate courts can supervise the discretionary power
of the lower courts more effectively. These are but a few of
the reasons why the videotape trial promises improvements to
traditional fact-finding methods. In view of the many profits to
be realized by this new trial concept, one legal commentator




has flatly predicted the inevitability of the widespread use of
the videotape trial in the future.4 '
At present, the concept remains in its infancy. However,
the adoption of the rule changes in Ohio may well mark the
end of the beginning and introduce a new era in trial prac-
tice. Certainly, limited substitutional uses of videotaping in
the conventional trial format are on the rise. Whether the pre-
emptory use of videotaping -using recorded testimony in
lieu of live witnesses for the entire trial- will eventually be-
come the rule throughout the country cannot as yet be deter-
mined. However, in view of the advantages it offers and the
fact that it is but a small logical step from the use of videotape
for depositions, demonstrative evidence, jury views, and so
forth (as is now rapidly becoming the case), to the use of
videotape for the entire trial, the merits and full implications
of the idea must be explored now. Certainly, it is an alter-
native to the present system which has proved itself workable,
and, therefore, has earned the commitment of our full atten-
tion and critical scrutiny. Even at this early stage in its de-
velopment the videotape trial has worked well. With the imagi-
native aid of the legal community, it could work far better in
the future.




VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS; RECORDING DEVICES
Proceedings before any court, proceedings before a grand jury, and
discovery proceedings may be recorded by stenographic means, by phono-
gramic means, by photographic means, by the use of audio electronic record-
ing devices, or by the use of video recording systems.
Proceedings in any court which are recorded on videotape need not
be transcribed into written form for the purposes of appeal. The videotape
recording constitutes the transcript of proceedings as defined in App. R.
9(A) and Sup. R. 15(H)3. A transcript of proceedings transcribed on
videotape shall be transmitted in its entirety as a part of the record.
Transcripts of proceedings transcribed on videotape will be filed with
the clerk of the trial court at the conclusion of the trial. Transcripts of
proceedings transcribed on videotape and other original records of trans-
script of prcceedings shall be maintained in the trial court in the manner
directed by the trial court until the case is finally terminated.
(Effective January 5, 1973)
SUPERINTENDENCE RULE 11
IMPROPER PUBLICIZING OF COURT PROCEEDINGS
Broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the court
room and area immediately adjacent thereto during sessions is pro-
hibited, except that a trial judge may authcrize:
(a) The use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other pur-
poses of judicial administration, or
(b) The use of electronic or photographic means for such other pur-
pose as may be authorized by the procedural or superintendence
rules of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Any violation of this rule shall be considered a contempt of the trial
court and punishable as such.
(Effective January 5, 1973)
SUPERINTENDENCE RULE 15
TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE RECORDED ON VIDEOTAPE
(A) This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record in this state
in the reception and utilization of testimony and other evidence recorded
on videotape and to all appellate courts in this state in the review of cases
in which the Record on Appeal contains testimony or other evidence tran-
scribed on videotape for use at the trial or where the transcript of proceed-
ings, if any, is transcribed on videotape.
(B) Depositions.
1. Authority. Civ. R. 30 (B) (3) permits a party taking a deposition
to have the testimony recorded by other than stenographic means which
would include a recording of the testimony on videotape (hereafter re-
ferred to as a videotape deposition).
2. Notice. The taking of a videotape deposition is subject to the
requirements of Civ. R. 30 (B) (3) regarding notice specifying the manner
of recording, preserving and filing of the videotape deposition, but it
shall be sufficient in this regard if the notice specifies that the videotape
deposition is to be taken pursuant to the provisions of Sup. R. 15 regarding
the recording, preserving and filing of the videotape deposition.
3. Officer. The officer before whom a videotape deposition is taken
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shall be one of those officers enumerated in Civ. R. 28. Upon the request
of any of the parties, the officer shall provide, at the cost of the party
making the request, a copy of the deposition in the form of a videotape, an
audio recording, or a written transcript.
4. Submission to witness. When the videotape deposition has been
taken, the videotape shall be shown immediately to the witness for exami-
nation, unless such showing and examination are waived by the witness
and the parties.
5. Certification. The officer before whom the videotape deposition
is taken shall cause to be attached to the original videotape recording a
certification that the witness was fully sworn or affirmed by him and
that the videotape recording is a true record of the testimony given by the
witness. If the witness has not waived his right to a showing and examina-
tion of the videotape deposition, the witness shall also sign the certification.
6. Filing.
(a) In absence of objections. If no objections have been made by
any of the parties during the course of the deposition, the videotape deposi-
tion, with the cerification, shall be filed by the officer with the clerk of
the trial court upon the request of any of the parties in accordance with
Civ. R. 30 (F) (1) and notice of its filing shall be given as provided in Civ.
R. 30 (F) (3).
(b) If objections have been made. If objections have been made by
any of the parties during the course of the deposition, the videotape
deposition, with the certification, shall be submitted by the officer to the
trial judge upon the request of any of the parties within ten days after
its recording or within such other period of time as the parties may stipu-
late, for the purpose of obtaining rulings on the objections. An audio copy
cf the sound track may be submitted in lieu of the videotape for this pur-
pose. For the purpose of ruling on the objections, the trial judge may view
the entire videotape recording, view only those parts of the videotape
recording pertinent to the objections made, or he may listen to an audio-
tape recording submitted in lieu of the videotape recording. The trial
judge shall rule on the objections prior to the date set for the trial of the
action and shall return the recording to the officer with notice to the parties
of his rulings and of his instructions as to editing. The editing shall reflect
the rulings of the trial judge and shall remove all references to the objec-
tions. The officer shall then cause the videotape to be edited in accordance
with the Court's instructions and shall cause both the original videotape
recording and the edited version of that recording, each clearly identified,
to be filed with the clerk of the trial court.
7. Storage. Each trial court shall provide secure and adequate facili-
ties for the storage of videotape recordings.
8. Inspection or viewing. Except upon order of the trial judge and
upon such terms as he may provide, the videotape recordings on file with
the clerk of the trial court shall not be available for inspection or
viewing after their filing and prior to their use at the trial of the cause or
their disposition in accordance with this rule. The clerk may release the
videotape to the officer taking the deposition, without the order of the
trial judge, for the purpose of preparing a copy at the request of a party as
provinded [sic] at paragraph 3.
9. Objections at Trial. The effectiveness of a videotape deposition
is greatly increased when all of the objections have been ruled upon, fol-
lowing the procedures set forth in this rule, prior to the time of trial. If,
however, an objection is made at the time of trial which objection has not
previously been waived pursuant to Civ. R. 32 (D) (3) or previously raised
and ruled upon, such objection shall be made before the videotape deposi-
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tion is presented and shall be ruled upon by the trial judge in advance of
that presentation. If such objection is sustained, that portion of the video-
tape deposition containing the objectionable testimony shall not be pre-
sented to the jury.
(C) Entire Trial Testimony and Evidence.
1. Authority. Civ. R. 40 permits all of the testimony and such other
evidence as may be appropriate to be presented at the trial of a civil action
by videotape. Civ. R. 40 is limited to cases where the entirety of the
testimony and appropriate evidence is presented on videotape. Civ. R. 40
does not contemplate treating the entirety of the testimony as a collection
of individual depositions. When Civ. R. 40 is invoked and all of the testi-
mony is recorded on videotape, the videotape recordings shall be the ex-
clusive medium of presenting testimony without regard to the availability
of the individual witnesses to testify in person. Thd limitations placed
upon the use of depositions do not apply when the entirety of the testimony
is recorded on videotape pursuant to the authority of Civ. R. 40.
2. Invoking Civ. R. 40. The entire testimony and appropriate evi-
dence may be presented by videotape recording under agreement between
or among all of the parties and with the consent of the trial judge. In an
appropriate case, having due regard for the costs involved, the nature of
the action, the nature and extent of the testimony, and after consultation
with the attorneys representing the parties to the action, the trial judge
may order the recording of all of the testimony on videotape.
3. Procedure. Unless clearly inapplicable, the provisions relating
to the taking of a videotape deposition shall apply to the recording of the
entirety of the testimony on videotape. The order of the taking of the testi-
mony of the individual witnesses and the order of the presentation of that
testimony shall be at the option of the proponent. In ordering, or consenting
to, the recording of all of the testimony on videotape, the trial judge shall
fix a date in advance of the day assigned for trial by which time all of
the recorded testimony must be filed with the clerk of the trial court.
4. Objections. All objections must be made and ruled upon in ad-
vance of the trial of the cause and no objections to any of the testimony
may be entertained during the presentation of the testimony. Edited copies
of all the videotape recordings shall be made as may be required to elinii-
nate all references to objections and to reflect the rulings of the trial judge
on the objections made.
5. Presence of counsel and trial judge. The counsel for the parties
and the trial judge shall not be required to be present in the courtroom
when the recorded testimony is played to the jury. The trial judge shall
not leave the courtroom during the playing of the recorded testimony
without admonishing the jurors as to their duties and responsibilities and
without leaving the jurors in the charge of a responsible official of the
court. The trial judge shall remain within easy recall and shall bear the
same duties and responsibilities as if he were physically present in the
courtroom.
(D) Use of Electronic Devices for the Transcribing of Verbatim
Transcripts of Proceedings.
1. Authority. Superintendence Rule 10 permits the use of electronic
devices as a means of transcribing any court or grand jury proceedings.
2. Determination of transcribing medium. The trial judge, in the
case of trial proceedings, or the administrative judge, in the case of grand
jury proceedings, in exercising his authority over the operation of his
court, may order the utilization of any means authorized by Superintend-
ence Rule 10 for preserving the proceedings.
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3. In lieu of requesting a copy of the transcript of proceedings, or
portion of it, a party may view the transcript of proceedings on file with
the clerk of the trial court or the clerk of the court of appeals as may be
applicable.
4. Reference to a particular portion of a transcript of proceedings on
videotape shall include reference to the event, the number of the reel of
tape on which it is recorded, and the elapsed time counter reading.
(E) Equipment.
1. Standard. To minimize the incompatibility of equipment, the
IEAJ Standard, the Japanese Standard one-half inch videotape specifica-
tions together with specifications for recording and play back equipment, is
specified as the standard for use in the recording of testimony and other
evidence on videotape for introduction in the trial courts of this state. If
a party records testimony on videotape which is not compatible with the
established standard, the party shall be responsible for the furnishing of
reproduction equipment or for conversion to the established standard, all
of which shall be at the cost of the party and not chargeable as costs in
the action.
2. Provision. Each trial court shall make provision for the availa-
bility of play back or reproducing facilities. As may be appropriate, the
trial court may purchase the equipment, may lease the equipment, or may
contract for the furnishing of equipment on the occasions of need for the
equipment. In the exercise of each of the specified [sic] options, the trial
court shall provide for the adequate training of an operator from within
the personnel of the court, or for the services of a competent operator from
some other source.
3. Minimum equipment. As a minimum, facilities shall consist of a
videotape player and one monitor, having at least a 14 inch screen. Color
facilities shall not be required. Where the trial judge relies upon the two
track audio cassette system for ruling upon objections made in the record-
ing of testimony on videotape, the trial court may purchase, or otherwise
acquire the modified equipment used in playing the soundtrack recording
of the testimony and recording the rulings of the trial judge.
4. Maintenance. Proper maintenance of equipment is essential. The
trial court shall take all reasonable steps to assure that the equipment is
maintained within the operating tolerances. The trial court shall provide
for competent regular maintenance of equipment which is owned or
leased by the court, including the running of a standard test tape at
least once every three months.
(F) Costs.
1. Depositions.
(a) The cost of videotape, as a material, shall be borne by the
proponent.
(b) The reasonable cost of recording the testimony on the videotape
shall be treated as costs in the action.
(c) The cost of playing the videotape recording to the jury in the
course of the trial shall be treated as a general cost of the operation of the
trial court.
(d) The cost of an audio reproduction of the videotape recording
soundtrack used by the trial court in ruling on objections shall be treated
as costs in the action.
(e) The cost of playing the videotape recording for the purpose of
ruling upon objections shall be treated as costs in the action.
(f) The cost of producing the edited version of the videotape record-
ing shall be treated as costs in the cause, provided that the cost of the
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videotape, as a material, shall be borne by the proponent of the testimony.
(g) The cost of a copy of the videotape recording and the cost of an
audio tape recording of the videotape soundtrack shall be at the expense of
the party requesting the copy.
2. Civ. R. 40 testimony.
(a) The cost of the videotape, as a material shall be borne by the
proponent of the testimony.
(b) The cost of copies for the benefit of the parties shall be borne
by the requesting party.
(c) All other cost shall be costs of the action allocated between or
among the parties as required by law as may be discretionary with the
court.
3. Electronically prepared Transcripts of Proceedings.
(a) The cost of copies of the transcript of proceedings or such parts
thereof as may be deemed necessary by a party for his use shall be borne
by the requesting party or as provided by law.
(b) The cost of viewing a transcript of proceedings transcribed on
videotape, as provided for in Sup. R. 15 (D) 3, shall be borne by the party
requesting it or as provided by law.
(c) All other costs shall be costs of the action and payment shall
be allocated by the court.
(G) Disposition of Videotapes Filed with the Court.
1. Ownership. The ownership of the videotape used in recording testi-
mony shall remain with the proponent of the testimony. Videotape may be
reused for the recording of testimony, but the proponent shall be respon-
sible for the submission of a recording of acceptable quality.
2. Release of videotape recordings.
(a) The trial court may authorize the clerk of the court to release
the original videotape recording and the edited videotape recording to
the owner of the videotape:
(i) upon the final disposition of the cause when no trial is had.
(ii) upon the expiration of the appeal period following the trial of the
cause, provided no appeal is taken.
(iii) upon the final determination of the cause, if an appeal is taken.
Provided, however, that if the testimony is recorded stenographically by the
court reporter during the playing of the videotape recording to the jury, or
to the court sitting without a jury, the videotape recordings may be re-
turned to the proponent upon disposition of the cause following the trial.
(b) The trial court's order of release shall be by journal entry.
(H) Definitions. For the purposes of these Superintendence Rules
the following definitions apply:
1. Record. The record consists of all papers and exhibits therto
filed in any court, the transcript of proceedings, or excerpts thereof, if any,
including exhibits, and certified copies of the docket and journal entries
prepared by the clerks of the various courts.
2. Original Record. The originals of all items which are a part of
the Record.
3. Transcript of Proceedings. The end product of whatever medium
used to preserve the content of proceedings in a trial court.
4. Transcribe. The process of preserving the content of oral pro-
ceedings or the process of transferring the content of oral proceedings from
one authorized medium to the same or any other authorized medium
of preservation.
5. Transcription. A copy, either in the same medium as the original
or in any other authorized medium of reproduction, of an original tran-
script of proceedings.
(Effective September 1, 1972, as amended, January 5, 1973).
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INDICATORS OF MANAGERIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN AN URBAN JUDICIAL BUREAUCRACY
By JAMES A. GAZELL*
INTRODUCTION
W HAT can be done to make certain that civil con-
flict is resolved in the peaceful arena of the court-
room and that criminal charges lead to justice for both
the accused and the community?
We must make it possible for judges to spend more
time judging, by giving them professional help for ad-
ministrative tasks ....
We have to find ways to clear the courts of the
endless stream of "victimless crimes" that get in the
way of serious consideration of serious crimes ....
We should open our eyes- as the medical profes-
sion is doing-to the use of paraprofessionals in the
law. Working under the supervision of trained attorneys,
"parajudges" could deal with many of the essentially
administrative matters of the law, freeing the judge to
do what only he can do: to judge .... In addition we
should take advantage of many technical advances, such
as electronic information retrieval, to expedite the re-
sult in both new and traditional areas of the law ....
And I endorse the concept of a suggestion made by
Chief Justice [Warren E.] Burger: the establishment of
a National Center for State Courts. This will make it
possible for state courts to conduct research into prob-
lems of procedure, administration and training for state
and local judges and their administrative personnel.
It could serve as a clearinghouse for the exchange of
information about state court problems and reforms.'
This recent comment by President Richard M. Nixon exem-
plifies the growing inclination of present and former public offi-
cials,2 government commissions,3 scholars,4 and the mass media 5
Associate Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies at Cali-
fornia State University at San Diego; Ph.D. in Government, 1968, South-
ern Illinois University.
'Nixon, Reforming the Administration of Justice, 57 A.B.A.J. 422-24
(1971).
2 See, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 196-200 (1970); Burger, Deferred
Maintenance, 57 A.B.A.J. 425 (1971); Burger, The State of the Federal
Judiciary-1971, 57 A.B.A.J. 855 (1971); Tydings, Modernizing the
Administration of Justice, 50 JUDICATURE 258 (1967); Warren, New Disci-
pline: Judicial Administration, 4 TRIAL 9 (1967-68).
3 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CiviL DISORDERS, THE RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD ON CIVwL DIoRDERs 183-94
(1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY
125-54 (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 80-91
(1967).
4 See, e.g., J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHID & D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECON-
sm EB 554-73 (1970); K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURrs IN URBAN POLITICS
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to view trial courts as bureaucracies whose maintenance rests
considerably on their managerial capability. This view arises be-
cause, especially in urban areas, the federal and state trial
courts have failed to exhibit sufficient managerial efficiency in
solving such critical problems as the mounting congestion of
criminal and civil cases, a malady that threatens to immobilize
this middle sector of the justice system funnel6 (see figure 1).
This article, finished in June 1972, explores the existence
of management consciousness in judicial organizations. Because
judges are the traditional court managers, the study, conducted
in September-October 1971, focuses on them. Forming the basis
of the article is an investigation of the first part of a three-part
managerial consciousness model which posits how judicial or-
ganizations maintain themselves. This model suggests that (1)
the acquisition and degree of managerial consciousness varies
directly with the gravity of the internal problems and external
pressures confronting an organization; (2) this consciousness
results in substantial changes in judicial operations to alleviate
the intra-organization and extra-organization pressures; (3) the
2-3 (1967); J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM
2-28 (1969); E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS
1-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MANAGING THE COUIrS]; H. JAMES,
CRISIS IN THE COURTS viii, 22, 25 (1967); J. JENNINGS, THE FLOW OF
ARRESTED ADULT DEFENDANTS THROUGH THE MANHATTAN CRIMINAL COURT
IN 1968 AND 1969 iii, v, 1-31 (1971); J. KLONOSKI & R. MENDELSOHN,
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE 5-7 (1970); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B.
BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 71-222 (1959); E. Galias & N. Gallas,
Symposium on Judicial Administration, 31 PuB. AD. REV. 111-43 (1971).
5 See, e.g., Larsen, Why The Courts Are Clogged, 13 SAN FRANCISCO 50-52
(1971); Mills, Nothing To Do With Justice, LIFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 57-60,
62-66, 68; Star, Jam-Up: Crisis in Our Criminal Courts, LOOK, Mar.
23, 1971, at 32-34, 39; Action to Help Clear Logjam in Courts, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1971, at 65; As I See It, FORBES, July 1, 1971, at
21-23; Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1970, at 32-45; What's Wrong with the Courts:
the Chief Justice Speaks Out, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 24, 1970,
at 68-71; Justice in America, COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
televised, Apr. 20, May 18, June 15, 1971 (three part series).
6 A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 70 (1967); D. EASTON, THE PoLmcAL
SYSTEM 96-100 (1953); D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
LIFE 21-33 (1965); J. KLONOSKI & R. MENDELSOHN, supra note 4, at xviii;
T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (1962); R.
QUINNEY, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 12-14 (1969); G. SCHUBERT,
JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING 105-07 (1965); E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY 180
(1968); 1. SHARKANSKY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 4-9 (1970); CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1969 at 39, 66, 76, 85, 87, 97, 105, 106; Elden,
Systems Analysis Decision Theory, and the Behavioral Approach in the
Study of Jurisprudence 5-12 (unpublished masters thesis, San Diego
State College, 1968).
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FIGURE I A Funnel Model of a Typical Criminal and Civil















FIGURE 2 A Typical Judicial Subsystem: Within the Justice




















































I (Continuances, Motion, Retrials)
Middle of Funnel
changes, in correcting or ameliorating the problems, create less
serious troubles which further sharpen the managerial acumen
of judges as the pattern is repeated. Parts (2) and (3) are
presented here to demonstrate the importance of managerial
consciousness if judicial actors are to exert more control in prob-
lem-solving or if they are to more readily accept the stringent
administrative leadership, the loss of considerable autonomy,
and the drastic operational changes which may be required to




To test the acquisition and degree of managerial conscious-
ness, this study analyzed the Superior Court of San Diego
County, an urban trial court. This particular court was chosen
for two reasons. First, this study wanted to analyze managerial
consciousness only at the state trial court level because this is
where the bulk of judicial business begins and ends.9 Second,
this court's internal problem of court delay and external pres-
sure of threatened trial court consolidation are both typical of
the forces which produce managerial consciousness in other
urban trial courts. To determine the extent of judicial mana-
gerial consciousness regarding these two areas of delay and
consolidation, this study requested that 20 veteran judges, of
the 23 who held positions in this court in September-October
1971, complete a 14-question interview which measured the six
areas of consolidation, specialization, discipline, delay, leadership,
and ideology. The results of this study, which are analyzed in
the following pages, describe six specific limitations in the
acquisition and degree of managerial consciousness in the areas
of discipline, delay, and leadership. These limits show that
the lack of consciousness and the attitudes of these judges may
prevent their efficient management of the problems which con-
front the judicial organization.
I. A MANAGERIAL-CONSCIOUSNESS MODEL
Although occasional signs of managerial consciousness in
judicial milieus date from 1906,10 only within the last few years
has it risen sharply.11 The motivation for this consciousness has
stemmed mainly from two sources. One is the aggravation of
at least nine problems: the inveterate delay besetting most
state and urban trial courts; 12 a widespread fear that such delay
helps to increase crime rates by reducing the prospect of swift
and certain punishment for guilty defendants; 13 more frequent
courtroom disruptions; 14 the incidence of recently concluded and
9 K. DOLBEARE, supra note 4.
10 W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICAL ADMINISTRATION 254-63, 338-50
(1929); Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin-
istration of Justice, 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 55 (1962); Pound, Organiza-
tion of Courts, 10 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 69 (1927).
11 See sources cited notes 1-5 supra.
12 D. KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 60-61
(1970).
13 See sources cited note 5 supra.
14 Mosk, Justice in Violent Times, 211 THE NATION 431 (1970); Nord-
heimer, Security Grows Tighter in Nation's Courtrooms, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1971, § 1, at 48, cols. 1-8.
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pending trials with political overtones; 15 greater publicity for
judicial difficulties; 16 a tendency of scholars to focus on the de-
cisional and procedural aspects of courts rather than on the
administrative facets; 17 a failure of courts to apply technology -
especially computers - in order to raise the efficiency of judicial
operations;' 8 a neglect of such organizations, a condition that
Chief Justice Burger recently described as "deferred mainten-
ance;"' 9 and broad cultural ferment 20 (see figures 1 and 2).
A second source motivating management consciousness is
the extensive scope of the above-mentioned problems which
embrace numerous urban trial court jurisdictions. Illustrative
of this situation is the extent of delay in these organizations.
With regard to civil-jury delay (an area for which the most
data is publicly available), the average time from answer to
trial ranges from more than 5 years in the Circuit Court of
Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, to 2 years in the District
Court of Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada. Falling between
these two boundaries are the trial courts of New York City;
Philadelphia and Norristown, Pennsylvania; Jersey City, New
Jersey; Boston, Cambridge, Lawrence, Dedham, and Spring-
field, Massachusetts; and Detroit, Michigan.21 With respect to
the criminal case delay (a topic for which only scattered infor-
mation is readily available), the lapse of time from filing to
disposition of such actions usually averages less than 1 year.
This situation predominates in all the cities of at least seven
states: Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
15 See, e.g., Berrigan Jury Panel Nearing Completion, L.A. Times, Feb. 6,
1972, § A, at 11; Chicago 7 Cleared of Plot, 5 Guilty on Second Count,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 2, at 14, cols. 1-8; Deadlock by Jury
Results in Seale-Huggins Mistrial, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1971, at 1, cols.
1-3, at 27, cols. 1-8; Ellsberg, Russo Charged in New Indictment on
Pentagon Papers, L.A. Times, Dec. 31, 1971, part 1, at 1, 6; Manson, 3
Girls Sentenced to Die, L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1971, part 1, at 1, 3, 20;
Newton is Cleared of Charges in Slaying, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1971, at
53, cols. 3-5.
16 See sources cited note 5 supra.
17 MANAGING THE COURTS at 7-9.
18 Adams, The Movement Toward Modern Data Management in the Courts,
23 U. FLA. L. REV. 250 (1971).
19 Burger, supra note 2.
20A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 25, 44-47 (1970).
21 THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, INC., CALENDAR STATUS
STUDY -. 1971, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION, PERSONAL
INJURY JURY CASES, AUGUST 1, 1971, at vii-ix (1971).
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Mexico, and New York.22
In explaining the time disparity for these two types of cases
it should be noted that delay in criminal cases is generally far
less severe than the delay in civil cases principally because
of the statutory priority accorded to criminal cases. For example,
criminal actions are moved more quickly because of short time
limits (often 60 to 90 days) and the extensive use of negotiated
pleas of guilty, which obviate lengthy trials.23 However, because
of these priorities, and the judicial personnel assigned to crim-
inal cases, a reduction of delay in criminal cases often does not
improve the overall delay problem because such a reduction
usually results in an aggravation of delay in the civil docket.
Aggravated judicial problems of widespread incidence tend
to motivate heightened managerial consciousness. At this point
it is useful to elaborate on the model which links these prob-
lems with organizational maintenance in a judicial setting. This
managerial-consciousness model 24 posits the following three
ideas. First, the acquisition and degree of managerial conscious-
ness varies directly with the gravity of the internal problems
and external pressures confronting an organization. Internal
difficulties include primarily a judicial resistance to substantial
change, which is reinforced by at least four mechanisms: habit,
an incessant stream of cases, traditionally broad discretion ac-
corded to judges in their efforts to surmount their workloads,
as well as a fear of diminished authority and status. The ex-
ternal pressures embrace four additional stimuli: growing popu-
lation, advancing technology, a desire to emulate programs that
succeed in other jurisdictions, and criticism from bar groups
and the mass media. Second, this consciousness results in sub-
stantial changes in judicial operations to alleviate these internal
problems and external pressures. Third, the accruing innova-
tions correct or ameliorate these problems but spawn a set of
less serious troubles, which further sharpen the managerial
acumen of judges as they repeat the problem-solving pattern.
22 Based on data supplied to the author on May 4 and Nov. 30, 1971, by
Mrs. Katherine Parkes, Librarian, The Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion, Inc., 40 Washington Square South, New York, N.Y. 10012.
23 See, e.g., A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28-29 (1967); BUREAU OF
CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1969, at
105 (1970); Task Force Reports on the Judicial Component of the Crimi-
nal-Justice System in Cook County, Illinois, Chicago Tribune, May 16-
23, 1971, § 1 [hereinafter cited as Task Force Reports].
24 W. BENNIS, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS AND PROS-
PECTS 22-23 (1969).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
II. MANAGERIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN AN URBAN TRIAL COURT
A. Background Analysis
The above model only suggests a theoretical framework for
data-gathering; 25 it must be tested for evidence which confirms
or denies the suggested theses. San Diego County was chosen
because it epitomizes an expanding metropolitan area in three
notable respects. First, its population has mounted during the
last 50 years, particularly since 1940, as indicated in figure 3. By
1960, the San Diego metropolitan area ranked twenty-third na-
tionally in population, a position that it maintains a decade later.
In 1970, the only two California counties whose populations were
larger were Los Angeles and Orange with 7,032,075 and 1,420,386
respectively.
FIGURE 3 Population of San Diego County
26
Percentage Population Rank
Year: Census Increase in California
1920: 112,248 - 5th
1930: 209,659 86.8% 4th
1940: 289,348 33.2% 4th
1950: 556,808 92.5% 4th
1960: 1,033,011 85.5% 2nd
1970: 1,357,854 32.4% 3rd
Second, since the 1920's, the composite workload of the
Superior Court of San Diego County has increased, especially
within the last 30 years, almost as drastically as the population.
However, due to a corresponding rise in the number of judge-
ships allocated to this court, the workload for each judge has
fluctuated within a narrow range. In 1970, this organization
ranked second in California with respect to its total filings and
its number of judgeships 27 (see figure 4).
Third, despite sharp increases in population and in cumu-
lative workloads, the extent of delay in the handling of crimi-
nal and civil cases has risen only at a gradual rate in this trial
court (see figure 5).
25 0. GARCEOU, POLITICAL RESEARCH AND POLITICAL THEORY 4-5 (1968).
2 6 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, 1970 CALIFORNIA ROSTER OF FEDERAL,
STATE, COUNTY AND CITY OFFICIALS 110 (1970); THE 1972 WORLD AL-
MANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 196 (1971).




FIGURE 4 Workload Changes
County
2 8
in the Superior Court of San Diego
Total No. of Total Filings
Year: Filings Judgeships per Judgeship
1926: 4,969 (0.0%) 4 (0.0%) 1,242 (0.0%)
1930: 5,088 (2.5%) 5 (25.0%) 1,018(-18.0%)
1940: 6,444(26.7%) 6 (16.7%) 1,074 (+5.5%)
1950: 11,112 (72.4%) 8 (33.3%) 1,389 (+29.3%)
1960: 18,848 (69.6%) 19 (137.5%) 992 (-28.6%)
1970: 32,260 (71.2%) 25 (31.6%) 1,290 (±30.0%)
FIGuRE 5 Scope of Criminal and Civil Case Delay in the Superior
Court of San Diego County29
Civil-Case
Criminal-Case Delay
Delay Rank in (Average Rank in
Year: (Median-Months) State Months) State
1963: - - 15.0 (0.0%) 7th
1964: - - 12.5(-16.7%) 6th
1965: - - 16.7(±33.6%) 3rd
1966: - - 16.3 (-2.4%) 7th
1967: - - 14.1 (-13.5%) 8th
1968: 2.7 (0.0%) 13th 17.6(+24.8%) 7th
1969: 2.9(-7.4%) 10th 18.8 (+6.8%) 7th
1970: 2.8(-3.4%) 12th 18.3 (-2.6%) 7th
1971: (Discontinued but - 16.6(±45.4%) 2nd
probably below 2.8)
This result probably stems from the efficiency of this or-
28 The Judicial Council of California was founded in 1926. CAL. CONST. art.
6, § la (1926). FIRST REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA
TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 56 (app. 1, 1927); THnD REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGIS-
LATuRE 86-87 (apps. A-H, 1931); NINTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF CALIFORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 17, 27-31
(1943); THIRTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALI-
FORNIA TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 54-55 (1950); EIGHTEENTH
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA TO THE Gov-
ERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 198-99 (1961); 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT
153 (1971).
29 See THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS
STUDY, PERSONAL INJURY JURY CASES 1-2 (1964); id. 1-2 (1965); id.
1-2 (1967); id. 1-2 (1969); id. 1-2 (1970); id. 2 (1971); JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 122 (1971); JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1972 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 106, 112 (1972).
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ganization in expediting its business. However, three caveats
temper this assessment. One qualification is the incompleteness
of the delay information which dates from 1968 for criminal
cases and from 1963 for civil cases. A second cautionary note
is that, although one may garner data about the scope of the
backlog for this court since 1926, such information is virtually
worthless because one cannot validly equate backlog with delay.
On the one hand, backlog is only the number of cases - criminal,
civil, or both - that faces a court. The mere incidence of suits
fails to divulge the length of time required to handle them. On
the other hand, delay typically centers on the average or median
duration of an action from its filing to its disposition. Under
this distinction it is possible for some courts to face a large
backlog but only a short delay whereas other judicial organiza-
tions may encounter the opposite situation.30 A final limitation
is that the data on the scope of delay in this jurisdiction suggest
that its judges may be achieving consistent efficiency in the
handling of criminal cases at the price of substantially increased
delay in the adjudication of civil matters (see figure 5).
B. Methodology
A statement of the methodology employed in this study
necessitates brief chronological attention to five requirements.
First, the apposite indices were canvassed for previous studies of
this institution in order to ascertain and to consider the possible
adoption of their research techniques. However, there were no
published articles that examined this court.31 The nearest, re-
cent studies have centered on examinations of trial court oper-
ations in Los Angeles,32 San Francisco,33 the state of Califor-
nia,34 Chicago,35 and New York City.36
30 MANAGING THE COURTS at 62-63; H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 44.
31 Based on an exploration of the categories "Administration of Justice"
and "Courts" in THE INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS Vols. 1-16 (1926-72);
and in AN INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS LITERATURE Vols. 1-6 (1888-1937).
32 J. HOLBROOK, A SURVEY OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, Los ANGELES
AREA 3-404 (1956); THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, RE-
PORT OF THE SPECIAL JUDICIAL REFORM COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 1971, at
vii-xvi (1971).33THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMIrrEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL
COURTS OF SAN FRANCISCO, PART I, THE SUPERIOR COURT BACKLOG: CON-
SEQUENCES AND REMEDIES 12, 24, 26, 27, 30-34, 37-40, 43, 45-48 (1970); id.
PART II, BAIL AND O.R. RELEASE 46-49 (1971); THE SAN FRANCISCO COM-
IVIITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NON-VICTIM CRIME IN SAN FRANCISCO,
PART I - BASIC PRINCIPLES, PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS 46 (1971); id. PART II
- SEXUAL CONDUCT, GAMBLING, PORNOGRAPHY 44-46, 55, 66 (1971).
34CALIFORNIA LOWER COURT STUDY 1-125 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
LOWER CoURT STUDY]; CALIFORNIA UNIFIED TRIAL COURT FEASIBILITY
STUDY 1-111 (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY].35 Task Force Reports at 1-2, 4.
36 J. JENNINGS, supra note 4. See a/so J. JENNINGS, THE FLOW OP DE-




Second, the internal structure of this court must be deline-
ated before it may be validly analyzed. In autumn 1971, the or-
ganization consisted of 25 judgeships, 7 of which 23 had been
filled at the time of this survey. Since that time the number of
judgeships for this court has risen to 28.38 These officials are
appointed by the governor of this state for 6-year terms, after
which they may seek re-election 39 (see figure 6).
FIGURE 6 The California Judicial Subsystem
40
Supreme Court -t Judicialconi
District Courts Administrative
of Appeal Office of Courts
SSpecial &Limited Jurisdiction
Municipal Courts: 75 Justice Courts
Superior Courts: 58 Civil: $5,000 or (rural): 244
Civil: over $5,000 less Civil: $500 orCrimial: Msde-less
Criminal: Mostly Criminal: Misde- Criminal: Misde-
felonies Small Claims: meanors
(6-YEAR TERMS) $200 or less Small Claims:(6-YAR TRMS)$200 or less
(6-YEAR TERMS) (6-YEAR TERMS)
A presiding judge is elected for a 1-year term by his peers
who rotate among four divisions: civil (with 19 judges), crim-
inal (with three judges), conciliation (with one judge), and
juvenile (also with a lone judge) (see figure 7).
Third, in September and October 1971, 20 judges (87 percent)
from a population of 23 consented to be interviewed with the
stipulation that their names remain confidential. Although Ron-
ald Reagan, the Governor of California, made two additional
37 CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 69595 (West Supp. 1972); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL-
FoRNIA, 1972 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 112 (1972); JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 152-53 (1971).
3 8
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA ROSTER 1971-72, at 70
(1971).
39 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16(c)-(d).
40 CAL. CONST. arts. 5-11, art. 6, §§ 1, 3-5, 16(c); LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
OF CALIFORNA, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 (1970); UNIFIED TRIAL
COURT STUDY at 10.
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appointments to this bench shortly before the start of this sur-
vey,42 the new judges were excluded because they had not
served in this position for a minimum of 1 year and had not
acquired extensive inside knowledge of the managerial problems
facing this organization. However, the 87-percent sample size
was certainly large enough to assure representativeness for the
valid extrapolation of findings from the sample to the rest of
the population.43 Fourth, because the idea of managerial con-
sciousness incorporates a melange of variables, this study sought
to discover the extent of this attribute in this court by em-
ploying six organizational variables: consolidation, specialization,
discipline, delay, leadership, and ideology.44 Since two of these
variables (delay and leadership) required the use of several
questions for thorough analysis, the questionnaire consisted of
14 items. 45 The queries germane to each variable were put in
mixed order in the questionnaire to reduce the possibility of re-
41 Interview with Larry Adams. former Secretary to the Superior Court,
now Jury Commissioner, San Francisco, 1971.
42 Reagan Names 2 to Superior Court, 3rd Judge Quits, San Diego Union,
Aug. 12, 1971, § B, at 1, 4.
43 H. BOYD & R. WESTFALL, MARKETING RESEARCH 378-82 (2d ed. 1964); E.
JONES, CONDUCTING POLITICAL RESEARCH 64-66 (1971).
44 MANAGING THE COURTS at 36-40, 61-64, 139-45, 156-60, 173-88.
45 See Apps. 1-3 infra.
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sponse sets, i.e., the inclination of respondents to answer items
of the same kind in a fixed manner despite their content46 (see
Appendix 3). In addition 11 background questions were included:
age, birthplace, religion, ethnic background, law school attended,
year of admission to law practice, political party affiliation,
public offices held before appointment to the current position,
year of appointment to the bench, and the names of ancestors
who served as judges or in other public offices in San Diego
County.4 7 The rationale for incorporating these additional items
into this survey was an attempt to determine their possible
impact on managerial attitudes.
Finally, the analysis of the garnered data consisted of four
segments: tabulations for each item, the calculation of percent-
ages, the determination of the mean (or average) as the best
measure of central tendency among almost all of the responses,
and the use of the highest correlation, if any, found between
organizational and demographic variables (Pearson's r).18
C. Principal Findings:
The principal findings of this study gravitate around the
six organizational variables of consolidation, specialization, dis-
cipline, congestion, leadership, and ideology which the 14 ques-
tions examine.
However, before presenting these findings, it is necessary to
review the background data for the respondents in this court
4 .1
in order to more thoroughly understand the results of this
study.50
The following 10 demographic items furnish a composite
picture of this institution and reveal a considerable degree of
background uniformity among the interviewed judges. This
uniformity is noteworthy because it implies that they have
46 F. KERLINGER, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 47 (1964).
47 See App. 4 infra.
48 The correlations were made by Standard Program Library No. 40 (SPL
40), a program on correlations and factor analysis assembled by the
Computer Center of San Diego State College. For two excellent sources
on correlations see H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 289 (1960) L. FREE-
MAN, ELEMENTARY APPLIED STAIISTICS FOR STUDENTS IN BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 89-102 (1965).
"Pearson's r" is a shorthand for Karl Pearson's product moment
correlation. Its function is to discover interaction between two variables
which are measured in different units. The Pearson r range is from
-1.0 to +1.0, with negative readings indicating low correlation, positive
readings indicating higher correlation, and readings in excess of +.20 or
+.25 considered significantly correlated.
491 See App. 4 infra.
54 K. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES' HANDBOOK 314, 357-58, 361,
379, 429, 439, 443-44, 449, 457-58, 498, 544, 569, 574, 598-99, 603-04, 609;
id. at 75-76, 222 (Supp. 1969).
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reached approximately the same level of managerial conscious-
ness. First, although their ages range from 44 years to 69, the
largest category of interviewees (seven) fall in the age bracket
of 56 to 60, with 56 as the mean. Second, most respondents (75
percent) are natives of states other than California and thus
have migrated to the region. Third, a majority of interviewees
(60 percent) failed to divulge their religious affiliation, if any.
Of those persons who made this disclosure, Protestantism was
the leading preference. Fourth, all members of this bench are
white. Fifth, most respondents (80 percent) received their legal
education from schools within California. Sixth, although the
years that these persons became attorneys ranged from 1924 to
1954, the largest portion (nine) attained this position between
1946 and 1950 with 1943 as the mean year. Seventh, all the judges
reached their present occupation through one of three career
routes: private practice (50 percent), prosecutional work (30
percent), and previous judicial service, especially in a San Diego
area municipal court (20 percent). Eighth, although the years
during which these incumbents were appointed to this bench
varied from 1947 to 1970, a large proportion of the appointments
(11) were made from 1958 to 1966 (the tenure of California
Governor Edmund G. Brown) with 1963 as the mean year. Ninth,
among these interviewees there was virtually no lineage of
judicial or other public service.' Finally, although the party
identification of the respondents was evenly divided between
Democrats and Republicans at the time of this research, the
composition of this court has tilted decisively in favor of the
Republicans with the re-election of Governor Ronald Reagan in
1970 and the expansion in the number of judgeships from 25
to 28.52
1. Court Consolidation
The first managerial variable centers on judicial consolida-
tion, the merger of all trial courts within a particular area into
a single organization empowered with exclusive, comprehen-
sive, and original jurisdiction which is placed under the super-
vision of one official whose main task is the matching of case-
There was one exception whose father was a prominent San Diego
attorney for many years. See L. STANFORD, FOOTPRINTS OF JUSTICE IN
SAN DIEGO AND PROFILES OF SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE BENCH AND BAR
84, 142-43 (1959).
.,See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFOPNIA, 1972 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT
(1972); Reagan, supra note 42; Reagan Names Harelson To Superior
Court, San Diego Union, Aug. 26. 1970, § B, at 1; Reagan Names Leedy
to Superior Court. San Diego Union, June 17, 1970, § B, at 1; Reagan
Names San Diegans to Judgeship, San Diego Evening Tribune, Mar. 6,
1972, § A, at 2; Reagan Names Two Judges to Bench Here, San Diego
Union, Dec. 16, 1971, § B, at 6.
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load requirements with the efficient deployment of judges.5"
This variable merited primary attention not only because the
mere knowledge of its meaning implies a high level of mana-
gerial consciousness but also because such a change may be
imminent in this state mainly as a result of the worsening con-
gestion in these agencies. 4 The Judicial Council of California
(a staff agency of the state supreme court which loosely super-
vises the California courts)55 may soon recommend to the state
legislature that the municipal and justice courts (the lower
courts) in each of the 58 counties of California be combined
into single tribunals with corresponding jurisdiction.56 Although
this partial consolidation is likely, the central issue may focus
on the desirability of extending such consolidation to the su-
perior courts.
57
In brief, three plans will probably receive attention from
the Judicial Council and the state legislature. The least drastic
proposal would merge the lower courts into county courts and
retain the superior courts. Both courts would feature direction
by a single chief judge as well as centralized administrative serv-
ices (such as security forces, reporters, and secretaries). A
second plan reaches further by merging all trial courts into
a single entity with two kinds of personnel: superior court
judges and associate superior court judges. The associate super-
ior court judges would consist of the present municipal and
justice court officials. The new organization would also offer
unified supervision and managerial services. A third plan,
which in the recent past has garnered much legislative support,
is the most drastic because it would combine all trial courts
into one organization with a single chief judge and with central-
ized administrative services.
58
In this political atmosphere, it was expected that the judges
of the San Diego County Superior Court would be overwhelm-
ingly critical of consolidation plans, regardless of their specific
content. This supposition rested on three bases: the attitudes
that other sources had found in their impressionistic encounters
5 3 
UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 7, 16, 60-61.
54 LowER CouRT STmY at 50, 69-72; UNIFIED TRIAL CoUr STUDY at 45-47.
55 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (a).
56 Judicial Council Seeks to Reduce Court Congestion, Develop Uniform
System of Judicial Administration, 11 CAL. J. 337-38, 347 (1971).
5 7 UNFE TRIAL COURT STUDY at 53.
58 UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 49-52.
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with these officials," ' the reluctance of these presently higher-
court officials to handle the spate of typical municipal and
justice court business (minor criminal and civil cases), 6° and
a threat to the status of these judges who tended to view the
lower courts as a training ground for judges wanting to advance
to a superior court position.1 However, when these respondents
were asked about their attitude toward judicial consolidation
(Question 1), the opposition to this idea only slightly exceeded
the approval of it.
62
At least four factors may account for this result. First,
since the understanding of consolidation presumes a high degree
of managerial consciousness, a substantial minority of judges
may have attained such a degree of consciousness that they
perceive its necessity for reducing criminal and civil case de-
lay, for lowering expenses, and for achieving greater efficiency.
A second possibility is a resignation to its inevitability in Cali-
fornia. A third reason may be that some judges feel confident
about dominating the operational patterns in a unified trial
court apparatus. A fourth consideration is the impact of demo-
graphic variables, especially the year of an interviewee's admis-
sion to practice and his age, since the tendency among judges
to favor trial court consolidation in California varies directly
with these two characteristics. The correlations between the
answers to this question and these two characteristics are 0.52
and 0.49, respectively.
2. Judicial Specialization
The second managerial variable focuses on specialization
and consists of two facets: a division of labor and a compart-
mentalization of tasks."I To measure both aspects of this variable,
this study used a pair of questions. One question centered on
the first kind of specialization, the tendency of a judge to hear
certain types of cases for an indefinite time. When asked how
often judges should be shifted from one section of this court
59) See the consolidated measures that California Assemblyman James A.
Hayes (R. Long Beach) has made repeatedly which parallel the third
plan described in this article. Cal. Assembly Const. Amend. No. 20
(intro. Jan. 20, 1972); Cal. A.B. 159 (intro. Jan. 20, 1972); Cal. A.B. 1400
(intro. Mar. 30, 1971); Cal. A.B. 2397 (intro. Apr. 3, 1970). See also
Cal. Senate Const. Amend. No. 57 (intro. Mar. 16, 1972) by Alfred H.
Song (D. 28th Dist.).
"o UNIFIED TRIAL COUier STUDY at 53; Judiciary Consolidation Opposed, San
Diego Union, Sepot. 9, 1971, § A, at 4.
61 UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 53.
62 See App. 3, Question 1 [hereinafter, all references to questions will
refer to App. 3].
63 W. BENNIS, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 4 (1970); MANAGING THE CouRTs at
27, 157-58; M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND EcONOMIc ORGANIZA-
TION 225-28, 261 (A. Henderson, T. Parsons transl. 1947).
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to another (Question 2), the judges revealed a deep fissure in
their opinions. One-half of the respondents said that they should
be rotated among the four segments of this court (civil, criminal,
conciliational, and juvenile) every 10-to-12 months. Implicit in
this finding are the beliefs that each judge should complete a
rotational cycle among the divisions of this court within a 4-year
period and that this duration is the minimum span necessary
for a judge to become conversant with the administrative prob-
lems of this organization. However, nearly as many judges (40
percent) failed to respond to this item. At least two factors
may explain this dichotomy. One is a discrepancy in the man-
agerial consciousness attained by these two groups of inter-
viewees. The first group, which opted for rotation, may evidence
this awareness because of the intermediate time period that
they chose: long enough to permit a judge to understand the
operational difficulties in each division but not so lengthy as
to encourage boredom, stagnation, and myopia. The other group,
which failed to respond to this question, may not have attained
such a level of managerial consciousness. A second factor in
explaining this dichotomy is party identification because the
tendency to favor certain rotational time periods tended to vary
directly with this demographic attribute. Generally, Demo-
cratic appointees inclined toward a fixed duration whereas Re-
publicans preferred a noncommittal attitude. The correlation
between the answers to this question and partisan affiliation
was 0.41.
The second item on specialization (Question 6) centers on
a delineation of basic tasks. When asked about the desirability
of establishing another section (a sentencing division) to com-
plement the other four sections of this court, the mean response
(3.3) was one of uncertainty or mild opposition at most. Such
an overall answer may divulge a high degree of managerial con-
sciousness for three possible reasons. First, these judges may be
reluctant to delegate a long-standing prerogative: the power to
sentence. Second, they may believe that the creation of such a
division may exert only a marginal pressure for reducing delay
because a change may signify merely a redistribution of the
same caseload. Third, since 80 percent of the interviewees re-
plied to this query, it may validly be concluded that they re-
garded themselves as possessing sufficient administrative knowl-
edge to comment on this subject. Finally, it should be noted
that the tendency to favor the establishment of such a section




The third organizational variable explores the forms of
intra-organizational discipline that a judge may receive from
his peers, especially a transfer from one section of this court
to another. When the reasons for such shifts were sought
(Question 3), most respondents claimed that this kind of change
usually occurs for one of the following reasons: mounting con-
gestion in another division, a personal preference to handle other
types of litigation, or a reaction to overwork. All these professed
reasons are nondisciplinary. Stated another way, these inter-
viewees asserted that a judge in this court would seldom, if ever,
be disciplined by this method even if he were involved in one
or more of the following situations: excessive awards in civil
bench trials, inordinate fining, excessive sentencing, insufficient
awards in civil bench cases, lenient sentencing, local bar asso-
ciation opposition to a judge's decisions, partiality to defendants,
a bias toward plaintiffs, too many decisions unpopular with fel-
low judges, an excessive number of decisions opposed by the
presiding judge, numerous decisions resulting in public indig-
nation, and too many decisions leading to criticism from other
public officials. Unlike the conclusions for the first two man-
agerial variables, the results for this one suggest the first limit
concerning the extent of managerial consciousness developed
by these judges. At least four considerations point toward such
a finding. First, in a consolidated trial court apparatus, one
function of a chief judge would be to define the precise circum-
stances that would govern the application of this informal sanc-
tion. Second, they may be satisfied that the use of peremptory
challenges by litigants constitutes adequate discipline for way-
ward judges.6 4 Third, the average percentage of respondents to
this series of items (78.5 percent) is slightly lower than the
corresponding items for the first variable (consolidation) and
part of the second variable (specialization). Finally, the average
correlation between a disposition toward practices invoking this
sanction and the year of one's appointment to this bench is high
enough (0.51) to intimate that newer members of this organi-
zation tend to favor more discipline over judicial conduct than
do judges with more seniority.
4. Delay
The fourth managerial variable probes the criminal and
civil case delay in this organization. Because this difficulty is
the foremost administrative problem facing this court, the ques-
6 4
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 170.1-.7 (West Supp. 1972).
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tionnaire includes four questions (4, 5, 8, and 10) to examine
this characteristic.
Question 4 asks the respondents to rate 24 proposed remedies
for delay according to their surmised efficacy in alleviating this
trouble.6 5 These proposed remedies fall into two basic categories:
fundamental and accelerative. The fundamental denotes man-
agerial changes that attempt to reduce the flow of certain cases
(inputs) into this court whereas the accelerative category tries
to speed the flow of cases through this bureaucracy by altering
administrative procedures, i.e., a quicker conversion of inputs
into outputs (see figure 2).
Seven of the suggested remedies in Question 4 explore in-
puts of three kinds: case, legal, and managerial. The first of
these inputs centers on criminal and civil litigation; the second,
on law affecting the types of cases entering this court; and
the third, on the personnel needed to operate this organization
efficiently. One of the seven remedies delved into case inputs
by seeking the judges' attitudes toward automobile accident
compensation plans that emulate workmen's compensation. The
mean response (3.0) was one of uncertainty probably because
this item amounts to a proposal for change from the tort sys-
tem to what are commonly called no-fault automobile insurance
programs. Two of the seven remedies inquire about legal inputs:
the abolition of jury trials generally and the elimination of
such trials in personal injury cases. The average responses (3.4
and 3.1, respectively) approximated uncertainty most likely
because these two items invoke far-reaching changes. The re-
maining four remedies of the seven consider managerial in-
puts: more court days, more judges, night court sessions, and
the greater use of auditors or referees to assist judges. Although
the mean responses to these items (4.4, 3.0, 3.3, and 2.9, respec-
tively), denote uncertainty, except for strong opposition to ad-
ditional court days, this indecision may stem from a suspicion
that these inputs will exert only a marginal influence on the
delay problem in this court.
Another 10 remedies of Question 4 examine acceleration of
the judicial process, i.e., accelerating conversion of system inputs
into system outputs. When ranged on a continuum from most
favorable to most hostile of four categories, the average re-
sponses of these judges to the items rank as follows: [1] more
65 The numbers in parentheses throughout this section represent the means
of the numbered evaluations in App. 3, Question 4. Questions were
derived from H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 51-52, 85, 89, 98-99, 108, 119, 124,
128. 140, 151, 154, 166-67, 174, 180, 193, 198, 202, 209.
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use of devices to increase settlements, i.e., certificates of readi-
ness to put cases on the court calendar (1.7), the greater use
of impartial medical witnesses in civil cases (2.0), additional
pretrial conferences (2.6), and payment of interest by losing
parties to cover the delay from answer to verdict (3.9); [2] the
adoption of split-trial procedures, i.e., separating liability and
damage proceedings (1.9); [3] the acceleration of jury trials by
the increased use of four devices, i.e., a judge's curbing of what
he considers repetitive testimony (2.2), judicial participation in
the examination of witnesses (2.4), a judge's assuming more
rigorous charge of trials (2.5), and a judge's discouragement of
what he regards as perfunctory objections (2.7); and [4] the
more stringent supervision of judges by the presiding judge
(2.9). These first 10 acceleration remedies were generally ap-
proved perhaps because they center on what judges may do
through their individual efforts to mitigate delay and because
these proposed changes may be fairly easy to implement.
However, the respondents professed uncertainty about the
efficacy of three other conversion acceleration remedies: the
use of inducements to spur more jury trial waivers, particularly
the substitution of a comparative rather than a contributory
negligence rule in exchange for such a waiver (3.0); a reduction
of trial-scheduling gaps by changing from a calendar system to
an assignment system (3.1); and clearing the docket of cases
unready for trial at their initially scheduled time (3.3). For
these remedies the uncertain responses may have resulted from
the inability of these judges to foresee what impact these
suggestions, if effected, might have on reducing delay in this
organization.
Three other suggested remedies attracted unfavorable mean
responses among these judges: the compulsory arbitration of
small claims (3.9), an enlarged trial bar (4.1), and the use of
a level court calendar- a more equitable distribution of court
congestion by the disposition of older cases first (4.3). This op-
position probably reflects doubts about the effectiveness of
these proposed remedies in alleviating such delay.
The last remedy of Question 4 centers on the interviewee's
attitudes toward weekly public disclosures of the caseload han-
dled by each judge. One item sufficed to cover this area since
decisions constitute the principal judicial output. The average
response was one of uncertainty (3.3), a surprising conclusion
because the judges could have been expected to oppose such
reports, which might be later used against them, especially
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during re-election. These judges may simply have been unable
to forecast what pressure such reports would exert on judges
to speed their work.
Finally, although the answers given for this collection of
24 possible remedies for delay uncover a considerable degree of
managerial consciousness, its extent is not nearly as high as
it was for the first three organizational variables of consolida-
tion, specialization, and discipline. Two considerations support
the conclusion that this question discloses a second limit in
these judges' development of managerial consciousness. First,
an average of only 71.5 percent of the respondents answered
this question on delay-the lowest percentage of responses
except for the replies to the second part of the consolidation
variable. Second, the replies to these items did not correlate
strongly with any of the demographic variables, with the pos-
sible exception of the year of a judge's appointment to the bench
whose mean correlation with this group of queries was 0.36.
Unlike Question 4, which centers on judicial attitudes to-
ward suggested devices for influencing the inputs, conversion
process, and output of the court, Queston 5 focuses on judicial
perceptions of delay in the middle (conversion or adjudicating)
process, especially that caused by attorneys. The judges were
asked about their views concerning what impact, if any, six
types of counsel may have on the court time devoted to cases.
The types of attorneys considered were client-paid attorneys,
group-paid lawyers, out-of-town attorneys, county-salaried pub-
lic defenders, counsel from the Legal Aid Society and similar
organizations, and assigned counsel.6 6 The mean response among
the judges indicated that client-paid attorneys tended to hasten
judicial proceedings (2.5); that the next four types exerted an
uncertain impact on the case flow (3.0, 3.3, 3.3, and 3.6, respec-
tively), but that assigned counsel tended to impede the con-
version process (3.9). Based upon this data, two factors suggest
the third limit in the interviewee's managerial consciousness.
First, although 76.5 percent of the judges replied to this series
of items, the high incidence of uncertain responses implies that
the administrative distinctions requested were too subtle for
them to make intelligently. Second, there were no important
correlations between the answers to these items and background
variables.
Question 8, the third question centering on the delay vari-
able, is a continuation of Question 5. Of the eight items in this
66 B. CooK, TBE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA 81-87 (1967).
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question (all of which explore the conversion or adjudicating
process), three (37.5 percent) were viewed by the respondents
as serious causes of delay: the nonavailability of witnesses at
trials (1.3), too many requests for continuances by the defense
(1.4), and an excessive number of motions by the defense (1.5).
The average reply for the remaining five items reflected the
attitude that these items constituted minor causes of delay in
this court: excessive requests for continuances by plaintiffs
(1.7), too many prosecutional motions (2.0), an inordinate num-
ber of defense objections (2.0), a plethora of objections by the
prosecution (2.0), and too many prosecutions (2.0).
The answers to this question imply a fourth limit on the
degree of managerial consciousness validly attributable to these
judges. This evaluation rests on the following considerations.
First, although the respondents tend to ascribe delay more to
the behavior of the defense than to the prosecution in criminal
or plaintiff in civil cases, this preference is marginal because
they have not generally reached a level of awareness that en-
ables them to make the sensitive judgments required by these
items. Second, the mean number of answers to this series of
queries amounted to 66 percent- the lowest level for the ques-
tions considered so far. Third, the answers to these items failed
to correlate strongly with any of the demographic variables
with the possible exception of the year of a judge's appointment
to the bench (0.39).
Question 10, the last one relating to the delay variable,
focuses on a case input item because it probes the judges' per-
ceptions as to whether the change of some felonies into mis-
demeanors (a recent alteration in the state penal code)
67 sig-
nificantly reduced the workload in this court. In answering this
question, the interviewees divided evenly in estimating the
impact of this measure on the extent of delay in this organiza-
tion. Like the previous question, number 8, this question sug-
gests a fifth limit on the development of managerial awareness
in the respondents. Two reasons largely account for this con-
clusion. First, 40 percent of the judges- the largest number
so far--expressed uncertainty on this item. Second, the ten-
dency toward indecision correlated highly with the increased
age of the interviewee (0.56).
5. Leadership
This fifth organizational variable also contains four ques-
tions (7, 11, 13, and 14). This attribute merits as much attention
67 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (5) (West Supp. 1972).
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as the delay variable because competent judicial leadership
is a sine qua non for alleviating the trial court delay. Such
leadership entails the efficient management of eight other tasks
besides delay: the court calendar (or case assignment process),
data processing, finances, juries and witnesses, personnel, plan-
ning, public relations, and space.68 All questions germane to this
variation (except for Question 13) center on the main judicial
executive in this organization, the presiding judge.
Question 7 seeks the interviewee's attitudes toward the best
method for the selection of a presiding judge. The respondents
unanimously favored the choice of this administrator by secret
ballot, a continuation of the present mode. Obversely, no one
favored the other two enumerated methods, appointment of
this official by the Judicial Council of California6 9 or by senior-
ity. Nor did these respondents avail themselves of the oppor-
tunity to volunteer any other method. The replies to this ques-
tion suggest a considerable degree of managerial awareness to-
ward the salience of this variable. Two pieces of information
buttress this finding. First, 90 percent of the judges answered
this question. Second, the correlation of the responses to this
item with the demographic characteristics was zero.
Question 11 seeks to ascertain the judges' views about the
optimal tenure for this manager, the presiding judge. At pres-
ent, although this official is elected by his peers for a 1-year
term, 70 he is customarily re-elected for a second year because,
as one judge commented, he needs approximately 1 year to
learn the many facets of his role. Again, all the interviewees
favored a de facto 2-year term for the presiding judge. Stated
another way, no one favored an extension of this official's
tenure to cover 3 or more years. Such a lengthened term might
be a means to augment leadership skills, but the price for this
change might be a diminution of his accountability to his peers.
Furthermore, no one favored a tenure of less than 2 years,
although that period would increase the peer accountability at
the expense of reducing leadership skills. Finally, although the
100 percent response rate and the zero correlation between the
answers to this query and the background attributes imply a
high level of managerial consciousness, it is possible to be
skeptical because a far longer term may be essential for this
68H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 81-82, 139 (1965); D. SAART, MODEMN
COURT MANAGEMENT: TRENDS IN THE ROLE OF THE COURT ExEcuTIvE 3-10
(1970).
69 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1(a).
70 CAL. RU.ES OF COURT 252-55 (West 1970).
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judicial leader to acquire expertise. An indefinite appointment
by his peers or by the judicial council may be the eventual
device to promote such skill, especially in a consolidated trial
court apparatus.
71
Question 14 tries to discover what the interviewees regarded
as the most significant managerial abilities needed to fulfill
the role of presiding judge. The judges who answered this
question believed that the presiding judge should exhibit two
principal qualities: the ability to organize the workload of this
court and considerable seniority. However, this query uncovered
the sixth and final limit in the development of managerial
consciousness among these respondents because only half of
the interviewees (the lowest response rate so far) completed
this item and because the more recent appointees tended to
check the listed attributes rather than leave this question blank.
The correlation between a reply to this query and the year of
a judge's appointment to this bench was mildly positive (0.32).
Question 13, the last question focusing on the leadership
variable, shifts emphasis from the selection, tenure, and man-
agerial traits of the presiding judge to a typology of the serious
and minor administrative problems facing this official. This
query consists of 20 managerial items culled from two noted
sources. 7 " On a mean basis, the respondents viewed only the
task of case scheduling as critical (1.4). They perceived 13
other functions as significant: the assignment of judges (1.6),
the maintenance of courtroom security (1.6), the continuation
of rapport with fellow judges (1.8), evaluating practices and
procedures (1.8), the keeping of good relations with the court
staff (1.9), satisfactory public relations (1.9), the establishment
and organization of divisions, departments, or districts (2.1), the
setting up of court committees (2.2), the assessment of judicial
competence (2.3), the facilitation of intra-organizational com-
munications (2.4), the expansion of courtroom space (2.4), the
garnering of appropriations (2.4), and the use of computers
(2.4). Among the minor tasks perceived to be confronting the
presiding judge are the remaining six: the maintenance of
court records (2.5), the measurement of judicial output (2.5),
the training of a court staff (2.5), budgeting (2.6), the recruit-
ment of staff members (2.8), and the disciplining of judges (2.9).
The answers to this group of items reveal much administrative
consciousness among the respondents because 78 percent of
71 LowER CoURT STUDY at 72-76; UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY 93-99.
72 See sources cited note 68 supra.
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them, on the average, replied and because their inclination to
answer varied directly with the year of their appointment to
this bench (0.62).
6. Political Ideology
The sixth organizational variable centers on political ide-
ology, which is germane to a consideration of managerial con-
sciousness because extreme political beliefs may interfere with
unbiased development of managerial consciousness. To analyze
this variable, two questions (9 and 12), each of which contains
numerous components, were employed. Question 9 asked wheth-
er, in these judges' views, the ethnic composition of the federal
and state courts should be generally proportionate to the racial
composition of the jurisdictional area. This question consisted
of nine court types: the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Courts of Appeal, the United States District Courts, the
California Supreme Court, the California District Courts of
Appeal, the superior courts in the state generally, the superior
court of San Diego County, the municipal courts in the state gen-
erally, and the Municipal Court for the San Diego Judicial Dis-
trict. For all the judicial organizations listed, the average re-
sponses for each item tended toward political moderation as evi-
denced by the answers which varied within a narrow range from
favorable to uncertain. Such middle-of-the-road views may rein-
force the respondents' managerial consciousness by encouraging
a pragmatic or technical outlook toward administrative problems
rather than a political one. Two considerations support this
assessment. First, 80 percent of the judges answered this ques-
tion. Second, the inclination of the respondents to sanction this
proposal varied directly with party affiliation (0.62) and age
(0.58) in that proponents of this idea tended to be Democrats
and young judges.
Question 12 represents a deeper probe into the impact of
political outlooks on the growth of managerial consciousness
among the interviewees. This query consists of 15 items to which
favorable answers connote a liberal orientation; uncertain re-
sponses, a moderate outlook; and unfavorable replies, a con-
servative perspective.7 3 Three items (20 percent) yielded mean
responses classifiable as liberal: a disposition to support claim-
ants in unemployment cases (1.7), an inclination to expand
the scope of the first amendment to the United States Consti-
tution (1.8), and a tendency to favor public employees in strike
73 Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 843 (1961).
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cases (1.8). Of the 12 remaining sections of this question, the
mean outlooks are near the middle of the response scale since
their proclivity to favor consumers in sales-of-goods cases aver-
ages 2.0; the labor union in management cases, 2.0; the em-
ployee in injury suits, 2.0; the state government in tax cases,
2.3; the injured person in motor vehicle accident cases, 2.3;
the tenant in landlord cases, 2.3; the wife in divorce cases, 2.3;
the finding of a constitutional violation in criminal cases, 2.5;
the support of college students in police cases, 2.6; the admin-
istrative agency in business regulation litigation, 2.8; the debtor
in a dispute with a creditor, 2.8; and the defense in criminal
cases, 2.8. This political moderation stems primarily from partisan
affiliation. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the
disposition toward more liberal answers correlates positively
(0.57) with Democratic Party membership. Much of this cen-
trism emanates from the Democratic judges who had been ap-
pointed by former California Governor Edmund G. Brown.
However, as his successor, Ronald Reagan, replaces resigning
Democratic appointees with Republicans 4 and as the size of
this organization increases,7 5 the ideological outlook of this court
may become much more conservative, although probably not
to such an extreme degree that the continued development of
managerial awareness in this court would be seriously impaired.
Finally, the finding of political centrism in this organization is
tentative because the mean response rate for these items was
only 56 percent of the judges. The low percentage probably
stems from the sensitive nature of this query.
CONCLUSION
Three noted court management scholars have commented
that "[T]he courts have not achieved the same measure of
success as other bureaucracies have in terms of efficiency or in
effectiveness in relating to clientele groups. ' '76 Increased mana-
gerial awareness among judges may foster such efficiency not
only in the Superior Court of San Diego County but also in
other state and federal trial courts. This article has sought to
devise a managerial-consciousness model in order to explain
how judicial organizations maintain themselves, particularly in
an urban trial court setting. This model consists of three propo-
sitions. First, such awareness grows from the convergence of
internal and external pressures on this bureaucracy. In the
74 See sources cited notes 42, 52 supra.
75 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 27.
7 6
MANAGING THE COURTS at 20.
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court examined in this article, the primary intrinsic force was
the mounting delay in the handling of criminal and civil cases.
The main extrinsic pressure was the increased likelihood of
consolidation which would place this organization and the
other trial courts in the state under centralized-and probably
more stringent - direction. Both forces have become typical of
what engenders managerial consciousness in other urban trial
courts. To measure such awareness, this study employed six
indicators: consolidation, specialization, discipline, delay, lead-
ership, and ideology. In brief, the mean response was opposi-
tion to consolidation tempered by resignation to its eventual
achievement. The judges favored a specialization of labor to
a greater extent than a division of tasks because the former
tends to encourage judicial expertise whereas the latter in-
creases the probability of stagnation. The interviewees gen-
erally opposed a tightening of discipline over judicial conduct,
a likelihood in a consolidated trial court apparatus. The re-
spondents tended to favor an accelerative rather than funda-
mental approach to the problem of alleviating delay in this
organization. Stated another way, they supported devices for
speeding the flow of litigation through this subsystem within
the justice process rather than seeking to curb some case in-
puts. Furthermore, the interviewees favored the perpetuation
of the current leadership mode, for they professed general satis-
faction with the selection and tenure of the presiding judge.
Finally, they subscribed to an ideology of political centrism,
which is consistent with the further development of managerial
consciousness.
Although their outlooks toward the three organizational vari-
ables of consolidation, specialization, and ideology facilitate the
continued maintenance of this trial court, their attitudes toward
the remaining three variables may inhibit their ability to reduce
delay and to adapt to a new judicial milieu, the consolidated
court. Impelled by rising congestion and the promise of sub-
stantial reductions in judicial operating expenses,77 trial court
consolidation in California may be completed by the year 1976.78
Accompanying such consolidation may be more rigorous disci-
pline on judicial behavior and a far more powerful court leader-
ship. Moreover, another concomitant may be a drastic approach
to eliminate delay. Such a thrust may cut off numerous case
inputs. Litigation centering on what are sometimes called vic-
UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 105-06.
7s See UNIFIED TRIAL COURT STUDY at 60, 68-73.
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timless crimes 79 (such as drunkenness, minor drug abuse, gam-
bling, vagrancy, abortions, and the sexual behavior of con-
senting adults) may be eradicated. Supplementing this approach
may be the greater use of plea-bargaining to expedite the flow
of the remaining criminal cases through this subsystem.80 Fur-
thermore, numerous civil suits involving personal injuries and
probate matters"' may be removed from judicial organizations
by what are commonly labeled as no-fault insurance programs 2
and by increased out-of-court settlements.
The second part of the managerial consciousness model sug-
gests that the acquired managerial consciousness results in sub-
stantial changes to alleviate problems. With respect to this study,
a heightened sense of managerial consciousness toward disci-
pline, delay, and leadership might have enabled the judges in
this court to exert more control over their internal and external
problems by formulating and publicizing their own proposals
for organizational changes to solve these problems. These pro-
posals would have helped this organization to co-opt extrinsic
pressures and to press its own ideas rather than to respond to
the projects of other agencies, such as the judicial council in
the state.
Finally, the third premise of the managerial-consciousness
model states that the changes, in correcting the present prob-
lems, create less serious troubles which can be solved as the
judges repeat this three-part process of the managerial-con-
sciousness model. Thus, a heightened sense of managerial con-
sciousness among trial court judges is a prerequisite for moving
a step closer to the attainment of a more efficient judicial sub-
system within the justice funnel (see figures 1 and 2). It is
hoped this type of efficiency will result in a heightened sense
of managerial consciousness that will allow the approximation
of a goal recently stated by President Nixon:
The ultimate goal of changing the process of justice is not
to put more people in jail or merely to provide a faster flow of
litigation, it is to resolve conflict speedily but fairly, to reverse
the trend toward crime and violence, to reinstill a respect for
law in all our people.8 3
7'1N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 2-24 (1970).
S," See sources cited note 23 supra.
81 A Remark by Hon. W. Craig Biddle, a member of the California Assem-
bly (R. Riverside County) as a participant in the Court Reform
Panel at the California Conference of the American Society for Public
Administration in San Diego, Cal., Feb. 19, 1972.
S2 Illinois No-Fault Law Invalidation Upheld, L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1972,
§ 1, at 17; State Bar Propose Modified No-Fault Insurance, L.A. Times,
Mar. 1, 1972, § 1, at 3.




Organizational Variables: Mixed Question Numbers:
1. Consolidation: #1
2. Specialization: #2, #6
3. Discipline: #3
4. Delay: #4, #5, #8, #10
5. Leadership: #7, #11, #13, #14
6. Ideology: #9, #12
APPENDIX 2
COVER LETTER
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND URBAN STUDIES
SAN DIEGO STATE COLLEGE
Dear Judge .................................. .:
As an associate professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies at
San Diego State College, I have had a deep professional interest in judicial
management, especially at the trial-court level. Three years ago I explored
the managerial problems facing the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
Now I need your assistance to examine the management operations of the
Superior Court of San Diego County. Therefore, I would be most apprecia-
tive if you would please complete the accompanying questionnaires before
your interviews with my research assistants (Mr. Marshall Bear, Mrs.
Romney Cohen, and Mrs. June Kaiser) and me. Thank you.
Most respectfully,
James A. Gazell, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Public
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DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
1. N am e: ..............................







3. Birthplace: 15 (Outside California: 75.0%) 5 (In California: 25.0%)




5. Race: 20 (Caucasian: 100.0%)
6. Law School Attended: 2 16 (In California: 80.0%);
2 4 (Outside California: 20.0%);
(U.S.C.: 20.0%);20 4(Balboa, later California Western: 20.0%);
(Miscellaneous: 35.0%)









8. Previous Public Offices Held Before Becoming a Superior
Court Judge:
Private Sector:
Private Practice 11 (55.0%)
Public Sector:
1. Municipal Court 3 (15.0%)
2. Prosecutor 3 (15.0%)
3. City Attorney 2 (10.0%)
4. State Elective Office 1 (5.0%)
Total: 20 (100.0%)
9. Year Appointed to This Bench: Mean: 1963; Range: 1947-1970
Before 1953 (Appointees of Governor Earl Warren) 1 (5.0%)
1953-1958 (Appointees of Gov. Goodwin Knight) 2 (10.0%)
1959-1966 (Appointees of Gov. Edmund G. Brown) 11 (55.0%)
1967-1970 (Appointees of Gov. Ronald Reagan) 6 (30.0%)
Total: 20 (100.0%)
Supplement:
1971 (Appointees of Gov. Ronald Reagan) 3
1972 (Appointees of Gov. Ronald Reagan) 2
Total: 5
(All together: 11) i.e., 6 ± 5
10. Names of Ancestors Who Served as Judges or in other Public
or Private Positions in San Diego County:
19 (None: 95.0%); 1 (5.0%)
528
11. Political Party Af
Optional Signature:
Date:




Supplement (1972) 10 (Democrats: 37.0%);
17 (Republicans: 63.0%)
All..in..Se...embe..-October...........................1971............All in September-October 1971
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
T HIS note endeavors to define the phrase "doing business"
as it applies to foreign corporations with contacts in Colo-
rado. Depending on how much activity is involved, an out-of-
state corporation may be subjected to three possible liabilities:
the jurisdiction of local courts, qualification with local stand-
ards, and taxation by the state government. Since each liability
requires a different degree of activity, it is possible to be
"doing business" for service of process purposes and yet avoid
the restrictions of qualification and taxation.
To determine the liabilities of a foreign corporation in
Colorado it is necessary to analyze individually these three
areas on a factual basis. Although the statutory guidelines
are considered in each section, their tendency to be general
and overly broad necessitates a concentration on case ma-
terials. Because the facts are of extreme importance in a
determination of "doing business," it is presumptuous, if not
impossible, to formulate a precise, consistent definition of the
term. Nevertheless, an analysis of what the Colorado courts
historically have considered to be significant contacts will
narrow the possible interpretations of the phrase.
The section on service of process has been subdivided
into tort and contract to reflect a distinction necessitated by
the 1965 long arm statute. The introduction of the "tortious
act" test by this statute has expanded Colorado's jurisdiction
to reach out-of-state manufacturers and has created a new
standard of liability. Qualification for "doing business" in-
volves procedural as well as substantive considerations due to
the doctrine of abatement. Taxation must be dissected into
sales and use, income, and franchise taxes to appreciate the
individual complexity of each. In contrast to the qualification
issue, the taxation of foreign corporations possesses great po-
tential for expansion in Colorado.
Overriding the statutory and case law of Colorado are the
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constitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme
Court. For service of process, "minimum contacts" is the gen-
eral standard which must be met. Qualification and taxation
are limited by the "undue burden on interstate commerce"
test which prohibits unrestricted regulation and taxation of
foreign corporations. This note will show that several Colo-
rado statutes exceed these limitations, especially in the area
of taxation.
I. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A. Constitutional Premise
In questions of service of process and jurisdiction, there
are two requirements which must be met to satisfy due process
of law: actual notice and minimum contacts. The modern "no-
tice" test has evolved from the case of Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co.' in which the Supreme Court held mere
publication to be unsatisfactory by stating that "It]he notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance . . 2
The "minimum contacts" test is more difficult to charac-
terize because of the varying application and interpretation
given it by the courts. The leading case, which introduced the
theory of "contacts" as opposed to "presence," is International
Shoe Co. v. Washington3 in which the Supreme Court held that
to subject a person, corporate or otherwise, to in personam
jurisdiction it must be proven that the party has "certain mini-
mum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' ,,4 This basic holding was supplemented by
a "systematic and continuous" test for the contacts5 and a recog-
nition that the "quality and nature of the activity" would be as
carefully considered as the quantity of the activity.6
The greatest extension of the "minimum contacts" test
appeared in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.7 which
maintained that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State."s This expansive holding was
1 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2 Id. at 314.
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 Id. at 316.
5 Id. at 320.
6 Id. at 319.
7 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
s Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
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quickly restricted in Hanson v. DencklaO which narrowed the
definition of the "quality" of a contact by holding that "it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws."10
B. Colorado Statutory Law
1. Notice
Colorado's service of process statutes for unqualified cor-
porations have had a turbulent history. Because the purpose
of this note is to determine the law as it exists today, it is
sufficient to note that in 1964 the then-current foreign cor-
poration service statutes were challenged and found to be un-
constitutional for failing to satisfy the due process test of
proper notice.'1 Under those statutes, "notice" consisted of
informing the Secretary of State, who then forwarded the
process by mail to the last known address of the foreign
corporation. Notice was deemed complete when the process
was mailed. Obviously, this method failed to meet the Mullane
requirements of "reasonable to convey" and "reasonable time."
Currently, there are two statutes of importance in this area.
The first is section 31-9-19(3) (a), the statute for service of
process on unqualified foreign corporations.1 2 Service may be
personal or by registered or certified mail. If by mail, notice
will not be complete until:
[F]iling with the clerk of the court from which such process is-
sued of the corporation's return receipt or, in the event the corpo-
ration refuses to accept such registered or certified mail, upon
the filing of such mail with the corporation's refusal to accept
indicated thereon .... 13
Thus, the burden of ensuring satisfactory notice has been
shifted from the Secretary of State to the party bringing suit.
The second important Colorado statute is section 37-1-26, the
long arm statute of 1965.14 Service under this statute must be
9 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
10 Id. at 253 (emphasis added). For a general discussion of service of
process on foreign corporations see Note, Developments in the Law -
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960) and Note, Jurisdic-
tion over a Foreign Corporation, 19 S.C.L. REV. 806 (1967).
11 See Clemens v. District Court, 154 Colo. 176, 390 P.2d 83 (1964) (hold-
ing Co.o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-8 (Supp. 1961) unconstitutional);
Leach v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 231 F. Supp. 157 (D. Colo. 1964)
(holding COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-35-19(3) (Supp. 1960) unconsti-
tutional).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-19(3) (a) (Supp. 1965). Subsections (1)
and (2) deal with qualified corporations.
13 Id.
14 Id. §§ 37-1-26 to -27.
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personal- not by mail. The importance of this distinction will
be discussed later.
2. Minimum Contacts
The second issue, minimum contacts, appears in sections
31-9-19 and 37-1-26. The test common to both laws is "trans-
acting business." For this note, it is most important to consider
section 37-1-26 which subjects any person "whether or not a
resident of the state of Colorado . .. to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state, concerning any cause of action arising from:
(b) The transaction of any business within the state; (c) The
commission of a tortious act within this state . . .
The legal problem in interpreting these statutes centers
on the determination of what constitutes "transacting busi-
ness."1 6 For each state this phrase has different connotations.
Perhaps the most cautious assessment of this phrase was made
by the Colorado Supreme Court:
[T]he one rule which permeates all of the decisions, in which the
question as to whether a foreign corporation is doing business in
a state other than that in which it was chartered, is that each
case depends upon its own facts.1
7
With this premise in mind, the analysis which follows will
examine the facts of various cases in an attempt to ascertain
the characteristic factors which influence the courts. The dis-
cussion is separated into tort and contract because of the cre-
ation in section 37-1-26 of a new test for tort actions involving
foreign corporations.
C. Colorado Case Law
1. Tort
In tort, the 1965 long arm statute's "tortious act" test ex-
panded the state's potential jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. Prior to this act, it was necessary to establish "minimum
contacts" through a "transacting business" analysis in order
to subject a foreign corporate manufacturer to Colorado juris-
diction. Today, in a tort situation, "transacting business" need
151d. §§ 37-1-26(1) (a)-(c). Sections (d) and (e) subject to jurisdic-
tion any person who owns real property in the state or insures persons
or property in the state. See Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D.
Colo. 1966) holding this statute constitutional. For parallel references
to the statute's model, see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1969).
16 Although some writers have made an academic distinction between the
meaning of "transacting business" and "doing business," this author
will treat them synonymously because the courts, regardless of any
possible legislative intent, interpret these phrases identically.
17 Colorado Builder's Supply Co. v. Hinman Bros. Constr. Co., 134 Colo
383, 389, 304 P.2d 892, 895 (1956) (emphasis added).
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only supplement the tortious act and possibly need not be
proven at all.
a. Prior to the 1965 Act
A leading example of the Colorado approach to tort cases
prior to the long arm statute is Focht v. Southwestern Sky-
ways, Inc.18 The injured plaintiff was attempting to join the
foreign corporate manufacturer (X) as a third party defendant
with the local seller (Y). The court, in analyzing the facts,
noted that X was a Kansas corporation whose business was
the production and sale of aircraft. X claimed to have no
control over Y, and pointed out that delivery of any order
made through Y was completed in Kansas. The aircraft was
then flown by Y from Kansas to Colorado. X argued that title
to the plane passed in Kansas, and there was no agency rela-
tionship binding X to Y nor connecting X to Colorado.
In a representative survey of the facts, the federal dis-
trict court analyzed the distributor agreement between X and
Y to determine X's contacts in Colorado and found:
1. Y was required to have all eight of X's models on hand.
2. Y was required to purchase and maintain sales promo-
tion supplies and participate in promotional efforts.
3. Y was required to follow X's ordering procedures and
to use X's forms.
4. All payment plans had to be approved by X.
5. Y was required to maintain service departments and
absorb the cost of X's warranties.
6. Y was required to purchase its tools from X.
7. X had an interest in the capital structure of Y.
8. Y's accounting system was prescribed by X and their
records were subject to review by X.
9. Reports were due from Y to X.
10. X had a factory school in Kansas where Y was "en-
couraged" to send at least one person per year.
It is impossible to discern which of these factors are most
important for determining "doing business." The point is simply
that the court will look to every possible relationship to assess
the substantiality of the contacts. But, as the court noted, "it
is not merely a matter of the frequency of the contacts, it is
also the extent of the control that a corporation exerts in a
state by means of devices such as the distributor agreement
18 220 F. Supp. 441 (D. Colo. 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964).
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. . . referred to"'19 which will determine the status of "doing
business." The court found an agency relationship, and con-
cluded that X could be subjected to service of process and in
personam jurisdiction in Colorado.2 0 The decision was based on
the quality as well as the quantity of the contacts.
b. After the 1965 Act
A case illustrative of the transition from "transacting busi-
ness" to "tortious act" is Lichina v. Futura, Inc.2 1 As in Focht,
this case involved an injury occurring within Colorado as the
result of a negligent act in manufacturing performed outside
the state. The plaintiff- attempting to utilize the new long
arm statute--argued that the "tortious act" arose within the
state. The federal district court, through a literal interpreta-
tion of the Act, held that the tortious act itself, i.e., the manu-
facturing, had to occur within the state for the plaintiff to
obtain jurisdiction over the foreign corporate manufacturer.
Being reluctant to fully implement the uninterpreted Act,
the federal court felt more comfortable with a "doing busi-
ness" analysis similar to that found in Focht. The court noted
that:
1. Salesmen of the foreign corporation had come to Colo-
rado.
2. Several sales were consummated in Colorado.
3. Several sales were sent f.o.b. Colorado.
4. The products (ski tows and lifts) were designed for
specific areas in Colorado.
5. After installation in the state, these instrumentalities
were inspected by the foreign corporation.
6. The foreign corporation took a chattel mortgage on
the lifts and tows and thereby kept a continuing interest in
the equipment.
The total effect of these contacts satisfied the court that,
under a Hanson v. Denckla analysis, the foreign corporation
was enjoying the benefits and protections of Colorado law. This,
when combined with the nature of the contact, one involving
the public safety due to the use of the equipment, compelled
the court to find that the corporation was "doing business"
in Colorado. In this fashion, they avoided the use of the new
"tortious act" provision.
19 Id. at443 (emphasis added).
20For other examples of the agency relationship for "doing business" for
tort see Jones v. Wood, 208 F. Supp. 750 (D. Colo. 1962) and White-
Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
21 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).
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"Doing business," like all conflict questions, must even-
tually be resolved by application of state law.22 Therefore, the
state courts' interpretations are of greatest significance. The
Colorado Supreme Court, when faced with a tort situation
similar to that found in Lichina, was not as reluctant as the
federal court to utilize the "tortioui act" provision of section
37-1-26(1) (c). In Vandermee v. District Court,23 the court di-
rectly confronted the question of whether the new act applied
to a nonresident corporation which designed and manufactured
an instrumentality outside of Colorado which, because of its
defective design, caused injury to a Colorado resident within
his state.
In analyzing section 37-1-26, the court found the intent of
the Colorado Legislature to be "the expansion of our court's
jurisdiction within constitutional limitations in order to provide
a local forum for Colorado residents who suffer damages in
Colorado as a result of tortious acts of non-residents." 24 The
court concluded that the "act" had its situs in Colorado where
the instrumentality failed and injured the plaintiff. The due
process limitation was considered to be satisfied because the
corporation manufactured its product with the intent to sell it
for ultimate use in another state. To secure their argument,
the court combined the "tortious act" test with a "minimum
contacts" analysis, finding that the corporation had "set up
channels of sales promotion and distribution in Colorado for
the purpose of selling its products in Colorado.
25
This liberal interpretation of the "tortious act" provision,
holding the place where the injury occurred to be the situs
of the "act," has been recently reaffirmed by the court in
Czarnick v. District Court.2 6 Here, the court followed the Illinois
precedent of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.,27 a case explicitly rejected by the federal court in
Lichina. The Gray case was viewed as persuasive precedent
since it interpreted the Illinois long arm statute which Colorado
used as its model. The supreme court in Czarnick referred to
the "ultimate use" test of Gray which had been used in Van-
dermee:
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its prod-
ucts for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it
22 Litvak Meat Co. v. Baker, 446 F.2d 329, 332 (10th Cir. 1971).
23 164 Colo. 117. 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
24 Id. at 121, 433 P.2d at 337.
25 Id. at 124, 433 P.2d at 338.
26488 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1971).
2722 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961).
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answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those
products.
28
The most recent case in this area illustrates the limits
of the "ultimate use" test. In Granite States Volkswagen, Inc.
v. District Court,29 the situation involved a plaintiff who pur-
chased a car in New Hampshire, and drove it to Colorado where
he was injured. Alleging injury as a result of faulty manu-
facturing, the plaintiff, a resident of Colorado, attempted to gain
jurisdiction over the manufacturer and the New Hampshire
dealer.
The New Hampshire dealer, after being personally served
in his state, moved to have the service quashed, denying any
agent, property, or contacts within Colorado. The supreme
court, in supporting the dealer's position, took notice of sec-
tion 37-1-26(1) (c) and the Vandermee and Czarnick holdings.
The court differentiated this situation from the earlier cases
in which "the defendant-manufacturer availed itself of the
channels of interstate commerce, and its product was distributed
for ultimate use in numerous states."3 ' In contrast, the dealer
in Granite was strictly in business in New Hampshire and had
no authority to sell or ship beyond that state. The fact that
the instrumentality was mobile was held not sufficient to
alter the situation.
Looking to Hanson v. Denckla, the court noted that "the
defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have
an effect in the forum state. '31 The fact that the injured buyer
had informed the dealer, at the time of sale, that she intended
to use the car in another state was considered insufficient
to change the local character of the business. Since the dealer
did not solicit interstate business or use channels of interstate
commerce to sell the automobiles, due process prevented the
subjection of the defendant to Colorado's jurisdiction.
c. Summary
In a tort action where the injury occurs in Colorado and
the plaintiff attempts to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign
corporate dealer or manufacturer, "doing business" and "tor-
tious act" are the two tests the court will use in analyzing the
issue. On any particular occasion, the court may choose to
emphasize one test as opposed to another. Both satisfy the
28 488 P.2d at 563, quoting Gray (emphasis added).
29 492 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1972).
30 Id. at 625.
31 Id. at 625-26.
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due process test of "minimum contacts" found in International
Shoe.
In view of its judicial acceptance and liberal interpreta-
tion, the "tortious act" provision of the new 1965 long arm
statute appears to be the simplest test to apply. The older
"doing business" test involved problems of quantitative and
qualitative analysis resulting in a highly unpredictable balanc-
ing of facts. In contrast, the "tortious act" test has developed
into a simplified question of "ultimate use." All that need
be proven is that the foreign corporation availed itself of the
channels of interstate commerce in order that its product be
ultimately used in other states. But, if the foreign corporation
can show that its business is a local one, purely intrastate in
character, then due process safeguards, as expressed in the
Granite case, will prevent the exercise of Colorado jurisdiction.
2. Contract
In the area of contract, there has been little change in
the statutory law in recent years.32 Consequently, the test for
"transacting business" is the same today as before the 1965
amendment. The one subtle but important addition to the law
is the introductory phrase, "concerning any cause of action
arising from" the transacting of business, found in section
37-1-26(1). This key language will be examined in cases dis-
cussed below.
Basically, the Colorado courts use a listing of contacts test
identical to the pre-1965 tort cases in an attempt to satisfy the
requirements of International Shoe and Hanson v. Denckla. Con-
sequently, the best analytical approach is to outline the con-
tacts considered important by the courts and attempt to gen-
eralize a conclusion from these facts.
a. Manufacturer-Distributor
In Colorado Builder's Supply Co. v. Hinman Bros. Construc-
tion Co.,33 the dealer was suing for the unpaid balance on a
purchase. As often happens, the buyer counterclaimed against
the dealer and the manufacturer for breach of warranty. In
deciding whether the foreign corporate manufacturer was sub-
ject to in personam jurisdiction in Colorado, the court fac-
tually dissected the relationship between the local dealer and
the foreign corporation (X) finding:
32 Note the "transacting business" requirement in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-35-19(3) (Supp. 1960), 31-9-19(3) (1963), 31-9-19(3)(a), 37-
1-26(1) (b) (Supp. 1965).
33 134 Colo. 383, 304 P.2d 892 (1956).
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1. X did not sell directly to the public any of the equip-
ment it manufactured.
2. The relationship between X and its distributors was
purely contractual.
3. X had its plants in Georgia and Illinois.
4. All sales were completed at these plants.
5. Title to the equipment was transferred to the distribu-
tor at the time the invoice was made.
6. X employed district representatives and service engi-
neers.
Since service was made on an engineer, the court ana-
lyzed his, and therefore X's, relationship with Colorado. The
engineer was a representative for a five-state region, and his
only duties were to advise and counsel the distributors "in the
promotion of sales. '34 After each of his promotional trips, he
reported to X on the progress being made in merchandising
their product. Other facts considered by the court were: the
engineer had no authority to sell X's product; although he lived
in Denver, he spent only 5 to 8 percent of his working time
there; he had no office in Colorado; and, he was paid by salary
without commission.
The conclusion reached by the court was that X was not
"doing business" in Colorado for purposes of service of process
and in personam jurisdiction. The facts considered in reaching
this decision typify the concern of the court with the relation-
ship between a foreign corporation and: (1) the ultimate buyer,
(2) the distributor, (3) the state in general, (4) the person
served, and (5) the relation between the person served and
the state. Primarily, the court was searching for an agency
relationship through Which the foreign corporation could bind
Colorado residents to contracts. In this respect, the key fact in
Colorado Builder's was the engineer's inability to bind anyone
to a contract with X. The other important consideration was
the relationship between the manufacturer and the distributor.
Unlike Focht, the facts in Colorado Builder's were insufficient
to support a finding of an agency relationship.
Several rules adopted by the court in Colorado Builder's
are worth noting. First, it supported the holding of Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chatters35 by stating that:
[A] greater quantum of "doing business" within the state of the
forum is essential to jurisdiction where the claim asserted does
34 Id. at 386, 304 P.2d at 894.
35 279 U.S. 320 (1929).
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not arise out of corporate activities within that state, than would
be required in a claim arising out of corporate conduct within
the state.6
This test may not be valid today. The 1965 amendment limits
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation transacting business to
a "cause of action arising from '37 such transaction. Colorado
Builder's implies that, if the "arising from" test is not met, a
higher quantum of evidence is necessary to satisfy due process.
The 1965 Act, in contrast, can be argued to stand for the rule
that the action must arise from the transaction of business or
jurisdiction will not attach.
A second holding in Colorado Builder's worth comment is
the quotation from Colorado Iron-Works v. Sierra Grande Mining
Co.: 38
In order to invoke the aid of our own courts in the collection of
such debt, it is not necessary for a citizen of this state to show
that the debtor was doing business generally in this state, but
that he is a debtor; that the debt is due and payable here; and
the debtor, whether a natural or an artificial person, if brought
by process within the jurisdiction, is amenable to our courts.
39
This holding narrows the defenses of a foreign corporation
by stating that a debt, while not necessarily equal to "doing
business," is sufficient to subject a foreign corporation to juris-
diction. The most important requirement is that the debt of
the corporation be due and payable in Colorado.
Thus, Colorado Builder's exemplifies a multi-step process
of determining "doing business." Every fact which might es-
tablish a relationship between the corporation and the state will
be considered both quantitatively and qualitatively, individually
and in sum. Note also, if the buyer had been suing in tort under
the modern statute, the foreign corporation would have been
subjected to Colorado jurisdiction because of his negligent




Another type of situation involving foreign corporations is
where a salesman-employee sues X corporation for unpaid com-
missions. This situation arose in Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett &
Co. v. District Court41 where the employment contract was made
36 134 Colo. at 390, 304 P.2d at 896.
37 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-26(1) (b) (Supp. 1965).
38 15 Colo. 499, 25 P. 325 (1890).
39 134 Colo. at 390, 304 P.2d at 896.
40 See discussion pp. 535-38 supra.
41 138 Colo. 270, 332 P.2d 208 (1958). For an identical case and holding see
American Type Founders Co., Inc. v. District Court, 154 Colo. 156, 389
P.2d 85 (1964).
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outside the state, forcing the employee to obtain local juris-
diction through a "doing business" argument. The court con-
sidered the following facts:
1. The employee-salesman showed samples of X's product
to Colorado customers.
2. Customers ordered after seeing the samples and the
catalogue.
3. The salesman wrote up the orders and sent them to X.
4. The salesman expedited the delivery.
5. The salesman assisted in the collection of delinquent
accounts.
6. The salesman solicited new accounts.
7. X sent merchandise to Colorado for display.
8. The salesman was a full-time employee of X.
9. X made $200,000 per year in Colorado.
To counter these facts, the corporation argued that, although
it had once been doing business in Colorado, its current ac-
tivities were minimal. The court recognized this defense, but
noted that the decrease in activity had occurred within the
last year and that X still maintained salesmen in the state.
The court concluded that X was "doing business" in Colorado
and was properly subject to in personam jurisdiction.
A supplement to the above-listed contacts can be found in
Elliott v. Edwards Engineering Corp.42 where a salsman-em-
ployee's activities were again analyzed. The court considered
the following facts to be relevant: the relationship between
the employee and the foreign corporation (X), the listing of X
in a Colorado phone book, the quantity of business done by X
through its employee, and whether the action arose from deal-
ings in the state. The court granted a motion to quash service
of process because of a lack of contact between X and Colo-
rado.
c. Parent-Subsidiary
A common problem in the area of contract is the parent-
subsidiary relationship. As in other contract situations, the
facts always dictate the result. However, the Colorado courts
have established certain definite exceptions to protect a parent
from being characterized as "doing business" simply because it
has a subsidiary in the state. The supreme court has held:




[T]he mere presence in Colorado of [a] wholly owned subsidi-
ary, standing alone, does not in and of itself subject the absent
parent corporation to our state's jurisdiction, where the two
companies are operated as distinct entities .... 43
This holding was reaffirmed in Perlman v. Great States Life
Insurance Co.44 which states:
[W]here the parent and its subsidiary maintain separate identi-
ties and charge each other for services performed . . . the corpo-
rations will be treated as separate entities for the purpose of
determining personal jurisdiction.45
Although this rule appears to be predictable on its face,
the court in Perlman examined certain contacts between the
parent and the subsidiary and concluded that these two enti-
ties need not be as separate as the above-quoted language seems
to imply. First of all, "loans to a corporate subsidiary . . . do
not constitute doing business, nor would the purchase of serv-
ices from such entities."4 Most importantly, "[n]either does
stock ownership in a domestic company nor common directors,
establish that [the parent] was doing business in Colorado. ' 47
This holding appears to interpret liberally "separate entity"
for "doing business" purposes. In general, the test used by
courts in determining when the parent of a subsidiary located
in Colorado will be subject to in personam jurisdiction is simi-
lar to the test used for determing when the corporate veil will
be pierced in general corporate liability suits.
d. Advertising
An important case which analyzes the question of when
advertising will meet the "minimum contacts" test is Safari
Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court.4 Here, in an action for breach
of contract, the court restated its view that the "legislature in-
tended to extend the jurisdiction of our courts to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause . . ." by enacting
the 1965 statute.411 In this case the contacts were listed:
1. Foreign corporation X had advertised in three national
magazines.
2. Plaintiff-buyer, a resident of Colorado, wrote to X in
response to the advertisement.
3. X mailed brochures to plaintiff.
43 Bolger v. Dial-A-Style Leasing Corp., 159 Colo. 44, 48, 409 P.2d 517, 519
(1966).
44 164 Colo. 493, 436 P.2d 124 (1968).
45 Id. at 496-97, 436 P.2d at 125.
46 Id. at 497, 436 P.2d at 126.
47 Id. at 496, 436 P.2d at 125.
48 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1969).
49 Id. at 459, 448 P.2d at 784.
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4. There was at least one interstate phone call.
5. There were 16 interstate letters.
6. $10,000 worth of checks payable to X had been drawn
by the plaintiff on a Denver bank.
The supreme court held that these contacts did not con-
stitute "doing business" because advertising was too tenuous
a contact. The court also noted that interstate phone calls and
the receipt of checks were not acts "by which the petitioner [X]
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within Colorado, thus invoking the benefits of its
laws."50
In contrast to this holding that advertising is not a suffi-
cient contact for service of process, section 138-5-2(22) (a) (c)
of the Colorado statutes defines "doing business" for taxation
purposes to include the "distribution of catalogues or other ad-
vertising" for solicitation.51 This statute will be examined as
to its constitutional validity in part three of this note.
e. "Arising From"
As mentioned earlier, an important consideration under the
new long arm statute is whether the action arose from the
transacting of business in Colorado. Although few cases have
interpreted this phrase, the issue was confronted in Knight v.
District Court.52 The plaintiff, a Colorado corporation, sued a
Utah resident on a promissory note. The defendant had come to
Colorado and had negotiated a loan with the plaintiff-bank.
Three months later, the promissory note was renegotiated in
Utah.
The court, looking to section 37-1-26 for guidance, held that
the renewal note had its "genesis" in the initial Colorado trans-
action. Because of the relationship between the two notes, the
plaintiff's claim was considered to have "arisen from" business
transacted in Colorado, and therefore the defendant was sub-
ject to Colorado's jurisdiction.
5 3
The federal court limited this opinion by holding in a later
case that if "no negotiations have been conducted in the forum
state, the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction
50 Id. at 460-61, 448 P.2d at 785.
51 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (c) (Supp. 1967).
52 162 Colo. 14, 424 P.2d 110 (1967).
53 For another promissory note case using CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-26
(Supp. 1965) see Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D.
Colo. 1966). See also Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395
(D. Colo. 1967).
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are found wanting. '54 The simple fact that payment alone
occurred in the state will not suffice to capture the foreign
person; and "the mere existence of a contract executed by a
Colorado resident . . . is [not] sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendant." 55
Although little can be said at present about the phrase
"arising from," this phrase will be of paramount importance
in any action where it is necessary to establish jurisdiction
through a "doing business" test. A potential question is: What
happens to a foreign corporation which commits a tort outside
the state which was the direct result of a contract made between
the parties in Colorado? Did the tort "arise from" the transac-
tion of business in Colorado? This extension of the long arm
statute is conceivable, especially in view of part statutory con-
struction used by the courts in expanding Colorado's jurisdic-
tion. "Arising from" has the potential to become 'he judiciary's
most powerful tool in implementing this expansion.
f. Procedure
A final case worthy of note because of its procedural im-
plications is Geer Co. v. District Court.56 Here, a buyer counter-
claimed against the dealer and manufacturer in response to a
claim for nonpayment. The buyer served notice on the manu-
facturer under section 31-9-19(3) (a), serving the secretary of
state and the manufacturer by mail. Although successful at
the trial level, on appeal the plaintiff attempted to support
her jurisdictional claim by use of section 37-1-26, the long arm
statute. The supreme court reversed in favor of the manufac-
turer and refused to accept the changed plea.
Plaintiff's error was in her original complaint which alleged
that the manufacturer was doing business in Colorado "through
its agent," the dealer.57 The defendant easily defeated this
unnecessarily narrow complaint by proving that its relation-
ship with the dealer was one of purchaser-seller.
The plaintiff made two errors: one strategic, the other legal.
Strategically, she should not have limited her claims of "doing
business" to the agency factor. As previously discussed, an
agency relationship is merely one of many facts to be con-
sidered in determining whether a foreign corporation is "doing
business" in Colorado. In the face of a broader complaint, the
.4 Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996, 1000
(D. Colo. 1971).
55 Id. at 1001.
56 172 Colo. 48, 469 P.2d 734 (1970).
57 Id. at 50-51, 469 P.2d at 735.
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defendant's rebuttal of the agency relationship would not neces-
sarily have defeated the service of process, especially since
there were other contacts indicating that the manufacturer
was "doing business" in the state.
The second error, legal in nature, was the attempted change
in plea on appeal. Since service was by mail, the plaintiff
was barred from using the long arm statute, which requires
personal service. The move to alter the plea illustrates plain-
tiff's lack of understanding of the difference between the stat-
utes. It is not required that agency be proven under one and
not the other. The test for both laws is transacting business.
The error was in the original complaint, not in choice of statute.
The conclusion is a caveat: since "[t]he burden of proof
is on the . . . plaintiff to establish by competent evidence all
the facts essential to the court's jurisdiction,"5 8 there is no
reason to increase this burden by drafting an overly specific
complaint. The statutes require that "transacting business" be
proven to subject a foreign corporation to service of process
and jurisdiction. Therefore, this is all that need be pleaded in
such a case.
g. Summary
The following questions should be asked when determining
a foreign corporation's status for service of process in Colorado
for all nontortious cases. The answers to these questions may
establish facts which either alone or in combination may con-
stitute "doing business":
1. Does foreign corporation X sell directly to the public
in Colorado?
2. If it does, where are the sales completed?
3. How is delivery effectuated?
4. Is the instrumentality sent f.o.b. Colorado?
5. Does X maintain a security interest in the instrumen-
tality?
6. If X does not sell directly, what is the relationship
between X and its distributors?
7. What is the relationship between X and its salesmen?
8. What is the relationship between X and its employees
in Colorado?
9. What authority do the distributors, salesmen, and em-
ployees have to bind X contractually?
10. What are the duties of the distributors, salesmen, and
58 Id. at 52, 469 P.2d at 736.
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employees in Colorado?
11. For how much territory are the distributors, salesmen,
and employees responsible?
12. Do the distributors, salesmen, and employees live in
Colorado?
13. Is X listed in a state phone book, either independently
or concurrently with its employee, salesman, or distributor?
14. What is the quality of business done by X in Colorado?
15. What is the quantity of business done by X in Colorado?
16. Does X have a debt due and payable in Colorado?
17. If X has a subsidiary in Colorado, what is their re-
lationship?
18. Do X and the subsidiary have common directors?
19. Does X control the subsidiary's stock?
20. Do X and the subsidiary charge each other for services
performed?
21. Is X's only contact in Colorado through advertising?
22. If the solicitation is successful, how is the sale made?
23. Does X negotiate contracts in Colorado?
24. Are the contracts merely payable in Colorado?
25. Does a cause of action arise from any of the above
transactions of business?
II. QUALFCATION
According to the Colorado Supreme Court:
[T]here is a distinction between "doing business" by a foreign
corporation such as would subject it to the jurisdiction of courts
not of its domicile, and "doing business" of the character that
would subject it to the power of the state to impose regulations
upon its activities. 5 9
This position is further supported by Professor Leflar who
feels that "more activity is required to subject a corporation
to the penalties of a qualification statute than to subject the
corporation to taxation on its local business or to service of
process on unauthorized agents."60
Few qualification cases have appeared in Colorado in the
last 50 years. This sparsity is partly due to the heavier burden
of proof necessary to establish "doing business" for qualifica-
5 9 Begole Aircraft Supplies, Inc. v. Pacific Airmotive Corp., 121 Colo. 88,
89-90, 212 P.2d 860, 861 (1949).
60R. LEFLAR, AMSuCAN CONFLICTS LAw 615 (1968).
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tion purposes. More importantly, the penalty in Colorado for
failure to qualify is too minimal to encourage litigation.61
A. Constitutional Premise
As with service of process and taxation, there are certain
basic constitutional maxims which override the area of qualify-
ing to do business in a state. Although due process and equal
protection are potential constitutional restrictions, the key issue
in qualification is: Does the state statute interfere with the
free flow of interstate commerce and thereby place an undue
burden on that commerce?
As a basic premise, it has been held that "the Commerce
Clause does not cut the States off from all legislative relation
to foreign and interstate commerce. '62 Furthermore, requiring
that a corporation obtain a certificate to do business "is a con-
ventional means of assuring responsibility and fair dealing on
the part of foreign corporations coming into a State . . . . In
short, it is a supervisory and not a fiscal measure.
'63
These theories are based on the constitutional philosophy
that a state can protect "the health, safety, morals and welfare
of its people" even though its restrictions affect interstate com-
merce "incidentally" or "indirectly." 4 In sum, the issues which
all courts must analyze in qualification cases are: (1) What
is the nature of the commerce? (2) Would a qualification re-
quirement place an undue burden on that commerce?
The most recent expression by the United States Supreme
Court on these issues is Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc.,
6 5
a decision which split the Court 4-1-4. The parties in the suit
were both corporations, one from Indiana, the other from New
Jersey. The former wished to enjoin the latter from selling its
goods at prices below the minimum set in a retail contract
which was executed by the parties in New Jersey. The de-
fendant argued that, under New Jersey law,66 only foreign
corporations qualified to transact business in the state are
allowed to bring any action there on a contract. In response,
the foreign corporate plaintiff alleged that its business in New
61 See generally Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137
(1955); Note, Corporations- State Regulation of Foreign Corporations
-Interstate v. Intrastate Business, 19 ALA. L. REV. 193 (1966); Note,
The Entry and Regulation of Foreign Corporations Under New Mexico
Law and Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 NAT. RES. J. 617
(1966).
62 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209 (1944).
63 Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
64 Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 201 (1944).
65 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
66 N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:15-3 to -4 (1937).
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Jersey was entirely in interstate commerce, and therefore, the
filing requirement violated the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court upheld New Jersey's statute and the
position of the defendant by characterizing the plaintiff's ac-
tivities as both interstate and intrastate. The Court noted that
"[i]t is well established that New Jersey cannot require
[the Indiana corporation] to get a certificate of authority to
do business in the State if its participation in this trade is
limited to its wholly interstate sales to New Jersey whole-
salers." 67 On the other hand, the Court held that "it is equally
well settled that if [the Indiana corporation] is engaged in
intrastate as well as interstate aspects of the New Jersey drug
business, the State can require it to get a certificate of au-
thority to do business.
'68
Following these premises, the Court analyzed the facts
and noted that the plaintiff hired a number of persons who
lived and worked in New Jersey, had an office in New Jersey,
was listed in a state phone book, and paid its New Jersey
secretary by salary. The fact that the litigation was based on
the interstate aspects of plaintiff's business was held immaterial,
and the defendant's position was upheld.
Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the plaintiff's em-
ployees were equal to "drummers" and he compared the case
to Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District.69 Unlike the ma-
jority, he did not want to separate these activities from plain-
tiff's interstate business because "[h]ere the dominant activity
is nothing more than advertising and public relations. These
are the minimum activities in which every 'drummer' for
an out-of-state concern engaged. '7 0 Therefore, he considered
such activities to be "exclusively in furtherance of interstate
commerce."
'71
Although this case has been cited as holding that a state
is precluded "from exacting a license of a firm doing an ex-
clusively interstate business as a condition of entry in the
67 366 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added). The Court cited Robbins v. Shelby
County Tax. Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887), Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S.
47 (1891), International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910), and
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
68 Id. at 279. The Court cited Railway Express v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440
(1931) and Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
69 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
70 366 U.S. at 292.
71 Id. at 291, quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
sota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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State, -7 2 it has also been interpreted in a more liberal fashion.7 3
For this note, the importance of the case is its typification of
the issues considered, and the problems they create, in an ex-
ample qualification case. As with service of process and taxa-
tion, the conclusion is ultimately one of fact, a test which gives
rise to 4-1-4 opinions like Lilly.
7 4
B. Colorado Statutory Law
The basic law in Colorado on qualification is section 31-9-
1 (1) which states: "No foreign corporation shall have the right
to transact business in this state until it shall have procured
a certificate of authority so to do from the secretary of state. '7 5
If a foreign corporation complies with the procedures,
7 6 it will
"enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a
domestic corporation .... -77
Most foreign corporations are concerned with the penalties
for failure to file. In Colorado, the primary sanction is that
the corporation shall not be permitted "to maintain any action,
suit or proceeding in any court of this state, until such cor-
poration shall have obtained a certificate of authority. 7 8 This
prohibition, which simply abates the action, will be discussed
later. This penalty is supplemented by section 31-9-3(3) which
holds the unauthorized corporation liable "in an amount equal
to all fees which would have been imposed by this code upon
such corporation had it duly applied for and received a cer-
tificate of authority to transact business in this state as re-
quired . . . .7
The laxity of these penalties is emphasized by section 31-
9-3(2) which states that the failure of a foreign corporation
to obtain a certificate "shall not impair the validity of any
contract or act of such corporation, and shall not prevent
such corporation from defending any action, suit or proceeding
72 Justice Douglas' dissent to the Court's dismissal of the appeal of People
v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 47 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1964), in Fairfax Family Fund, Inc. v. California, 382 U.S. 1, 2 (1965).
73 See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. T.G. Stores, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 941 (D.
Md. 1965), aff'd, 356 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1966).
74 Note that for interstate carriers there are different issues which will not
be discussed in this paper. See Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity
Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
7 5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1(1) (1963).
76 Every foreign ccrporation authorized to do business in Colorado must:
(1) have a registered office and (2) have a registered agent for service
of process. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-17 (1963), 31-9-18 (Supp.
1965).
7 Id. § 31-9-4 (1963).




in any court of this state."8 0 This laxity has resulted in a limited
amount of litigation in Colorado on the issue.81 The remainder
of the statute itemizes the formal procedures involved,8 2 yet
nowhere in the act is the term "transacting business" defined. 13
C. Colorado Case Law
Since a definition of "transacting business" is unavailable
at the statutory level, it is necessary to look to the common law
for guidance. Unfortunately, very few qualification cases have
been litigated in Colorado in the last 50 years. However, cases
from the 19th and early 20th centuries, even though based on
different statutory requirements, can provide basic premises
which remain valid. The reliance of the Supreme Court upon
old precedent in Lilly demonstrates the relevance of past cases.
There is an abundance of Colorado cases during this early
period due to the stiff penalties then imposed by the qualifi-
cation statutes. Instead of merely preventing an unqualified
corporation from suing until it filed a certificate, the law held
all officers, agents, stockholders, and directors personally liable
for anything that occurred while unqualified. Furthermore,




a. One Act v. Continuous Transaction
For service of process, McGee8 5 held one contract to be
a sufficient contact for "doing business" in a foreign state.
This test is not valid for qualification purposes.
In 1913, the Colorado Court of Appeals faced this issue
so Id. § 31-9-3 (2).
81 Note in contrast the strict sanctions imposed by other states for failure
to qualify. See Note, Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Corporate
Qualification Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 117 (1963).
8
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-5 (1963) -corporate name (form F-2),
31-9-6 (1963) -change of name (form F-3), 31-9-7 (Supp. 1965) -
what application must contain, 31-9-8 (1963) -how to file, 31-9-9
(1963) - purpose stated in application, 31-9-10 (1963) - amendment
to corporation's articles (form F-4), 31-9-11 (Supp. 1967) -amend-
ment to certificate (form F-3), 31-9-12 (Supp. 1967) -revocation of
certificate by the secretary of state, 31-9-13 (1963) - issuance of
certificate of revocation, 31-9-14 (1963) -filing of articles of merger,
31-9-15 (Supp. 1967) -withdrawal (form F-5), 31-9-16 (1963) -filing
of certificate of withdrawal, 31-9-17 (1963) -registered office and
agent, 31-9-18 (Supp. 1965) -change of registered office or agent.
83For examples of definitions of "doing business" for qualification see
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 106 (1971) and RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1971).
84See Ch. 19, § 23, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 151 (General Laws of Colo-
rado); Ch. 52, §§ 1-14, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 116. For a case on officer
liability see King Copper Co. v. Dreher, 68 Colo. 554, 191 P. 98 (1920).
85 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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in Cockburn v. Kinsley.s8 There, a foreign corporation, which had
made a contract in the state, denied "doing business" in Colo-
rado. The court noted that the purpose of the then-existent
qualification statute 7 was to require filing by foreign cor-
porations which were "engaging in the general prosecution and
operation of the ordinary business which they were incor-
porated to carry on . . . in order that the state authorities
may supervise and control their transactions . *..."88 There-
fore, the court felt that "a single act or business transaction is
not 'doing business' within the meaning of the [qualification]
statute .... "-89
The court made a distinction between "doing business" for
service of process and "doing business" for qualification, and
held that "cases involving motions to quash the service upon
a foreign corporation are not controlling in cases such as the
present one." 90 However, the court noted that, if it can be
proven that a corporation is not "doing business" for service
of process, it definitely is not "doing business" for qualification
"because an inconsiderable transaction of business ought to be
sufficient in the former instance that would not be at all suf-
ficient in the latter."91
Another important case on this issue of continuous con-
tacts is Cooper Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson92 where the
plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, had made a contract with a
citizen of Colorado. The defendant breached the contract; but
the plaintiff, when suing for damages, was confronted with
the defense that it had failed to file a certificate, thereby
making the contract invalid under the current law.
9 3
The United States Supreme Court held that, because the
contract was the only business ever conducted by the corpora-
tion in Colorado, it was not "doing business" for qualifica-
tion purposes. The Court further stated that a foreign cor-
poration must ordinarily transact business to be subject to a
qualification statute, although the "extent of exercise of these
powers" was left undecided. 94 In contrast to the modem McGee
doctrine for service of process, the Court held that the "prohi-
88 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 P. 1112 (1913).
87 Ch. 52, §§ 1-14, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 116.
88 25 Colo. App. at 109, 135 P. at 1118.
89 Id. at 100, 135 P. at 1116.
90 Id. at 103, 135 P. at 1117.
91 Id.
92 113 U.S. 727 (1885).
93 Ch. 19, § 23, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 151 (General Laws of Colorado).
94 113 U.S. at 734 (emphasis by the court).
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bition against doing any business cannot . . . be literally in-
terpreted,"95 and that the Colorado constitution" did not refer
to a single act but rather to the "carrying on of business by
a foreign corporation." 9 Since this section of the state's con-
stitution has yet to be amended, this interpretation is valid
today.
b. Interstate v. Intrastate Commerce
Another case relevant to a substantive interpretation of
the current statutes is Butler Brothers Shoe Co. v. United States
Rubber Co.98 There, the defendant, a Colorado corporation, had
contracted with a New Jersey corporation to sell goods, retain-
ing certain funds in a Colorado account for the plaintiff-foreign
corporation. When the defendant defaulted in payments and
the plaintiff sued, the defendant alleged that the New Jersey
corporation was not licensed to do business in Colorado, and,
therefore, the contract was void. ')9 Citing Cooper, the defendant
argued that a foreign corporation "cannot lawfully exercise
any corporate power or do any business whatever in the State
of Colorado without compliance with the requirements of its
statutes."'100
The court, in disagreeing with the defendant, noted that
all corporations have the right to "institute and maintain in
the federal courts . . . its suits in every other state ... ,
More importantly, the contracts between the two parties were
considered to be interstate in nature. The Colorado law was
held to be "ineffectual to restrain or modify the power or
duty of the national courts to hear and decide the contro-
versies of such corporations arising from its [sic] transactions of
interstate commerce . ".1..2
c. Summary
Article 15, section 10, of the Colorado constitution has been
11I1d.
"; COLO. CONST. art. 15, § 10 (1876) provides: "No foreign corporation shall
do any business in this State without having one or more known places
of business, and an authorized agent or agents in the same, upon whom
process may be served."
117 113 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added). Colorado cases supporting this in-
terpretation of doing business as a continuous act for qualification are:
Craig v. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 38 Colo. 115, 87 P. 1143 (1906);
Roseberry v. Valley Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 35 Colo. 132, 83 P. 637 (1905);
Miller v. Williams, 27 Colo. 34, 59 P. 740 (1899); Kindel v. Beck & Pauli
Lithographing Co., 19 Colo. 310, 35 P. 538 (1893); Tabor v. Goss &
Phillips Mfg. Co., 11 Colo. 419, 18 P. 537 (1888); Gates Iron Works v.
Cohen, 7 Colo. App. 341, 43 P. 667 (1890).
8156 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 577 (1908).
99 Ch. 52, § 10, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 121.
100 156 F. at 6-7. Defendant cited COLO. CONST. art. 15, § 10 (1876).
101 Id. at 16.
102 Id. at 18.
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interpreted to be limited to the carrying on of business in intra-
state commerce. This interpretation, which limits the applica-
tion of the qualification laws to foreign corporations which
commit more than a single act or which are not engaged solely
in interstate comerce, has been supported by case law.'" ' Thus,
the simple conclusion is that "doing business" for qualification
purposes is a stricter test requiring more contacts than the test
for service of process. Even if a series of contacts is proven,
the corporation may still maintain the defense of interstate




The heavier burden of proof and the current minimal
penalty for failure to qualify are not the only factors in-
hibiting the litigation of "doing business" for qualification.
Along with these is the characterization of the statute as a
mere abatement. As noted earlier, if a corporation fails to quali-
fy, it cannot bring a suit in the state until a certificate of
authority is obtained. Even in 1907, it was permissible to
file the certificate after commencement of a suit and thereby
alleviate the problem.' 4 This procedural maneuver, which even-
tually eliminated the issue of qualification, was accepted by
the Colorado Supreme Court in 1928 when it held that "En]on-
compliance with that statute is a matter in abatement."' 05
The leading and most recent case on this point is Admiral
Corp. v. Trio Television Sales & Service, Inc."'6 The case involved
a foreign corporation which brought suit, but was dismissed
from court because it was not qualified to do business in
Colorado. After judgment, the plaintiff filed his certificate and
brought a new suit on the same claim. The defendant pleaded
res judicata.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the defendant's plea,
and held that where a foreign corporation's suit is dismissed
solely on the basis of its failure to file a certificate, mainten-
ance of the suit is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata
if such corporation files after the dismissal.10 7 As in the 1907
case, it was held that "[f]ailure to file the required certificate
103See, e.g., Savage v. Central Elec. Co., 59 Colo. 66, 148 P. 254 (1915);
Herman Bros. Co. v. Nasiacos, 46 Colo. 208, 103 P. 301 (1909).
104 Internaticnal Trust Co. v. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 41 Colo. 299,
92 P. 727 (1907).
105 Rocky Mt. Seed Co. v. McArthur, 85 Colo. 1, 5, 272 P. 1117, 1119 (1928).
1U6 138 Colo. 157, 330 P.2d 1106 (1958).
107 Id. at 162, 330 P.2d at 1108-09.
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served only to abate the action during the time it remained
unrecorded.' '10 8 In summary, the court stated:
The dismissal of an action based exclusively upon a defense
which could only abate the action does not in any manner
prejudice the right of the plaintiff to bring a second suit on the
same claim once the defect which gave rise to the abatement
of the first action has been cured.10 9
The result of this case is to encourage a foreign corpora-
tion to pay the filing fees and obtain a certificate rather than
face lengthy and expensive litigation on the issues of "doing
business" and interstate commerce. Furthermore, corporations
need no longer fear the pre-1920 repercussions from late filing.
b. Pleading as a Defense
Another important procedural point first noted in 1919
is that a "defendant's failure to plead noncompliance [with
the qualification statute] amounted to a waiver thereof." 0
This issue appeared more recently in Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock
Asphalt Co."' where a defendant did not raise the issue of
plaintiff's failure to qualify until the appellate level. The court
dismissed the complaint because the "failure of a foreign
corporation to comply with the cited statute goes to its ca-
pacity to sue, and is a matter of defense to be pleaded by
the defendant in bar of the action."'112 Therefore, although fail-
ure to qualify can be an effective means of abating a case, it
must be pleaded initially or the defense is waived.
c. Statute of Limitations
One final procedural point of importance is the effect of
abatement on the statute of limitations. A 1911 case which
still stands as valid precedent is Western Electrical Co. v.
Pickett.113 Here, in a fact situation similar to the Admiral case,
the court faced the question: Is the running of the statute
of limitations suspended by the attempted institution of the
suit before compliance with qualification?
The supreme court answered no, rationalizing that when
the plaintiff filed suit it technically could not prosecute be-
cause of its failure to qualify. Thus, the statute of limitations
108 Id.
109 Id. at 163, 330 P.2d at 1109. Note the interesting dissent which analyzes
the question of corporate "existence" under COLO. RV. STAT. AqNN. §
141-2-1 (2) (1953). An analysis of this statute can be found in Capriles,
Business Organization, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 613, 649 (1960).
110 Watson v. Empire Cream Separator Co., 66 Colo. 284, 285, 180 P. 685
(1919).
111 316 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1963).
112 Id. at 53.
113 51 Colo. 415, 118 P. 988 (1911).
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ran until the filing of the certificate and the commencement
of the second suit. The court felt that to hold otherwise would
"abrogate the only inconvenience or penalty which has been
placed upon the non-resident corporation for its failure to




The substantive issues involved in qualification and "do-
ing business" appear to be mooted by the procedural doctrine
of abatement. The only penalty, that of not being able to
bring suit while not qualified, can be remedied without fear
of res judicata. The procedure has eliminated this aspect of
"doing business" from the Colorado courts since the paying
of back fees will certainly amount to less than a litigation of
the issue.
If involved in such a suit, one must be aware of two
caveats. First, the nonqualification must be pleaded as a de-
fense at the trial level; and second, the statute of limitations
will continue to run as long as the corporation is unqualified,
regardless of attempted suits in the interim. This last point
exemplifies one of the few instances in which the defense of
failure to qualify could be an effective strategy.
III. TAXATION
A. Constitutional Premise
The power of a state to tax a foreign corporation is limited
by the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
When a foreign corporation is faced with a state tax levy, its
best defense is to allege the levy places an undue burden on
interstate commerce. In deciding the merits of such a defense
in the past, the Supreme Court has considered whether the
tax was discriminatorily applied, whether it was properly
apportioned, and whether there was a sufficient nexus be-
tween the state and the corporation. As the Court has suc-
cinctly stated, "[tihe simple but controlling question is whether
the state has given anything for which it can ask return."" 5
In this note, consideration of the highly complex subject
matter of state taxation on interstate commerce is limited to
the question of "doing business." To analyze this question, the
sales and use tax, franchise tax, and income tax will be re-
viewed. Within this general scope, the constitutional premise
can be summarized as follows:
114 Id. at 424, 118 P. at 991.
115 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
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[N]et income from the interstate operations of a foreign corpora-
tion may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not
discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities
within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support
the same.11 6
Below is a brief summary of questions deemed important
by the Supreme Court when analyzing state taxation of for-
eign corporations:
1. Were the sales arranged through an agent in the taxing
state?
117
2. Did the corporation maintain salesmen or solicitors in
the state?""
3. Did the corporation solicit entirely through the mail?"19
4. Did the corporation maintain local stores within the
state?
120
5. Was the taxpayer merely an "itinerant drummer"? 1 1
6. Was the tax levied on the "privilege" of engaging in
interstate commerce?
122
7. Does the tax subject the corporation to the burden of
"multiple taxation" ?12
8. Does the tax discriminate so as to provide a "direct
commercial advantage to local business"?"'
-
The answers to the above-listed questions will determine the
sufficiency of the nexus and the fairness of the tax.
B. Colorado Case Law
Whether one is susceptible to taxation for "doing business"
in Colorado is, with the exception of the franchise tax, not
dependent on the qualification issue. A "foreign corporation
may escape a state tax [income or sales and use] even though
it is qualified to do business in the state.' 125 The question of
taxation is resolved on the basis of the quality, quantity, and
116 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959). For general comments on this area, see Note, Federal Limita-
tions on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REV. 953
(1962); Note, State Taxation of Multistate Businesses, 74 YALE L.J. 1259
(1965).
117 Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); General Trad-
ing Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
118 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
119 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
120 Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
121 Robbins v. Shelby County Tax. Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
122 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
123 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
124 Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1945).
125 1 CCH STATE TAX REP., COLO. 2-012 (1965).
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character of the business transacted in the state plus an
analysis of the nature of the tax. Thus, it involves the same
factual analysis discussed for service of process and qualifica-
tion.
Briefly, Colorado cases have held that sales made by an
itinerant traveling salesman are not subject to a use tax on
the distribution of circulars."26 Since his business was purely
interstate, the levy violated the commerce clause. The court
has also stated that taxing a foreign corporation on sales
completed outside of the state was violative of the commerce
clause. Additionally, taxing a foreign corporation on sales
completed outside of the state was held violative of the Con-
stitution, even though the corporation had an office in the
state and was selling to Colorado residents. 127 In contrast, a
corporation which held no property in Colorado, had never
engaged in business in the state, had no office of solicitation,
and had never carried on commerce in Colorado, was held
liable for income tax on "income received from a source in
Colorado. ' '128 It has also been held that a foreign nonprofit
corporation is not entitled to an income tax exemption unless
it operates in Colorado "for the benefit of the people of this
State."1
29
Colorado case law in the area of taxation is quite old.
The cases, standing alone, are too broad to support a detailed
analysis, although a few premises can be gleaned from them.
To find definitive aid on taxation questions, one must look
to the statutes where, for the first time, there appears an ex-
plicit definition of "doing business."
C. Colorado Statutory Law
1. Sales and Use Tax
In the definition section of the Colorado sales and use
tax statute,130 the phrase "doing business" is defined. Al-
though this definition has yet to be interpreted by the Colorado
Supreme Court, it appears that the statute is subject to a valid
constitutional challenge.
First, the definition characterizes the leasing, selling, or
delivering of tangible personal property by a retail sale for
126 City of Pueblo v. Lukins, 63 Colo. 197, 164 P. 1164 (1917).
127 Colorado v. American Can Co., 117 Colo. 312, 186 P.2d 779 (1947). Note:
the defendant was authorized to do business in Colorado.
128 Arvey Corp. v. Fugate, 129 Colo. 595, 272 P.2d 652, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
871 (1954).




COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (Supp. 1967).
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the use, storage, distribution, or consumption within Colorado
as "doing business" for the purpose of the statute.13 ' Second,
a foreign corporation is "doing business" for the purpose of
the statute if it maintains in the state, either directly or through
its subsidiary, an office, distributing house, salesroom, ware-
house, or other place of business. 3 2 The third and final section
will be quoted in its entirety because of the apparent con-
stitutional flaw. "Doing business" is:
The soliciting, either by direct representative, indirect repre-
sentatives, manufacturers' agents, or by distribution of catalogues
or other advertising, or by use of any communication media, or
by use of the newspaper, radio, or television advertising media,
or by any other means whatsoever, of business from persons
residing in this state, and by reason thereof receiving orders
from, or selling or leasing tangible personal property to, such
persons residing in this state for use, consumption, distribution,
and storage for use or consumption in this state.133
This statute, in its detailed analysis of the phrase "doing
business," is a marked improvement over the nondefined areas
of service of process and qualification. Unfortunately, the above-
quoted section sharply conflicts with a 1967 Supreme Court
opinion on taxation in interstate commerce.
In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,34
the Supreme Court confronted the issue of a sales and use tax
levied on solicitations made through catalogues. The foreign
corporation involved was a Missouri mail order house which
sent catalogues twice a year to active or recent customers in
Illinois. "Flyers" were also mailed to potential customers in
the state. The corporation had no place of business in Illinois,
no agents or solicitors in the state, no telephone listing there,
and conducted no advertising by means of billboards, radio,
or television. The State of Illinois attempted to levy a use tax
on the corporation by making it collect and pay taxes on sales
made in the state.
The Supreme Court, in ruling against the state, held that
the Constitution requires "some definite link, some minimum
connection between a state and the person, property or trans-
action it seeks to tax.'13 5 The Court was particularly con-
cerned with whether National Bellas Hess had been afforded
131 Id. § 138-5-2(22) (a).
132 Id. § 138-5-2 (22) (b).
133 Id. § 138-5-2(22) (c) (emphasis added).
134 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
135 Id. at 756, quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954).
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"the protection and services of the taxing State."'1 6 The main
obstacle facing Illinois was the fact that "the Court has never
held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection
and payment upon a seller whose only connection with cus-
tomers in the State is by common carrier or the United States
mail.' 1 37 When challenged, Colorado will be faced with that
same obstacle.
This distinction between mail order sellers with retail
outlets, solicitors, or property within the state and those who
communicate with their customers solely by mail or common
carrier was adamantly defended by the Court. Not only was
the contact with the state deemed tenuous, the opinion noted
that "it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more
exclusively interstate in character than the mail order trans-
actions here involved.'
38
Obviously, the Colorado statute, which was enacted the
same year National Bellas Hess was decided, conflicts with
this holding in stating that "[t]he soliciting . . . by distribu-
tion of catalogues" 13 9 is transacting business for sales and use
tax purposes. In addition to this conflict, the Colorado Supreme
Court has held that advertising is too tenuous a contact even
for service of process.
140
Thus, the solicitation section of this definition is open to
constitutional attack because of the undue burden on inter-
state commerce and lack of contact. The remainder of the
statute appears valid, and places taxation in its usual posi-
tion as regards "doing business:" fewer contacts are necessary
for service of process, but more are necessary for qualification.
2. Franchise Tax
The current Colorado franchise or license tax,' 4 ' levied
on foreign corporations which are qualified and authorized to
do business in Colorado, is also subject to constitutional chal-
lenge. As noted earlier,142 section 31-9-4 states that any foreign
corporation which qualifies to do business in Colorado shall
"enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a
domestic corporation.' 1 43 However, there is currently a dis-
136 Id. at 757.
137 Id. at 758.
138 Id. at 759.
139 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (c) (Supp. 1967).
140 Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 488 P.2d 783
(1969).
141 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-7 (1963).
142 See discussion p. 549 supra.
143 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-4 (1963).
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parity between the franchise tax for domestic corporations
and the license tax for foreign corporations.
Under section 31-10-6, a franchise tax on domestic corpora-
tions is itemized as follows:
A $10 tax on every corporation with an authorized capital stock
of $50,000 or less;
$20 - $50,001 to $150,000
$40 - $150,001 to $250,000
$65- $250,001 to $500,000
$100-- $500,001 to $1,000,000
$250 - over $1,000,001.141
In contrast to this graduated scale, section 31-10-7 states
that all foreign corporations who are qualified to do business
in Colorado are subject to a flat $100 license tax in lieu of
a franchise tax.1 4" This open discrimination in taxation contra-
dicts the consitutional premises which dominate this area of
the law.
In 1905, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a similar statute
which permitted discrimination between domestic and foreign
corporations on taxation of authorized capital stock.1413 The
court based its opinion on a detailed differentiation between
"excise" and "property" taxes. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and held the statute unconstitutional
as impairing the contractual relationship between the corpora-
tion and the state.1
4 7
At that time, Colorado had a statute, similar to the current
section 31-9-4, which granted a foreign corporation rights equal
to those of a domestic corporation if the foreign corporation
had qualified to do business in the state. 148 The Supreme Court
characterized this promise as being contractual: the state would
give the foreign corporation equal rights in return for formal
qualification. Because of this contract, the Court disagreed
with the Colorado Supreme Court's careful delineation of
"excise" and "property" taxes, and held:
Whatever be the name or nature of the tax, it must be measured
in amount by the same rate as is provided for the domestic in-
144 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-6 (1963).
145 Id. § 31-10-7.
146 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. People ex rel. Lindsley, 34 Colo.
240, 82 P. 531 (1905). The statute involved was ch. 3, §§ 64-66, [1902]
Colo. Sess. Laws 73-74 which placed a 2 cent levy on every $1000 of
capital stock for domestic corporations and a 4 cent tax on the same
amount for foreign corporations. If the foreign corporation's stock had
a par value of less than $1, the tax was 21/2 cents per $1000 of stock.
147 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Colorado ex rel. Lindsley, 204
U.S. 103 (1907).
148 Ch. 19, § 23, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 151 (General Laws of Colorado).
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stitution, and if the latter is not taxed in that way neither can
the State thus tax the foreign corporation.'
4 9
In further clarifying its position, the Court noted that "[t]his
is not an exemption from taxation, it is simply a limitation of
the power to tax beyond the rate of taxation imposed upon a
domestic corporation.
150
Since this case is still recognized as valid law, it would
appear that the franchise tax in Colorado is subject to attack
on the ground that it impairs the obligation of the contract
existing between the state and a qualified foreign corporation
under section 31-9-4. As the Court said in American Smelting:
[T]he liabilities, restrictions and duties imposed upon domestic
corporations constitute tie measure and "imit of the liabilities,
retrictions and duties which might thereafter be imposed upon
the corporation thus admitted to do business in the State.1
5 1
This equilibrium is not expressed in sections 31-10-6 and -7,
and should be challenged by any foreign corporation subjected
to the $100 levy or any domestic corporation now paying over
$100 in franchise taxes.
3. Income Tax
a. Prior to 1951
Prior to 1951, the Colorado income tax law governing cor-
porations required a 4 percent levy on "the entire net income
derived from property located and business transacted
within this state during the taxable year."' 5 - Such an income
tax statute creates problems of apportionment: What part of
the corporation's income was derived from "doing business"
in Colorado?
An example of the Colorado Supreme Court's approach
to apportionment is Cruse v. Stayput Clamp & Coupling Co.'
The defendant corporation had its only office and manufactur-
ing plant in Colorado, and it maintained no other inventory.
The company received orders in Colorado and shipped them
"to the destination, sometimes c.o.d., sometimes on open ac-
count, sometimes f.o.b. Denver, sometimes f.o.b. destination."'"
4
The state tax commissioner argued that defendant's entire net
income equaled his net income in Colorado for section 2(b).
The corporation answered by characterizing its Colorado net
i4" 204 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 114.
351 Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
152 Ch. 175, § 2(b), [1937] Colo. Sess. Laws 679.
353 113 Colo. 254, 156 P.2d 397 (1945).
154 Id. at 257, 156 P.2d at 398.
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income as sales "completed by delivery in Colorado to Colorado
purchasers.' '155
After reviewing various decisions from other states, the
court concluded that the tax commissioner's assessment was
correct and upheld the following principle:
[A] state may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on net income
derived from transactions in interstate commerce as well as from
other sources without violating any constitutional provision. 156
In contrast to this case, Colorado v. American Can Co.
1 57
held that a foreign corporation which had carefully selected
its contacts could not be taxed on its total net income. Here
the tax assessment was based on income derived from retail
sales made to customers in Colorado. The defendant argued
that the orders, although taken in Colorado, were transmitted
to New Jersey for acceptance. The product was shipped from
warehouses outside of Colorado f.o.b. to a point of delivery
also outside the state. There, the product was picked up by
carrier for delivery to a retail purchaser in Colorado. The cor-
poration was authorized to do business in Colorado and main-
tained a Colorado warehouse from which it made sales to local
customers.
158
The court, in seeking to apportion the income derived from
transacting business in the state, broke the business into na-
tional, totally Coloradan (from the local warehouse), and busi-
ness in goods delivered outside the state for Colorado cus-
tomers. The court held that the corporation's net income for
the state tax was to be limited to the sales made from the
Colorado warehouse.
Thus, the argument made by the corporation in Stayput
Clamp appears to have found acceptance in American Can.
The court rationalized this difference by noting that the cor-
poration in Stayput Clamp had all of its property in Colorado,
and therefore the "transacting business" test could be avoided.
b. After 1951
In 1951, the income tax law was altered to accelerate the
corporate tax to 5 percent. 159 Complementing this increment was
a change in the statutory language. The amended statute taxes
the following:
155 Id. at 258-59, 156 P.2d at 399.
156 Id. at 264, 156 P.2d at 401.
357 117 Colo. 312, 186 P.2d 779 (1947).
158 Note that under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (Supp. 1967) this
type of transaction would be subject to sales and use tax.
159Ch. 196, § 2(b) (2), [1951] Colo. Sess. Laws 453.
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[T]he net income of every corporation derived from sources
within this state .... Income from sources within this state
includes income from tangible or intangible property located or
having a situs in this state and income from any activities car-
ried on in this state, regardless of whether carried on in intra-
state, interstate or foreign commerce.160
This new language, which would seem to cover the Amer-
ican Can situation, is clearly differentiated from the old statute
in Arvey Corp. v. Fugate."' Here the director-inventor of a
corporation left the business, took some key employees with
him, and created a new company authorized to do business in
Colorado. The original corporation filed an action to enjoin the
activities of this new business on the basis that the director-
inventor was bound contractually and as a fiduciary to the
plaintiff. In winning the suit, the corporation received all the
gains and profits that the new Colorado corporation had ob-
tained during a certain accounting period.162 The state tax
commissioner promptly stepped in and levied an income tax
on these gains and profits.
In defense, the corporation argued that it was never domi-
ciled in Colorado, had no property in the state, had never
engaged in business or carried on commerce in Colorado, and
had no office there. It further contended that it had never
received income from sources within the state, directly or in-
directly, and the rights obtained from the earlier litigation were
an intangible whose situs was the domicile of the defendant.
In analyzing the new statute, the court held that "income
from sources within this state" was to be interpreted as "broad
and all inclusive."'163 The previous cases of Stayput Clamp and
American Can were held to be inapplicable because they used
the older test of "business transacted within the state" while
Fugate involved the new statute's "income from sources within
the state." Note also that "doing business" is no longer the test
but has been replaced by the carrying on of any activity.
The court held the source of the income to have its situs
at the location of the business activity. The conclusion was that
the "monies it received was [sic] income; that such income
constituted the profits from the operation of a Colorado cor-
poration; and therefore the source of the income was confined
strictly to Colorado.'
164
IN Id. § 2(b) (1) (emphasis added).
161 129 Colo. 595, 272 P.2d 652 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
16 2 Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951).
163 129 Colo. at 599, 272 P.2d at 655.
164 Id. at 600, 272 P.2d at 655.
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Although there have been no cases interpreting the current
section 138-1-3, this case gives a definite preview of what a
foreign corporation can expect when trying to avoid the state's
income tax. As with the 1965 long arm statute, this new law
definitely expands the state's power. "Income derived from
sources" within the state will probably be interpreted as liberal-
ly as the "arising from" test in the tortious act area. As with tort,
it is no longer necessary to prove that the foreign corporation
was actually "doing business" in the state. Today, the "transac-
tion of business" is no longer in the statute. The test has been
broadened to "activities carried on in this state."' 6 5 Thus, the
tax commissioner's burden of proof has been minimized.
D. Summary
The taxation question is still limited by the Supreme Court
cases noted earlier. Any tax is vulnerable to an attack on the
grounds of discrimination or undue burden on interstate com-
merce. The "doing business" test for sales and use taxation
requires more proof than the "doing business" test for service
of process but less than the "doing business" test for qualifica-
tion. Franchise taxation is limited to corporations already quali-
fied to do business, and, for income tax purposes, the "doing
business" test has been eliminated.
As discussed, it appears that both the Colorado license tax
and the definition of "doing business" for sales and use taxa-
tion are subject to basic constitutional challenges. The former
is discriminatory and impairs the state's contractual obligation,
while the sales and use tax extends the power of the state
beyond its boundaries because of a lack of proper nexus and
interference with interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
Although "doing business" can never be precisely defined,
this note has attempted to narrow the scope of the phrase as
it applies in Colorado. There are certain statutes or cases which
have managed to directly connect the term with the three
areas of conflict. In service of process, the "tortious act" test
has grown since its 1965 inception through the "ultimate use"
standard outlined in Vandermee and Czarnick. For contract,
the possible expansion of jurisdiction through the phrase "aris-
ing from" may alter the balancing of contacts test which has
been adhered to in the past. The issue of qualification has
been largely mooted in Colorado by the relaxed penalties and
165 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-35 (Supp. 1965), as amended (Supp.
1969).
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the judicial interpretation of abatement in the Admiral Corp.
case. The sales and use tax statute which defines "doing busi-
ness" appears to place an undue burden on interstate com-
merce through its inclusion of solicitation as a substantial
contact. The licensing tax is also subject to constitutional chal-
lenge because of its obvious discrimination when compared to
the franchise tax on domestic corporations. Finally, the income
tax statute has eliminated the "doing business" test in order
to adopt the more expansive standard of "activities carried on."
This, when combined with the potentially broad language of
"income derived from," implies a future extension of Colo-
rado's taxation on the income of foreign corporations.
Thus, the general trend in Colorado has been to expand
the state's power over foreign corporations by bringing them
into local courts and levying state taxes upon these businesses.
With the sole exception of the qualification standards, the leg-
islature and the courts are unanimous in their approval of
treating out-of-state corporations more like local citizens than
foreign ones. In the process of acquiring this power, certain




THE COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT:
A PRESCRIPTION FOR REGRESSION - TORTS - COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 130-11-1 to -17 (Supp. 1971)
INTRODUCTION
F OR centuries the doctrine of sovereign or governmental im-
munity has insulated both the individual public official and
the corporate personality of state and local governments from
suit. Under this doctrine the state and its political subdivisions
might be sued only if they consented to such suit, and until
recently this requirement of consent was an absolute maxim
of law. In its earliest application in English common law,1 the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the recovery of a plain-
tiff aggrieved by a sovereign defendant in either tort or con-
tract 2 solely because of the defendant's public character. The
merits of the cause of action and the equitable considerations
which might favor compensation were irrelevant.
Such injustice persisted with the doctrine's appearance in
American jurisprudence. 3 But American courts were quick to
recognize these injustices, and soon began to modify the doc-
trine's operation in an effort to mitigate its harsh consequences.
Two approaches to such modification emerged. The first was
to define the sovereignty of public entities in such a way as to
exclude some portion of the entities' functions from the gen-
eral class of sovereign activity. Thus, where an actionable harm
was caused by a public employee while engaged in an activity
which, though "public" by definition, was not deemed "sov-
ereign," the public entity could not avail itself of sovereign
immunity,4 but was instead held liable under the theory of
respondeat superior.' The second approach was to construct
1 For a review of the historical development of sovereign immunity in
English common law, see Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
2 This comment will deal primarily with immunity from a suit in tort.
Colorado, like most states, negatived its immunity doctrine as to con-
tract actions under the fiction of "inferred consent" (the court inferred
the government's consent to suit from the act of contracting itself). See
Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo.
19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957). See also Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush
Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
3 The evolution of sovereign immunity in early American common law is
treated in depth by Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
4 See subsection I.A., What Is Sovereign? pp. 571-75 infra.
5 See generally Williams, Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of
the Servant, 72 L.Q. REV. 522 (1956).
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an elaborate fiction by which the public entity was said to have
"waived" immunity or to have "consented" to the suit. Such
consent was inferred from the purchase of liability insurance
by the governmental defendant. 6 Unfortunately, these common
law exceptions to sovereign immunity proved difficult to ad-
minister as the courts found little guidance in reason to dis-
tinguish the sovereign from the nonsovereign act. Instead of
eradicating the injustice of sovereign immunity, the exceptions
merely compounded the injustice with confusing distinctions.
By the mid-20th century the uncertainty of the immunity doc-
trine's application under these exceptions had become a judicial
nightmare, and abrogation of the doctrine seemed assured.
Between 1942 and 1945, New York became the first state to
begin piecemeal legislation to take sovereign immunity out of
the state's common law;7 several other states followed." In
March 1971, Colorado joined this growing minority with the
supreme court's opinions in Evans v. Board of County Com-
missioners' and two companion cases.'" By these decisions the
court emphatically erased all features of governmental im-
munity from Colorado's common law. Further, the decisions
sounded a challenge to the Colorado General Assembly to
provide for the financial protection of public entities which
now stood nakedly open to suit. In the court's view this might
have been accomplished by the purchase of liability insurance
or by the legislative reinstatement of sovereign immunity.'1
The general assembly chose the latter alternative by enacting
the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.12
Although the Act does restore sovereign immunity as a
general rule in suits against the state and its political sub-
divisions, 13 it still embraces the central policy considerations
of Evans, as indicated in the Act's Declaration of Policy:
It is recognized by the general assembly that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, whereunder the state and its political sub-
divisions are often immune from suit for injuries suffered by
private persons, is, in some instances, an inequitable doctrine.14
6 See subsection I.B., What Is Consent? pp. 575-76 infra.
7 The process of abrogation including legislative and judicial interaction
is reviewed in Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363, 1391 (1954).
s A list of these states is found in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs,
482 P.2d 968, 969 n.1, 972 n.12 (Colo. 1971).
9 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971).
10 Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 482 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1971); Proffitt v.
State, 482 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1971). The opinion rendered by the court
in Evans is conclusive as to these decisions as well.
11 The court outlined these alternatives in Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (Colo. 1971).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 130-11-1 to -17 (Supp. 1971).
13 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (a).
14 Id. § 130-11-2.
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However, in spite of this recognition, the general assembly has
failed to accomplish its primary objective - to provide the
courts with a realistic approach to governmental liability.
Instead, as this comment will demonstrate, the new Act is a
regression which will force the courts back into the injustice
and uncertainty of pre-Evans common law. Before the full
impact of this regression may be appreciated, however, the
reader must first understand the nature of sovereign immunity
and the injustice and uncertainty incident to its application
under common law prior to Evans.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Pai-Evans DocTnm
As the doctrine of sovereign immunity unfolded in Amer-
ican cases, a set of universal rules grew up for defining the
extent of immunity enjoyed by both the public entity and its
employees.' 5 In the context of tort law, the doctrine protected
most governmental employees from liability for injury resulting
from "foreseeable conduct" within their "scope of employ-
ment. '16 The employee would be held personally liable only
if his conduct exceeded this scope of employment. Even the
traditional limits of respondeat superior defining scope of
employment were expanded beyond conventional principles
as the foreseeability of official conduct came to encompass
more and more behavior previously considered outside the
scope of employment. 7
The public entity's liability under this formulation was
truly a situation of "heads, I win -tails, you lose." If the
wrong committed by the public employee was caused by con-
duct foreseeably within the scope of employment, then sovereign
immunity would protect both the public entity and its employee.
If the conduct was found to be outside the scope of employ-
ment, then the employee might be held personally liable, but
clearly his employer would not be liable under any theory of
respondeat superior.' s
In Colorado, immunity was first recognized in the 1893
decision, Board of County Commissioners v. Bish,19 which
shielded local governments from suit. Immunity for the state
15 Both the general rules and particular idiosyncrasies of various state
formulations are found in Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 7, at 1391.
16 See W. PRossE R, LAW OF Toirrs §§ 131-32 (4th ed. 1971).
1' Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 TAN. L. REV. 263
(1937).
18 The classical statement of these two rules in federal common law is
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884). Colorado's common law
on this point is reviewed in Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609
(1960).
19 18 Colo. 474, 33 P. 184 (1893).
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was established 2 years later when the supreme court decided
In re Constitutionality of Substitute for Senate Bill No. 83,20
better known as the Benedictine Sisters case. Without discussing
the justification for the doctrine, the court simply stated:
We recognize the doctrine that, without ccnstitutional or legisla-
tive authority, the state in its sovereign capacity cannot be sued.
No such authority exists in this state. This being so, no liability
upon contract or tort, if any there may be, can be enforced
against the state in any of its courts. 2
1
In the Benedictine Sisters case, the appellant challenged
the constitutionality of sovereign immunity, at least as it af-
fected property interests. The challenge was premised upon
the Colorado constitutional provision that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, with-
out just compensation. '22 Since the appellant's property had
been taken incident to a public works project and since no
compensation, just or otherwise, had been received, the claim
appeared sound. The supreme court, however, avoided this
compelling constitutional argument by ruling in favor of the
state on grounds of sovereign immunity.23 The constitutional
validity of a doctrine which so plainly interfered with the
exercise of this right to just compensation was an issue vir-
tualy ignored by the court.
The court continued to ignore this issue for nearly half a
century. Finally, in its 1939 decision, State v. Colorado Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co.,2 4 the supreme court ruled that legislative
consent to sue was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction
over actions against the state. This was so because the extent
and nature of public liability was a matter vested to the exclu-
sive concern of the legislature. 25 The court felt incompetent
to "legislate" such compensation for the plaintiff, as this would
clearly violate the separation of powers clause. Moreover, the
court felt powerless to compel the legislature to affirmatively
perform its own duty, for such a mandate was profoundly dif-
ferent from declaring a positive act of the legislature uncon-
stitutional.
This reasoning ignored the obvious competence vested in
the judiciary to declare the taking of property without just
20 21 Colo. 69, 39 P. 1088 (1895).
21 Id. at 72, 39 P. at 1089.
2 2 
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
23 21 Colo. at 72, 39 P. at 1089.
24 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939).
25 This rationale was used often in early federal common law. See United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
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compensation, in and of itself, an act beyond the constitutional
authority of either legislative or executive power. Ultimately,
the Colorado Supreme Court surrendered to this logic in Box-
berger v. State Highway Department.2 1 In this case the court
carried the constitutional argument to its logical conclusion
by finding sufficient grounds for jurisdiction over suits against
the state in the constitution itself:
This judicial power is conferred by [the constitution] and we see
no reason to invoke a different doctrine as to remedy for the
citizen whose property is wrongfully held by the sovereign or
any other source of imposition. The rights of a citizen remain
the same whether they collide with an individual or the gov-
ernment, and judicial tribunals were wisely established to cor-
rect such matters without the individual being relegated to the
position of no other remedy except to appeal to a legislature,
maybe to no avail, as all the people, or the citizens, are, in fact,
the sovereign under our desirable form of government. 27
Boxberger established nothing more than the unconstitutionality
of sovereign immunity when raised as a defense to actions
seeking enforcement of constitutional prohibitions against the
uncompensated taking of property. As to all other actions,
however, sovereign immunity remained an absolute rule.
This exception to sovereign immunity was the product of
a much larger process, one by which the absolute quality
of the immunity doctrine had begun to erode. The courts in
most jurisdictions28 were retreating from the purist conception
of sovereign immunity and embarking upon the long climb
toward abrogation of the doctrine. As mentioned earlier,29 this
process utilized two primary avenues of retreat, one requiring
distinctions between sovereign and nonsovereign acts and the
other calling for waiver of immunity where the public entity
had procured liability insurance. Each of these will be discussed
in turn.
A. What Is Sovereign?
The fundamental injustice of sovereign immunity was that
the plaintiff was barred from recovery for an otherwise ac-
tionable harm merely because the defendant was a public
and not a private institution. This injustice was accentuated by
the personal immunity of the public employee responsible for
26 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952).
27 Id. at 441, 250 P.2d at 1008.
28 South Carolina was the only jurisdiction which consistently refused to
find any common law liability. See Irvine v. City of Greenwood, 89
S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
29 See pp. 567-68 supra.
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the plaintiff's harm, 30 since the possibility of an alternative de-
fendant was thereby negatived.
By the mid-19th century the courts began to respond to
these injustices by the development of the famous (or infamous)
governmental-nongovernmental distinction.3 New York was
first to carve out such an exception to sovereign immunity in
the landmark case, Bailey v. City of New York.3 2 The plaintiff
complained of damage incurred because of the city's allegedly
negligent construction of a dam across a river. The court dis-
tinguished between the "private" and "public" activities which
are carried on by government. Because the construction of a
dam was deemed "private" or "proprietary," the defendant
was unable to escape liability under the veil of the immunity
doctrine.
Similarly, in McCarthy v. City of Syracuse, 31 the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that those duties of public officials,
though imposed by law, which were "ministerial" in nature were
not the same as duties incident to the general authority of the
sovereign. Rather, they were duties which were somehow not
of a governmental character, and if injury resulted from the
negligent performance of such duties, the municipal corpora-
tion and its officials could be held liable in tort.
The lead of New York was followed by Wisconsin,34 Rhode
Island,35 and Oregon.36 Then in 1904, Colorado adopted the New
York rule for public liability in the decision of Veraguth v.
City of Denver.3 7 The court, speaking of municipal corporations,
declared:
One class of its powers is of a public and general character, to
be exercised in virtue of certain attributes of sovereignty dele-
gated to it for the welfare and protection of its inhabitants; the
other relates only to special or private corporate purposes, for the
accomplishment of which it acts, not through its public officers
as such, but through agents or servants employed by it. In the
former case its functions are political and governmental, and no
liability attaches to it either for nonuser or misuser of a power;
30 Some states limited personal immunity to "superior officers." These
states included California, Utah, Arizona, and some New England states.
See, e.g., Dawson v. Martin, 150 Cal. App. 2d 379, 309 P.2d 915 (1957).
31 The terms "governmental" and "nongovernmental" are used here
generically. Some cases refer to a public-private test, others to govern-
mental-proprietary distinctions.
32 3 N.Y. 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842).
3346 N.Y.S. 194 (App. Div. 1871).
34 Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 14 Am. R. 760 (1873).
35 Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 R.I. 141, 23 Am. R. 434 (1875).
36 Wagner v. City of Portland, 40 Ore. 389, 60 P. 985 (1900).
37 19 Colo. App. 473, 76 P. 539 (1904).
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while in the latter, it stands upon the same footing with a private
corporation, and will be held to the same responsibility with a
private corporation for injuries resulting from its negligence. 38
In theory, the rationale supporting such distinctions rested
in the court's conception of sovereignty which was seemingly
designed to permit recovery by the plaintiff whenever possible,
but precluding such recovery whenever the sovereign power
of government might be "usurped" or interfered with.3 9 To
grant a remedy against the state when its injury-producing
activity was governmental (i.e., sovereign per se) would con-
stitute the imposition of a standard of conduct upon the func-
tioning of sovereign authority. This suggested a form of external
control or regulation over the exercise of sovereignty. Such a
remedy was then clearly improper.4 0 But if the activity was
merely proprietary or nongovernmental, no usurpation of sov-
ereign power would be effected by permitting a private cause
of action, and governmental immunity in such cases was less
essential to the smooth operation of government.
Similarly, the discretionary-ministerial test, applied to the
public officials' personal liability, was seen as a distinction be-
tween "sovereign" and "less-than sovereign" acts. This distinc-
tion rested on the theoretical assumption that a public em-
ployee engaged in the determination of sovereign policy must
have the freedom of action to effectively exercise sovereign
authority, hence he was said to act in his own discretion as a
sovereign agent. To avoid usurpation of, or interference with,
this sovereign agency, the employee was held personally im-
mune. In contrast, the public employee whose acts were classi-
fied as ministerial was not immune from suit because he was
engaged in the implementation of sovereign policy, and such
implementation was considered inherently less sovereign or
perhaps less necessary to the unhampered exercise of sov-
ereignty.41 In this manner the discretionary-ministerial distinc-
tion was treated as a subset of the more general governmental-
nongovernmental test.
This reasoning worked well in theory; yet in practice the
3s Id. at 477, 76 P. at 540-41.
39 This "usurpation" and interference rationale was used in Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., i337 U.S. 682 (1949).
40 This reasoning is tersely embodied in a remark by Justice Holmes: "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,
353 (1907).
41 This distinction between determination and implementation of sov-
ereign policy is set forth in Note, 38 Micr. L. Rzv. 1344 (1940).
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courts found substantial difficulty in arriving at general rules
for making these distinctions meaningful. The difficulty arose
from the interactive character of the distinctions. Conclusions
under one distinction depended, in part, upon conclusions
reached under the other. The court first decided whether the
public entity was, with respect to the harm-producing activity,
involved in a governmental or nongovernmental activity. If
governmental, the public entity was immune, irrespective of the
personal liability of its employee.42 The employee was person-
ally liable then only if his conduct was ministerial or fell out-
side the scope of employment.43 If the public employer was
classified as nongovernmental, it was generally subject to lia-
bility and its employee could not avail himself of his employ-
er's immunity.44 However, if the employee committed a tortious
wrong by conduct characterized as discretionary, he was per-
sonally immune and the public entity could vicariously assert
his immunity in its own defense.45 This meant that the public
entity was subject to liability only when all of three conditions
were met- (1) its general activity was deemed proprietary
and not governmental, (2) its employee's injury-producing con-
duct was ministerial and not discretionary in character, and
(3) its employee's conduct, consistent with the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, was within the scope of his employment.
46
The complexity of this formulation was compounded by
the difficulty in defining such terms as governmental or non-
governmental function and discretionary or ministerial acts.
47
42 The Colorado case law representing this rule is reviewed in Malvermia
Inv. Co. v. City of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951).
43 See City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 7, 351 P.2d 826, 829
(1960). The "scope of employment" test should be distinguished from
the immunity tests since an agent would be personally liable, and the
principal not liable, for torts committed by the agent's conduct outside
the scope of employment, irrespective of the public or private character
of that employment.
44 See City & County of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 P. 590 (1905).
45 See Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 P. 1040 (1913). See also W.
PRoSSER, supra note 16, §§ 131-32.
46 Although the distinctions between these three conditions were often
blurred or not explicitly recognized, the textual statement is a valid
summary of the requirement to find liability. If any one of the ele-
ments (governmental character, discretionary employee activity, em-
ployee action within the scope of employment) was recognized as
missing, the public entity escaped liability.
47 The Colorado case law in this area is typical of the confusion incident
to attempted distinctions between these terms. Compare City & County
of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1101 (1957) with Williams
v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (governmental-
nongovernmental distinction applied to operation of public facilities).
Also compare Moses v. City & County of Denver, 89 Colo. 609, 5 P.2d
581 (1931) with City & County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295
P. 788 (1931) (discretionary-ministerial distinction applied).
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The finding of a "general statutory grant" authorizing particu-
lar functions of government was used as a criterion for deciding
the governmental-nongovernmental issue.48 But the vagueness
of this criterion made it all but useless for anything but the
most extreme cases. 49 The ministerial-discretionary distinction
did little to diminish the confusion, because in most jurisdic-
tions it operated only after a finding that the public entity
was engaged in a governmental activity.50 Mr. Justice Traynor,
in reviewing the California rule on public liability, observed:
[The immunity doctrine] has become riddled with exceptions,
both legislative and judicial, and the exceptions operate so illogi-
cally as to cause serious inequality. Some who are injured by
governmental agencies can recover, others cannot: one injured
while attending a community theater in a public park may re-
cover, but one injured in a children's playground may not .... 51
B. What Is Consent?
In addition to the interpretive difficulties created by the
governmental-nongovernmental distinction, the courts encoun-
tered more problems in accomplishing selective waiver of sov-
ereign immunity by other means, most notably through the con-
sent proviso of the doctrine. Since the immunity doctrine per-
mitted suits against the state and its political subdivisions when-
ever these entities consented to such actions, it seemed logical
enough to create exceptions to immunity by expanding the
meaning of such consent. Traditionally, this consent required
either legislative waiver of immunity or voluntary submission
of the public entity to the jurisdiction of the court wherein
the complaint had been filed. But in a series of cases beginning
with an Illinois decision, Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
District No. 302,52 a curious new method of consent was devised.
Where the public entity procured any liability insurance, it was
deemed to have waived its claim to sovereign immunity to the
extent of the policy limits. 53 This applied as to all actions
brought against the governmental entity. Thus the govern-
mental unit which purchased insurance to cover potential torts
48 See McIntosh v. City & County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337
(1936).
49 See Abeyta v. City & County of Denver, 165 Colo. 58, 437 P.2d 67
(1968) (discussing the governmental-nongovernmental distinction in
the context of the city's exercise of police power under a general statu-
tory grant).
50 This includes Colorado. See City & County of Denver v. Maurer, 47
Colo. 209, 106 P. 875 (1910).
51 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961) (abrogation of sovereign immunity in California)
(court's citations omitted).




arising from nongovernmental activities found that it had par-
tially waived its immunity as to all activities- including those
which were heretofore clearly governmental and immune, ab-
sent the insurance.
54
In the final analysis, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
under the governmental-nongovernmental and discretionary-
ministerial distinctions was a veritable judicial quagmire. Even
a conceptually separate exception to immunity, such as the
insurance-waiver approach just outlined, became impossible to
administer effectively because of these distinctions. They were
the culprit, the ultimate cause of uncertainty and confusion
in the common law.55 Moreover, the two tests failed to answer
the other critical need in the law of sovereign immunity, namely
the need for greater justice. Whereas prior to the governmental-
nongovernmental and discretionary-ministerial distinctions, an
aggrieved party might not recover for harm he suffered because
the defendant was a public entity, now a plaintiff's recovery
depended upon the general character of the tortfeasor's func-
tion. Neither of these criteria of liability bore any rational
relationship to the actual "culpability" of the defendant. Ulti-
mately, the denial of a just demand for compensation under
the new tests was as bitter a pill to swallow as under the
original sovereign immunity doctrine.
56
II. ABROGATION OF THE DOCTRINE: THE Evans DECISION
By the time New York began to progressively uproot its
immunity doctrine during the early 1940's, 57 nearly every Amer-
ican jurisdiction had experimented with some form of selective
waiver of immunity. By the late 1950's it was quite apparent
that these experiments were failures. The problems which
plagued the governmental-nongovernmental and discretionary-
ministerial distinctions had become universal. Abrogation
seemed inevitable.
New York stood as a lone pioneer in the field of abrogation
until 1957, when Florida repealed its immunity doctrine in
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.58 This was a wrongful death
5 4 Although Colorado did not follow this approach, it would have been
possible under the insurance-waiver provisions of CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 123-30-11 (Supp. 1965).
55 Justice Frankfurter offered his evaluation of the governmental-nongov-
ernmental distinction in his majority opinion in Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
56 An excellent comment on the justice of these common law tests is found
in Gellhorn & Shenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 722 (1947).
57 See p. 568 supra.
58 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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action brought by the widow of a prisoner killed during a
fire in a locked and unattended jail. In permitting recovery
the Supreme Court of Florida explicitly limited its denial of
immunity to municipal corporations:
We ... feel that the time has arrived to declare this doctrine
anachoristic [sic] not cnly to our system of justice but to our
traditional concepts of democratic government .... Affirma-
tively we hold that a municipal corporation may be held liable
for the torts of police officers under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 59
A number of other jurisdictions followed Florida with ju-
dicial decisions and legislative enactments, varying from mere
expansion of previous waiver rules to total abrogation of im-
munity."' Then, in March 1971, Colorado became the eighteenth
state to severely alter governmental immunity in favor of
liability. ' In Evans v. Board of County Commissioners,6 2 the
plaintiff brought an action in negligence for an injury sus-
tained in a fall allegedly caused by defective steps of the El
Paso County Courthouse. The trial court ruled that govern-
mental immunity precluded any recovery, and the plaintiff
brought an appeal on the sole issue of whether immunity in
such cases should continue in Colorado. With two dissents the
supreme court ruled that such immunity should no longer
operate. Mr. Justice Groves remarked in his majority opinion:
Obviously, there is ample authority to continue application of the
doctrine, and there is an abundance of authority to overturn it.
A majority of us simply think that the doctrines are causing too
great a degree of injustice. 3
The dissenting opinions of Justices Day and Kelley are sub-
stantially aimed at the lack of judicial restraint evidenced by
the majority in overruling principles which the court had "pro-
nounced and repronounced . . . through the past many years."
4
The dissenters emphatically felt the majority had overstepped
the limits of its competence and that the general assembly was
the only proper forum in which to abrogate governmental im-
59 Id. at 132.
60 For a review of these legislative and judicial interactions see Van
Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statu-
tory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963). For more recent develop-
ments, including a proposal by the American Bar Association and the
Administrative Conference of the United States to amend the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act so as to eliminate the remaining vestiges of fed-
eral sovereign immunity see K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREAT-
ISE §§ 27.00 to .10 (Supp. 1971).
61 The first 17 states are listed in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 482
P.2d 968, 969 n.1, 972 n.12 (Colo. 1971).
62 482 P.2d 968.
63 Id. at 970.
64 Id. at 973.
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munity. However, Justice Groves provides an adequate rebuttal
to this accusation of "judicial legislating. '65 In recalling that
the doctrine was originally judge-made, Justice Groves com-
ments: "the effect of this opinion . . . is simply to undo what
this court has done and leave the situation where it should
have been at the beginning, or at least should be now: in the
hands of the General Assembly .... "66
Although the majority recognizes the proper role of the
legislature, and indeed invites legislative action,6 7 it also recog-
nizes the simple fact that what is "created" by the judiciary
may be dismantled by it. It is true that in the more than 75
years since Colorado adopted immunity in Bish, the legislature
may have acted numerous times in ways demonstrating a tacit
recognition of governmental immunty, but never had such bare
reliance bordered on codification of the doctrine.
Despite the variety of arguments, historical and contempo-
rary,6 offered by the majority in support of abrogating im-
munity, the ultimate logic of the Evans opinion seemingly
turns on the court's recognition of the immunity doctrine's
obsolescence:
Some courts and writers, while not wishing to state that the
older decisions were wrong when decided, take the position that
the intervening vicissitudes of society have necessitated a change
in the law. We agree with these points of view. 69
By Evans, the supreme court set the stage for the general as-
sembly's response.
III. FROM REASON To REGRESSION
A. The Legislative History of the Act
In Evans and its two companion cases, the Colorado Su-
preme Court delayed the prospective effect of their decisions
until after June 30, 1972, to permit the legislature adequate time
to act in response to the decision: "If the General Assembly
wishes to restore sovereign immunity and governmental im-
munity in whole or in part, it has the authority to do so."17 0
65 For an evaluation of "judicial legislating" in those jurisdictions which
were in the fore of abrogation, see Littlefield, Stare Decisis, Prospective
Overruling, and Judicial Legislation in the Context of Sovereign Im-
munity, 9 ST. Louis L.J. 56 (1964).
66 482 P.2d at 971.
67 Id. at 972.
68 These arguments included a discussion of the ancient but distorted
maxim, "the king can do no wrong." This autocratic maxim's hostility
with American political ideology is examined in Barry, The King Can
Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349 (1925).
69 482 P.2d at 970.
70 Id. at 972.
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Additionally, the court sought to provide the state with suf-
ficient time to secure the liability insurance needed until the
legislature might act.
71
The general assembly had been preparing for several years
to face the question of governmental immunity and responded
promptly to the Evans decision. From reference to the Colorado
Legislative Council's report, "Governmental Liability in Colo-
rado ,' '" published in 1968, it is evident that the legislature's
response could have taken any of three forms.
First, the state and its political subdivisions might have
been made subject to open-ended liability, with no greater legal
protection than a private defendant. There were two ways to
accomplish this. One was to do nothing, thereby permitting
Evans to stand with its clear abrogation of all public immunity.
The other way was to codify Evans in a manner similar to the
New York model, 7 3 which provides for governmental liability
as though the government were a private person, but which
does not enumerate exceptions to this general waiver of im-
munity as in the case of the Federal Tort Claims Act.7 4 Both of
these approaches were rejected, most probably because they
promised to bring financial havoc to all levels of government,
and this fear outweighed the obvious equity of total abrogation.
The second form the Act might have taken would have
mimicked statutes of Illinois 7  and California,711 the former de-
fining immunity for certain governmental bodies and liability
for others, and the later cataloging every function of each
governmental agency as a function either immune from or
subject to liability. These formulations were also rejected, per-
haps because they constituted mere codification of the dysfunc-
tional governmental-nongovernmental distinction which so many
state judiciaries and legislatures had long ago denounced.
77
Further, the Illinois and California models emphasized the prior
inconsistencies of their judiciaries' governmental-nongovern-
mental distinction and sought to improve on this case law
71 Id.
72 Colorado Legislative Council, Governmental Liability in Colorado, Re-
search Publication No. 134, Nov. 1968 [hereinafter cited as Legislative
Council]. The council studied public liability, compiling a' wealth of
information about the experiences of other states which had abrogated
immunity, as well as past problems specific to Colorado case and
statutory law.
73N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW §§ 50 to 51-a (McKinney 1965).
7428U.S.C.§§2680(a)-(k) (1954).
75 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-100 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
76 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815, 815.2 (West 1969).
77 See pp. 574-77 supra.
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version, rather than to attack the primary injustice of the
immunity doctrine itself.
The third option available to the general assembly was to
overrule Evans and reinstate immunity in either its pre-Evans
"judicial form" or in a new legislative form which would
modify the troublesome governmental-nongovernmental and dis-
cretionary-ministerial tests. This latter alternative was ulti-
mately selected by the Colorado legislature, and the Act, which
is closely patterned after the statutes of Utah78 and Michigan,79
reaffirms immunity as the general rule and then provides for
a number of exceptions.
B. The Provisions of the Act
Under the Act, general immunity extends to all forms of
public entities including any "kind of district, agency, instru-
mentality, or political subdivision of the state organized pursu-
ant to law."80 The immunity doctrine continues in its historical
shield of any public employee, "whether or not compensated,
elected or appointed," 8' and the common law "scope of employ-
ment" standard is codified by the Act, with independent con-
tractors excluded from the class of protected individuals.
82
The Act specifies that "[a] public entity shall be immune
from liability in all claims for injury which are actionable in
tort except as otherwise provided in this section."' 3 The excep-
tions to such immunity specified in this section permit public
liability under the following conditions:
(b) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased
by such publice [sic] entity, by a public employee, while in the
course of his employment, except emergency vehicles operating
within the provisions of section 13-5-4 (2) and (3). C.R.S. 1963;
(c) The operation of any public hospital, penitentiary, re-
formatory, or jail by such public entity, or a dangerous condi-
tion existing therein;
(d) A dangerous condition of any public building;
(e) A dangerous condition which interferes with the
movement of traffic on the traveled portion and shoulders or
curbs of any public highway, road, street, or sidewalk within
the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any highway
which is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the
federal primary highway system, or of any paved highway
which is a part of the federal secondary highway system, or of
any paved highway which is a part of the state highway system,
on that portion of such highway, road, street, or sidewalk which
78 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -15 (1961).
79MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.996(101) to (115) (1967).
80 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-3(2) (Supp. 1971).
81 Id. § 130-11-3 (3).
82 Id.
83 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (a).
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was designed and intended for public travel or parking thereon;
(f) A dangerous condition of any public facility, except
roads and highways located in parks or recreation areas, public
parking facilities, and public transportation facilities maintained
by such public entity. Nothing in this paragraph (f) or in para-
graph (e) of this subsection (1) shall be construed to prevent
a public entity from asserting the defense of sovereign immunity
to an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved
property, whether or not such property is located in a park or
recreation area, or highway, road, or street right-of-way;
(g) The operation and maintenance of any public water
facility, gas facility, sanitation facility, electrical facility, power
facility, or swimming facility by such public entity, or a danger-
ous condition existing therein.
8 4
In addition to these specific exceptions, a separate provision
of the Act waives sovereign immunity to the policy limits of
any liability insurance carried by the defendant-public entity.
""
These exceptions would apparently create liability not only
for harms which previously were not actionable, but also for
those harms most commonly caused by employees of the state
and its subdivisions. No doubt this was the benevolent intent
of the general assembly. But when each exception is carefully
scrutinized, read in terms of other provisions of the Act, and
then compared to both Evans and the pre-Evans status of im-
munity, serious doubts as to the practical impact of the Act
must be entertained.
C. The Nonregressive Features of the Act
Before turning to the central theme of this comment, the
regressiveness of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act,
it is valuable to outline the nonregressive features of the Act.
For purposes of analysis, the waiver provisions may be
divided into four groups: (1) waiver for injuries" arising from
the negligent operation of motor vehicles, (2) waiver for in-
juries caused by the operation of certain public facilities, (3)
waiver for injuries caused by the presence of a dangerous condi-
tion in such facilities, and (4) waiver by insurance. Each of
these will be examined in turn.
1. Operation of a Motor Vehicle
The Act's first waiver of governmental immunity, that for
injuries resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle by a
public employee,T actually replaces prior statutory waiver for
-S4 Id. §§ 130-11-6(1) (b) to-6(1) (g).
85 Id. § 130-11-4.
86 "Injury" is defined in the Act as "death, injury to a person, damage
to or loss of property, of whatsoever kind, which would be actionable
in tort if inflicted by a private person." Id. § 130-11-3(4).
87 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (b).
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injuries caused by the negligent operation of police, fire, and
health department vehicles.8 8 This new waiver covers a broader
range of risk-producing activities and retains immunity only
for certain emergency situations. 81* The waiver extends to all
vehicles including those owned or leased by the public entity.
The only possible limitation of this waiver provision stems
from the legislature's use of the common law phrase, "while in
the course of employment," to qualify the government's waiver
of immunity. But under the theories of "foreseeability" and
"implied authority," Colorado courts have tended to construe
"scope of employment" expansively, at least when such a con-
struction favored the immunity of the public official."" If these
precedents are retained, such a construction will now favor the
liability of the public entity, and this first waiver provision
should then operate to increase the number of successful suits
brought by private plaintiffs.
2. Operation of Public Facilities
Subsection (c) and (g) of the specific waiver clause of
the Act permit suits against the public entity for two distinct
classes of activity. The first is for injury arising from the
operation of public hospitals, penitentiaries, reformatories, or
jails.:"' The second is for injury caused by the operation of any
public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming
facility.92 The first group includes only facilities administered
under a specific grant of sovereign power and thus previously
immune as governmental activities under the common law
test.9 3 The second group includes only functions which were
held proprietary at common law and thus subject to liability.9 4
At first glance this would appear to broaden the bases
for public liability, but, as will be demonstrated below, these
gains are questionable.
3. Dangerous Conditions
Potentially, the largest area of sovereign liability created
88 Id. § 13-10-1 (1963).
89 These emergency situations, liability therefor, dollar amount limits on
recovery, and provision for insurance are treated by COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 130-10-1 to -3 (1963).
90 The classic Colorado case on scope of employment is Comstock v. Bivens,
78 Colo. 107, 239 P. 869 (1925).
91CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-6(1) (c) (Supp. 1971).
92 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (g).
93 See Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960); City & County of
Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).
94 See Cerise v. Fruitvale Water & Sanitation Dist., 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d
462 (1963); City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 P. 1000




by the Act depends upon the existence of a "dangerous con-
dition" in some public facility or on some roadway. Five of
the six specific waiver provisions in the Act involve dangerous
conditions, and the importance of clearly understanding this
term cannot be overemphasized. Collapsing these five provisions
the state and its subdivisions are liable for all injuries arising
from the existence of a dangerous condition in any "public
hospital, penitentiary, reformatory, jail," 5 or any other "public
building,"'9 6 or "any public facility (except roads and highways
located in parks or recreation areas), public parking facilities
and public transportation facilities. ' '197 The public entity is liable
as well for any injury caused by the presence of a dangerous
condition which interferes with the movement of traffic on the
traveled portion and shoulders or curbs of any public highway,
road, street, or sidewalk,"' and for injury caused by a dangerous
condition in any public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power,
or swimming facility.9 "
"Dangerous condition" is defined by the Act as existing
"where the physical condition of public facilities or the use
thereof constitutes a risk to the health or safety of the public,
which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been known to exist .... A dangerous condi-
tion should have been known to exist if it is established that
the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of
such a nature that, in the exercise of due care, such condition and
its dangerous character should have been discovered."'0'0 More-
over, the Act makes compulsory the proof of the time for which
the condition has existed. 0 1 Therefore, although a plaintiff
might establish, by other inferences, the existence of defend-
ant's knowledge of the condition, the plaintiff may still be
barred from recovery for want of adequate proof as to the time
element.
Two other provisions may limit recovery under the Act for
injuries arising from dangerous conditions. First, a dangerous
condition must be evidenced by a defective condition which is
somehow at variance from the intended condition of the prem-
ises. Thus, a defect in design alone will be insufficient as a
95 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-6(1) (c) (Supp. 1971).
96 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (d).
97Id. § 130-11-6(1) (f).
9SId. § 130-11-6(1) (e).
99 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (g).




grounds for waiver of immunity.10 2 The second limitation ex-
cludes liability for injuries caused by the presence of a "danger-
ous condition on a public highway, road, street or sidewalk,'
0 3
or in a "public facility' ' 0 4 if such injury was caused by the
"natural condition of any unimproved property."'10 5 This limita-
tion operates irrespective of any knowledge, actual or construc-
tive, which the defendant has of the dangerous condition.
Additionally, two ambiguities in the Act with respect to
dangerous conditions promise to burden the courts. Both involve
the applicability of the immunity waivers to suits arising from
the existence of dangerous conditions on public roadways. First,
when the Act was originally introduced, it called for the waiver
of immunity wherever there existed "a dangerous condition on
any highway, road or street." 06 As enacted, however, the
statute applies only to "[a] dangerous condition which inter-
feres with the movement of traffic on the traveled portion
and shoulder and curbs of any public highway, road, street or
sidewalk . . . ."oT The ambiguity stems from the phrase "inter-
feres with the movement of traffic." Must an element of the
alleged tort be an interference with some legally recognized
interest of the plaintiff which is identical to an "interference
with the movement of traffic," or will any harm incident to
the presence of a dangerous condition which incidentally inter-
feres with traffic be a harm that is actionable? Only substan-
tial litigation will determine to what extent this phrase will
limit governmental liability.
The second ambiguity incident to the dangerous condition
waivers involves injuries occurring on roads and highways
within the exclusive control of counties. The legislative coun-
cil in 1968 observed that counties were not liable for injuries
caused by defective conditions on thoroughfares, but that cities
were liable for such harm. 1 8 The council recommended that
this discrepancy be corrected. 109 The general assembly "ad-
dressed" this problem by ignoring it. The only statutory clas-
sification relevant to highways retains immunity for unpaved
302 Id. § 130-11-3 (5) (b).
303 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (e).
104 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (f).
105 Id.
106 H.R. No. 1047, 48th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. § 130-11-6(1) (e) (Colo.
1971).
107CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-6(1)(e) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis
added).
108 See Legislative Council at 137. See also City of Denver v. Williams, 12
Colo. 475, 21 P. 617 (1889).
109 See Legislative Council at 137.
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highways only. Immunity as to paved highways in cities is
waived, but there is no mention of paved highways over which
the county has control, ostensibly leaving the immunity of the
counties intact.1 10
4. Waiver by Insurance
The final form of waiver designated by the Act depends
upon the purchase of liability insurance by the public entity.
Recognizing that insurance is an adequate answer to the fears
that waiver of immunity will mean financial ruin to many gov-
ernmental units, the legislature has provided for a general
waiver of immunity as to all injuries caused by any activity,
so long as the injury is one for which the insurance is applic-
able." ' Damages under this provision are limited to the policy
limits and are recoverable from the insurer only, although the
insurer may not be named as a party defendant."
r2
This general waiver, however, is also limited. The operation
of the waiver depends upon the purchase of insurance, and,
although the state is required to insure itself for losses caused
by conduct falling within any of the six specific waiver pro-
visions in section 6 of the Act,' 1' insurance for all other losses
is merely permitted. 1  Moreover, at the time of this writing,
no insurance, compulsory or voluntary, has been obtained by
the state." '5 In short, this general waiver clause is little more
than a safety feature of the Act, a feature which mandates the
purchase of insurance to cover only those losses for which
immunity has already been waived elsewhere in the Act.
5. Summary
These four general classes of waiver-for the operation of
motor vehicles, for the operation of public facilities, for the
presence of dangerous conditions, and for the purchase of insur-
ance- are all admirable attempts by the general assembly to
expand public liability. Some of the waivers are severely
limited; others are free from any true limitation. Some are am-
biguous, promising substantial problems for the courts; others
are mere codifications of the common law, and the courts should
be well acquainted with their sometimes clouded legal signifi-
cance. But the greatest potential limitation on the effective-
31 WThis follows from the exclusivity of public liability as defined by the
Act. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 130-11-2, 130-11-6(1) (a) (Supp. 1971).
311 Id. § 130-11-4(1).
112 Id. § 130-11-4(2).
13 Id. § 130-11-16.
114 Id. § 130-11-15.
115 See Denver Post, July 9, 1972, at 35, col. 4.
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ness of the Act has not yet been discussed. This limitation em-
braces the several provisions of the Act which require the
courts to retreat to the pre-Evans common law distinctions of
governmental-nongovernmental and discretionary-ministerial
functions.
D. The Regressive Features of the Act
The Act provides "that the distinction for liability purposes
between governmental and proprietary functions should be
abolished.""' ; This, of course, is a policy wholly consistent with
Evans. However, the realization of this policy under the new
Act is a different matter altogether. The remainder of this
analysis demonstrates the failure of the Act to achieve this
statutory abolition.
1. Public "Operation" Versus Private "Operation"
As has already been mentioned, operation of certain pub-
lic facilities and the presence of dangerous conditions in those
facilities comprise the bulk of immunity waivers under the Act.
The Act's specific definition of the term "operation" points to
the first regression:
"Operation" means the act or omission of a public entity or pub-
lic employee in the exercise and performance of the powers,
duties, and functions vested in them by law with respect to the
purposes of any public hospital, jail, public water, gas, sanita-
tion, power, or swimming facility.
117
Recalling that absolute immunity is the rule and waiver the
exception,'" 8 those waivers for the specified "operations" become
effective in a rather curious manner. Where an injury occurs in
the operation of any of the enumerated facilities, the court must
decide if the act or omission is misfeasance or nonfeasance with
respect to any duty or power vested in them by the operation of
law. Since the phrase "vested in them by law" will include
direct statutory grants of authority, this definition of "opera-
tion" has an ironic effect. Whereas, at common law prior to
Evans, the public entity might be immune because the court
had made out a governmental function from the existence of
such a direct statutory grant of authority,119 a similar finding
under the Act will lead to liability. In any event, to decide
whether the injury-producing activity complained of by a pros-
pective plaintiff is part of an "operation," within the meaning
of the statute, the courts must again determine the public vis- -
1"6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-2 (Supp. 1971).
117 Id. § 130-11-3(6) (a) (emphasis added).
118 See p. 580 & note 83 supra.
119 See p. 575 & note 48 supra.
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vis private nature of the activity and the legal status of the pow-
er or duty under which the activity was performed. The govern-
mental-nongovernmental distinction with which the courts have
long expressed dissatisfaction, and which the general assembly
in this very Act declares abolished,120 has once again become
the ultimate criterion for public liability.
2. Governmental "Operation" Versus Proprietary "Opera-
tions"
The legislative council's report, "Governmental Immunity in
Colorado," made the following recommendation in 1968:
The committee determined that the doctrine of immunity should
not apply to those activities which are determined to be pro-
prietary in nature and that the liability of an entity when en-
gaged in these functions should be determined as if it were a
private corporation or individual. These functions include but
are not limited to the following: water, sewer, trash, and waste
disposal, electric and gas utilities, swimming pools, etc.121
Thus the council intended that all functions defined previously
at the common law as proprietary be subject to civil liability,
yet the general assembly waived immunity only for those func-
tions listed by the council as examples of proprietary functions,
ignoring all other similar nongovernmental activities. This
poses severe problems for the courts. Although they might now
easily decide if a particular injury has been proximately caused
by a specified nongovernmental function, what is the result if
the injury-producing function is not enumerated in this waiver
provision? If the court simply assumes, under proper canons
of statutory construction,'1 22 that the list is exhaustive, or if it
reads literally the clause, "the state and its political subdivisions
. ..should be liable for their actions and those of their agents
only to such an extent, and subject to such conditions, as are
provided by this article,' 123 then the plaintiff's action must be
denied, and the courts are forced back into the injustice of pre-
Evans sovereign immunity. If the courts decline to read the list
as exhaustive, they must then find some other criteria for judg-
ing whether immunity should or should not be applied. Without
the guidance of the legislature in the matter of such criteria,
and no such guidance is found in the Act, the courts must fall
1
20 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-2 (Supp. 1971).
121 Legislative Council at 143 (emphasis added).
122 The canons of statutory construction require the court to treat al lists
as exhaustive unless a contrary legislative intention is apparent (expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius - the expression of one excludes all
others). See People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, 26 Cal. 2d 503,
159 P.2d 641 (1945).
123 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-2 (Supp. 1971). See also id. § 130-
11-6(1) (a).
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back on something akin to the original governmental-nongov-
ernmental distinction.
Whichever of these two approaches is taken, the basic con-
fusion, uncertainty, and inequity of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine must continue. It is still quite possible that parents of a
child killed because of negligent maintenance of a park will be
barred from recovery, but parents of a child drowned in an
adjacent swimming pool can recover to the limits set forth in
the Act.
124
3. Vicarious Immunity: The Final Regression
The clearly unfortunate feature of the Act, as described
above, once again requires the courts to utilize some public-
versus-private distinction in determining governmental liability
for injuries arising from the operation of public facilities. But
even the potential of these problems is dwarfed by the regres-
sive effect of one other provision in the Act.
The list of specific waivers of immunity prescribed in sec-
tion 6 of the Act is immediately followed by a proviso:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver
of sovereign immunity where the injury arises from the act, or
failure to act, of a public employee where the act is the type
of act for which the public employee would be or heretofore has
been personally immune from liability.12 5
Two constructions of this provision are possible. Fir;t, the
courts may reason that the public employee has som.-times
been personally immune from suit under the pre-Evan: com-
124 Limitations on judgments. (1) (a) The maximum amount that
may be recovered under this article shall be:
(b) For any injury to one person in any single occur-
rence, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars;
(c) For an injury to two or more persons in any single
occurrence, the sum of three hundred thousand dollars; except
that in such instance, no person may recover in excess of one
hundred thousand dollars.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of
this section, if a public entity provides insurance coverage to
insure itself against all or any part of its liability for any in-
jury, or to insure a public employee acting within the scope
of his employment against all or any part of his liability for
injury, and the insurance coverage is in an amount in excess
of the limits specified in subsection (1) of this section, then
recovery may be had in an amount not to exceed the limita-
tions of insurance coverage; except that for this purpose self-
insurance as permitted in this article shall not be considered
insurance coverage and shall not increase the limits of liability
provided in subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit
the recovery of damages for types of actions authorized under
article 1 of chapter 41, C.R.S. 1963, in an amount in excess of
amounts specifed in said article.
(4) A public entity shall not be liable for punitive or ex-
emplary damages under this article.
Id. § 130-11-14 (Supp. 1971).
125 Id. § 130-11-6 (2) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
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mon law doctrine of sovereign immunity. If the agency of
government for which he works is engaged in a generally "gov-
ernmental" function or if he is personally employed in a "dis-
cretionary" activity at the time the injury occurs,12" he will be
immune from suit. In short, the public employee is personally
immune because "heretofore" he has been immune under sov-
ereign immunity. Since the employee is personally immune
and since the state may avail itself of its employee's immunity,
the state may vicariously assert sovereign immunity. This is
clearly a circuitous construction as it goes directly to old sov-
ereign immunity definitions to cloak the public entity with
sovereign immunity even in those cases where immunity has
now been expressly waived by the Act.
The second interpretation actually constitutes a potential
"saving construction." Since the state's immunity depends upon
its employee's immunity and since sovereign immunity in Colo-
rado has a purportedly limited existence, the courts must now
more clearly separate the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
the doctrine of immunity for public employees.'12 7 Then some
new test for deciding whether the public employee is personally
immune must be devised independent of the pre-Evans sovereign
immunity rules. The legislature, however, by using terms such
as "heretofore . . . immune" has instructed the courts to look
to common law in order to fashion such a test. Some criterion,
either borrowed directly from common law or created from it,
would then be necessary to adjudge the immunity of the em-
ployee. The only criterion available in this historical grab-bag
is some public-private test such as the discretionary-ministerial
distinction. But what does this mean? If, for example, the
courts develop a standard which shields the public employee
from suits in tort when his activity is "discretionary," then both
the public entity and the official will escape liability strictly
because he is involved in the determination and not the im-
plementation of governmental policy.2'8 The same criticisms
leveled at such a distinction in the pre-Evans common law
are again applicable. Any public-private dichotomy employed
by the courts to interpret this vicarious immunity provision
must rest on the traditional assumption that some functions
of government are profoundly more sovereign than others.
126 See p. 574 supra.
127 This may be difficult to accomplish since the courts have treated the
discretionary-ministerial test for public employee immunity as a subset
of the governmental-nongovernmental test for public entity immunity.
See p. 573 supra.
128 See p. 573 supra.
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As observed earlier, such criteria for public liability bear no
rational relationship to the actual responsibility of the defend-
ant, nor to the compensability of the plaintiff's injury.1 29
This vicarious immunity of the state impedes the operation
of all specific waivers of immunity under the Act, for the vicari-
ous immunity clause refers to all waivers listed in section 6 of
the Act. Thus, in "abolishing" the governmental-nongovernmen-
tal distinction, the general assembly has merely transferred all
the uncertainty and injustice of the pre-Evans common law to
another public-private test, most probably the discretionary-
ministerial distinction. In short, the pre-Evans quagmire has
been altered in name only.
CONCLUSION
When one compares the Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act to the historical common law doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, a number of common features are apparent. The same
uncertainty and confusion which led to the decision in Evans
has been restored to the law. The same injustices to which the
law had become so acutely sensitive have been recreated. In
the hands of an imaginative and aggressive bar, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in Colorado must again become a judicial
nightmare.
In the past several decades, notions of social loss and "cost-
spreading" have become favored concepts in the law of torts.
Theoretically, the class of society which ultimately benefits
from the risk-producing activity should bear the financial bur-
den of compensating for any losses occasioned by the activity.
These losses are also, in some sense, spread among that class
which can best absorb them. For example, in a field such as
products liability, it is the class of consumers which absorbs the
loss suffered by individual members of the same class. The
price of the product includes the cost of compensating for past
and future losses. Moreover, such spreading is far more efficient,
in the economists' sense of the word, than is leaving the loss to
be absorbed by the injured individual as best he can.
In public liability the arguments are much the same. With
the availability of insurance there is simply no justification for
leaving the burden of loss upon the individual. Such loss is
more efficiently spread through the class of citizens and taxpay-
ers, each paying some minute fraction of total losses as part
of the cost of government. The simple economic and social
pressures which favor the spreading of loss, rather than letting
129 See p. 576 supra.
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it fall upon an individual incapable of effective "self-compensa-
tion," are pressures to which the supreme court in Evans was
surely responding. The development of these pressures and the
court's response to them suggest a higher sense of justice than
that reflected by any continuation of governmental immunity.
On this ground alone the Colorado Governmental Immunity




WILLS - REVOCATION AND REVIVAL - No REVIVAL OF PRIOR
WILL BY REVOCATION OF SUBSEQUENT REVOKING WILL -
Bailey v. Kennedy, 162 Colo. 135, 425 P.2d 304 (1967).
INTRODUCTION
T HE distinctive attribute of a will which renders it unique
from other legal instruments which affect property is its
ambulatory quality. As a dispositive document, a will is not
and cannot become operative until the demise of its maker.
Derivative from this notion is the additional characteristic of
revocability.' To be a will, it is imperative that the instrument
be revocable.
2
Revocation, as applied to wills, is "the recalling, annulling,
voiding, or invalidating of a testamentary instrument which,
but for such revocation, would have been given effect as a last
will and testament. '3 Permissible modes of revocation are
prescribed by statute in every state except Tennessee.4 Typi-
cally, a will can be revoked: (1) nonintentionally, by operation
of law when an event occurs (such as marriage of the testa-
tor) to which the law attaches the automatic effect of revoca-
tion or (2) intentionally, when the testator performs an act to
the document (such as burning or tearing it) or when the testa-
tor executes a succeeding document (a new will, codicil, or
other writing).- A subsequent written instrument can revoke
an earlier one in two ways: expressly, by inclusion of a revoca-
tory clause, or impliedly, by virtue of inconsistent provisions.6
Closely allied to the revocatory feature of wills is what
might be termed its negative correlative, the phenomenon of
revival. As wills may be executed and revoked, so too may
1 "The essential element of revocability follows from the idea that the
will is not meant to create any rights in others or to pass any interest
in the property covered by the will prior to the maker's death." 1
BOWE-PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 1.2 (1960). "This revocable quality of
the will is what is usually meant when it is said that the will is am-
bulatory." Id. § 5.17.
2 The power of a testator to revoke is of equal stature and im-
portance as the power to make a will in the first place, and
one of the inherent characteristics of a will is its revocability
.... At modern law,... if it can be shown that the instrument
in question is irrevocable, it is not a will whatever else it
may be.
2 Id. § 21.1.
3 Id.
4 1 P-H WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS SERV. 1007 (1969).
5 McKinlay, Revocation of Wills, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 492 (1957).
6 2 BOwE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.33.
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,revoked wills be restored or revived, reassuming their tempo-
rarily interrupted legal efficacy. Revival is regulated by statute
in only 31 states.7 Among them and also among the states
which have dealt with the issue solely by case law, many dif-
ferent approaches to the revival question abound. The conflict
of authority associated with revival is nowhere more apparent
than with respect to the question of whether the destruction
of a later revoking will can bring about the revival of a once-
revoked but still undestroyed earlier will.
Through an analysis of Colorado's leading case in this area,
Bailey v. Kennedy," this comment will examine this jurisdic-
tion's position on revival by revocation of a revoking instru-
ment and also explore the intimately related issue of revoca-
tion by subsequent will.! The following questions, as they per-
tain to Colorado, will be considered. If a testator executes a
first will, later a second, and then destroys the second, when he
dies is he testate according to the earlier will or intestate?
Must the second will contain an express clause revoking all
prior wills in order to effect a revocation under the statute?
I. Bailey v. Kennedy
Morrison Bailey died testate, naming his wife beneficiary of
a testamentary trust and giving her a power of appointment
over the trust qualified by a provision that if she were to die
intestate, then the trust property was to be distributed to his
heirs. Mrs. Bailey executed a will and codicil. She later exe-
cuted a second will which contained a clause expressly revok-
ing all prior wills. Subsequently, she revoked the later will
by tearing and destroying it. At her death, proponents offered
the first will and codicil for probate. Contestants (Morrison
Bailey's heirs) produced a copy of the second will, proving its
execution though not disputing the fact that it had been re-
voked by destruction. The trial court found that the later will
had been revQked with the intention of reviving the earlier
will and codicil and admitted these instruments to probate.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first
will was revoked at the time the second was executed and
that, once revoked, a will can be revived only by republication.
The court remanded the case and ordered that the trust assets
7 1 P-H, supra note 4, 1008.
8 162 Colo. 135, 425 P.2d 304 (1967).
9 The Colorado statute provides for revocation "by some other will or
codicil in writing, or other writing declaring such revocation, executed,
declared and attested as provided in section 153-5-2 [the statute defining
the requisites of a will] .... " COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963).
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be distributed in keeping with Morrison Bailey's will and the
remainder in accordance with the laws of intestacy.
II. REVAL IN PERSPECTIVE
Revival has proved itself a most perplexing problem for the
courts and legislatures of the last two centuries. Antecedent to
and still coexistent with the Bailey holding is a motley assort-
ment of precedent and statutes on the subject. To appreciate
the Bailey position, therefore, one must view it against the
backdrop of the rather protean past of the revival question.
England furnished the United States a rich legacy on the
issue by formulating no less than three distinct positions with
respect to whether the revocation of a subsequent will revives
an earlier one. 10 At common law, revocation of a revoking will
revives the latest undestroyed will automatically as a matter of
law.11 Resting upon the rule that a will is ambulatory, this
theory asserts that a will which has been revoked prior to the
testator's death can wield no power as a revoking instrument.
The revocation of the second will constitutes a revocation of a
revocation, leaving the earlier document unaffected.12 A second
case law rule, the ecclesiastical, considers revival a strictly
factual question of the testator's intent at the time the second
instrument was revoked.13 The revocation takes immediate
effect upon execution of the later will. Revival of the first
instrument - at the later will's subsequent revocation - de-
pends upon the available evidence regarding the testator's in-
tentions concerning the earlier will with no presumption for
or against revival. A third position was promulgated by Parlia-
10 For interesting detailed accounts of the historical evolution of these vari-
ous positions, see 2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, §§ 21.49 through 21.56;
Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument, 22 Ky.
L.J. 469 (1934); Roberts, The Revival of a Prior by the Revocation of
a Later Will, 48 AM. LAw REG. 505 (1900); Zacharias & Maschinot,
Revocation and Revival of Wills, 25 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 185 (1947).
"Harwood v. Goodright, 1 Cowp. 87, 98 Eng. Rep. 981 (1774); Goodright
v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 98 Eng. Rep. 317 (1770).
12 A will has no operation, till the death of the testator. This sec-
ond will never operated: it was only intentional. The testator
changed his intention; and cancelled it. If by making the sec-
ond, the testator intended to revoke the former, yet that revoca-
tion was itself revocable: and he has revoked it.
Goodright v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 2514, 98 Eng. Rep. 317, 319 (1770).
As several commentators have pointed out, the use of the term "revival"
in this context is technically incorrect. The revocation of the later will
actually prevents the revocation of the former, and that which has
never been revoked is hardly a candidate for "revival." See, e.g.,
Roberts, supra note 10, at 517. One writer suggests that the word"restoration" would be more appropriate to the common law theory of
revival. Evans, Testamentary Revival, 16 Ky. L.J. 47 n.1 (1927). An-
other contends that "It would be more logical for these courts to refer
to the prior will as suspended by the subsequent will and reinstated by
cancellation of that [second] will." 46 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 497 n.6 (1946).
13 Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add. 116, 162 Eng. Rep. 238 (1824).
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ment via the Statute of Wills of 1837.14 This "anti-revival" rule
abrogated both the common law and the ecclesiastical rules and
directed that, once revoked, a will could be revived only by
re-execution or republication in compliance with the statute on
the execution of wills. Although silent as to when a revocation by
subsequent will took effect in time, the statute was soon in-
terpreted to mean that the revocation occurred at the time of
execution of the later instrument. 15 Under this "anti-revival"
view, therefore, a will revoked by the execution of a later will
can regain legal vitality only through re-execution or republi-
cation even when the second instrument itself meets rejection
at the hands of the testator.
American jurisdictions, as a group, have historically favored
no single English position on the revival question. Individual
states have selected a preference from among the three rules,
often adding variations." In fact, no fewer than five views of
the issue have been exhibited in this country:
(1) the earlier will is revived ipso facto (common law rule);
(2) the earlier will is revived unless an intention to the con-
trary appears (common law rule modified by the ecclesiastical
rule); (3) the earlier will is not revived unless reexecuted or
republished (English view after adoption of the Statute of
Victoria [the Statute of Wills of 1837]); (4) the earlier will
is not revived unless intent to revive appears (post-Statute of
Victoria view modified by the ecclesiastical rule); (5) revival
is solely a question of intent (ecclesiastical rule).17
One writer suggests, however, that these five positions are now
only of historical interest because, by case law and statute,
14 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict/, c. 26, § 22 (1837).
15 Major v. Williams, 3 Curt. 432, 163 Eng. Rep. 781 (1843) (by implica-
tion). Prior to this case, it was arguable that the Statute of Victoria did
not interfere with the common law rule because it pertained only to"revoked wills," and according to the common law view, the first will is
never revoked following revocation of a subsequent will prior to the
testator's death. Unrevoked wills merely continue in existence and need
not be republished. However, in holding that the revocation took im-
mediate effect upon execution of a subsequent will, the English courts
effectively rejected that argument.
16 [T]he question of revival of an earlier will by the destruction or
other revocation of a later will is involved in much contradic-
tion and conflict. The courts of different jurisdictions seem to
have taken every conceivable view of the matter ....
Roberts, supra note 10, at 506. Almost 50 years later, the situation had
evinced no discernible improvement:
This survey of judicial decisions dealing with revocation and
revival of wills, even when taken state by state, discloses an
almost kaleidoscopic pattern of confusing factual situations and
legal determinations from which one could draw a parallel case
to fit almost every set of circumstances which human ingenuity
or carelessness could produce or to bolster up an argument on
either side of some particular problem.
Zacharias & Maschinot, Revocation and Revival of Wills, 26 Cm.-KENT
L. REV. 107, 146 (1948).
1763 W. VA. L. REv. 86, 88 (1960) (citation omitted). See generally
Annot., 28 A.L.R. 911 (1924); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1072 (1946).
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the jurisdictions adhering to the ecclesiastical rule or one of its
variants (rules 2, 4, and 5) have settled upon a functionally
similar view, denominated the "American Rule," which holds
that a prior will is not revived unless it is clear that the testa-
tor intended revival.'8 Given this consolidation, we find that in
the United States today, 29 states follow the hybrid "American
Rule";'! six have remained faithful to the English common law
rule;2 0 and 12 have adopted an "anti-revival" rule modelled
after the English Statute of Wills. 21 Prior to the Bailey case,
Colorado was among the three states which espoused no view
with respect to revival.
22
The English experience and the disparity of opinion rela-
tive to the revival question still evident among American juris-
dictions reflect the thorny nature of the issue. In seeking a
solution to the problem of how to treat a former will when
a later one is destroyed, the courts and legislatures are faced
with a dilemma. Two conflicting goals, both of which are fun-
damentally intrinsic to the law of wills, must be reconciled.
The testator's evinced intent must be honored with the utmost
fidelity, while at the same time, statutory safeguards asso-
ciated with the execution and revocation of wills must be de-
ferred to in the spirit of the Statute of Frauds23 as expressed in
American statutes. In other words, the strict exclusionary rules
regulating the admissibility of parol evidence in determining
a testator's intent must be heeded while simultaneously at-
tempting to maximize opportunity to arrive at a true finding
of that intent as manifested by him. How the various positions
on revival deal with this tension will be consider following an
examination of the court's reasoning in the instant case.
III. THE Bailey RATIONALE
Bailey was a case of first impression in Colorado. Having
no revival statute upon which to base its decision, the Colorado
Supreme Court was faced with the competing positions extant
on the issue. In reaching its decision, the court alluded to the
18 Comment, Revival of Revoked Wills, 19 Wyo. L.J. 223, 228 (1965).
19 "American Rule:" 19 states by statute (Ala., Alas., Cal., Idaho, Ind.,
Kan., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.D.,
Utah & Wash.) and 10 states by case law (Iowa, Md., Mass., Minn.,
Neb., N.H., N.J., Tenn., Vt. & Wyo.). Id. at 229 nn.32-36.
20Common law rule: two states by statute (La. & Mich.) and four states
by case law (Conn., Del., R.I. & S.C.). Id. at 229-30 nn37-39.
21 "Anti-revival" rule: 10 states by statute (Ark., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Ill.,
Ky., N.C., Tex., Va. & W. Va.) and two states by case law (Miss. &
Wis.). Id. at 230 nn.40-43.
22 Arizona and Maine, in addition to Colorado, have no position on revival.
Id. at 230.
23 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 22 (1677).
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"notable division of authority '24 on the question of revival by
revocation of revoking will but apparently felt that delineation
of the relative merits of the several views was unwarranted.
The court proceeded directly to its own choice, giving the
impression that it believed that the statute on revocation com-
pelled only one result.
2 5
The Colorado statute on revocation of wills provides for
several modes to revoke a will:
A will shall be revoked by, and only by, the subsequent mar-
riage of the testator, or by burning, tearing or obliterating the
will by the testator himself, or in his presence and by his direc-
tion and consent, or by some other will or codicil in writing, or
other writing, declaring such revocation, executed, declared and
attested as provided in section 153-5-2 [the statute defining the
requisites of a will] .... 26
By the plain words of the statute ("by, and only by") and by
case law,27 these are the mandatory and exclusive methods by
which to effect a revocation. Relying on local precedent,28 the
Bailey court declared that all methods of revocation listed
in the statute are of equal effectiveness when accomplished
coincidental with the necessary intent to revoke. All methods
being equal, any of the statutory modes of revocation must
therefore become operant at precisely the same point in time.
Obviously, when a will is revoked by an act to the document
itself (burning, tearing, or obliterating), such revocation has
immediate physical and legal effect: in whole or in part, the
instrument is literally destroyed. To hold that revocation by
subsequent will does not take effect until the instrument is
admitted to probate, the court reasoned, would yield inequality
among the modes by giving "undue prominence and unwar-
ranted preference" to revocation by act to the document and
thus favor the abusive revocatory forms over revocation by
subsequent instrument. 29 Furthermore, since there is nothing
on the face of the statute to indicate that the modes are to vary
with respect to the time of their operative effect, the court con-
cluded that the legislature intended each method of revocation
24 Bailey v. Kennedy, 162 Colo. 135, 137, 425 P.2d 304, 305 (1967).
25 Other courts in jurisdictions with a revocation statute like Colorado's
have reached contrary results. See, e.g., Timberlake v. State-Planters
Bank of Commerce & Trusts, 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1961), noted in
10 KAN. L. REV. 106 (1961); 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 166 (1961); 63
W. VA. L. REV. 86 (1960).
26 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963).
27 Isenbart v. Johnson, 124 Colo. 436, 238 P.2d 879 (1951).
28 Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444, 211 P. 668 (1923); Freeman v. Hart, 61
Colo. 455, 158 P. 305 (1916).
29 162 Colo. at 139, 425 P.2d at 306.
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to be the equal of the others.30 Revocation by any statutory
method has present effect at the exact moment it is employed.
By its result, the court held that the execution of a subse-
quent will containing a revocatory clause constitutes a statu-
tory mode of revocation. This holding was clearly within the
meaning of the plain words of the statute. A will can be
revoked by "some other will," and even if that will must "de-
clare" such revocation (discussed infra), certainly a will having
a clause revoking all previous wills can be said to "declare"
a revocation. Since all modes of revocation are equivalent and
therefore accomplish a revocation at the same instant, the
execution of a second will with a revocatory clause, as a recog-
nized mode of revocation, is tantamount to physical destruction
of the earlier document.
The trial court had embraced the "American Rule" of re-
vival in holding that Mrs. Bailey died testate by her earlier will
and codicil because she had revoked the later will with the
intention of reviving the first. The supreme court rejected
this view and adopted the "anti-revival" rule, holding that once
revoked, a will can be revived only by republication of the
document in compliance with the statute which prescribes the
requisites of a will. In reversing the lower court, the supreme
court called attention to the danger which inheres in the
"American Rule," and clearly intimated in dictum that a doc-
trine which allows a once-revoked will to regain legal sanction
through parol evidence hazards the twin perils of fraud and
perjury for the reason that, as here, oral evidence as to intent
will frequently be provided by claimants who stand to gain
or lose by the result.3 1 If a Colorado testator intends an earlier
instrument to be revived upon the destruction of a later one
having a revocatory clause, he must manifest that intent with
nothing less than the statutory formalities required to create
it in the first instance. Tolerating less stringent standards re-
garding manifestation of testamentary intent, the court seems
to say, compromises the statutory safeguards developed to
protect the testation process and invites their breach. In Colo-
rado, only through republication can a revoked will be revived.
IV. REVIVAL IN CoLORADO
The position on revival settled upon by the Bailey court
derives from abundant authority, conforming with the doctrines
of England and 12 other states in this country.3 2 Inasmuch as
3o Id. at 138-39, 425 P.2d at 306.
31 Id. at 140, 425 P.2d at 306-07.
32 List of states note 21 supra.
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two other views of the matter also have currency in the United
States, a juxtaposition of Bailey with them affords a means
to evaluate the implications of the Colorado decision. The de-
gree to which each view maintains the competing objectives of
faithfulness to the testator's intent and avoidance of the parol
evidence dangers in the probate process is a proper benchmark
by which to gauge their relative merits.33
The common law rule, accepted in a distinct minority of
states, has elicited much criticism. A classic and cogent repudi-
ation of that rule was expressed in an early Georgia decision
concerned with revival by revocation of a later inconsistent
will:
The case is this: He had a scheme, and abandoned it for an-
other, and thus [then?] abandoned the second.. .. [Clan you...
say that when he abandons the last he returned to the first? If
these two schemes comprehended all the possible dispositions of
his property, then the conclusion would be a logical one ....
But when the number of possible schemes in every case is legion,
you cannot say that because he has departed from any one you
know his mind has settled upon any other particular one out
of that infinite number. The whole fallacy lies in assuming that
the two papers exhaust the subject. It seems to me that the
abandonment of any one scheme does not of itself afford the
least indication in favor of any other particular one out of an
infinite number.34
As this case implies, the common law rule ignores the possi-
bility that the testator intended to die intestate when he re-
voked the later instrument. With this in mind, one authority
submits that the "anti-revival" rule conforms more closely to
the effect most testators would expect a later revoking will to
have on an earlier one: that a prior will is revoked finally
and forever at the time a second is executed. 35 The prevention
of automatic revival protects against probation of a previous
will which had at one time been rejected by the testator but
retained inadvertently or for records-keeping purposes with the
belief that it was devoid of present or potential legal efficacy.
Another criticism of the common law rule is that it fails
to distinguish between the dispositive and revocatory functions
33 Professor Page has stated that a truly ideal rule in this area is unachiev-
able: "No rule can be worked out which will avoid the dangers of oral
evidence on the one hand and which will give effect to the actual inten-
tion of the testator in the particular case, on the other." 2 BOWE-PARKER,
supra note 1, § 21.54. It follows that scme compromise between the two
objectives is inevitable. No rule is completely free from criticism;
therefore, whichever a court chooses as the "best" rule is so in only a
relative, not ideal, sense.
34 Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, 320-21, 76 Am. Dec. 649, 651 (1860)
(emphasis added by the Georgia Supreme Court).
35 2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.54.
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of a will. Although it is undisputed that the dispositive pro-
visions of a will must be considered ambulatory, this argument
contends that revocatory provisions must be given immediate
effect at the time a subsequent will is executed in that a
revocatory clause is not essential to testamentary validity and
should be considered a separate instrument of immediate ef-
fect. 36  The same reasoning has also been applied to incon-
sistency in the subsequent will on the ground that there is no
difference in principle between revocation by express clause
and by implication.
3 7
Although the ecclesiastical rule and its modern variant, the
"American Rule," attempt to avoid distortion of the testator's
intent risked by automatically probating a will about which
only one thing is known for certain-that it was in some
degree expressly or impliedly rejected by the testator-it in-
dulges a greater hazard: the danger of abuse of the entire pro-
bate process by allowing oral testimony from interested parties.3
This approach is contrary to the spirit of the Statute of Frauds
in permitting a will once revoked to be restored to legal conse-
quence on the basis of parol evidence alone.
3 19
The Bailey view on revival avoids the dangers of parol in
determining the validity of a prior will and, in the opinion of
this writer, runs a minimal risk of abusing the testator's in-
tent.41' When a testator executes a subsequent will it is reason-
ably safe to assume that in some respect the second instrument
revokes the first. For what other reason would a person exe-
cute a second testamentary document if not to change one
U, Note, Destruction of a Subsequent Will as Effecting the Revival of a
Prior Will, 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 614, 622 (1931); 12 COLUM. L. REv. 353, 355
(1912).
37 46 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 498 n.9 (1946). See generally Note, Revival by
Revocation of a Later Instrument -Effect of a Revocatory Clause, 28
Ky. L.J. 227 (1940).
38 The courts which have adopted the ecclesiastical law rule ...
attempt to do justice by giving effect to the actual intention of
the testator; but they do it by throwing open the gates for oral
evidence of testator's declarations, upon which the validity of
the first will is to depend.
2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.54. With respect to American statutes
which direct that there is no revival unless it appears by the terms of
the revocation, one authority states that the "prevailing" interpretation
of such statutes is that the phrase, "unless it appears by the terms of the
revocation," applies only to instances of written revocation and that oral
assertions as to intent are not sufficient to revive under a statute of
this type. To the extent that this is true, then no objection can be made
that this position violates the Statute of Frauds. Ferrier, Revival of a
Revoked Will, 28 CAL. L. REV. 265, 266 n.7 (1940).
3) See the report of the committee on revision of New York statutes
(dated 1827-28) as quoted in Ferrier, supra note 38, at 267; 12 COLUM.
L. REv. 353, 355 (1912).
40 But see Ferrier, supra note 38, at 272-75.
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already in existence?" Inconsistency or a revocatory clause in
the second will manifests a disclaimer of the first. In tearing
up the second, the rejection itself is rejected, but the conclu-
sion that by such act the testator automatically intends testacy
by revival of the lirst is only one of many possible intentions.
Further, if the testator desires that the first will be reinstated,
he can do so through republication and thus express his desires
unequivocally and preclude the necessity of establishing his
intent through parol evidence.
Intestacy, established by statute and representing the legis-
lature's accumulated judgment on how the average deceased
person would probably have wished his assets distributed had
he made a will, requires no safeguards.42 Since the first English
Statute of Wills,4 3 the testation process has been closely regu-
lated and guarded through comprehensive statutory controls."
Despite the possibility for denial of a testator's wishes inherent
in the "anti-revival" rule, is it not better to risk distribution of a
testator's property according to the laws of intestacy rather than
to risk an even greater abuse of the estate by allowing oral
evidence to determine distribution when a testator destroys
a second will, leaving a once-revoked will in existence?
45 The
Bailey view refuses to honor any manifestation of a testator's
intent other than those required by statute to create a will in
the first place. To make a will, certain formalities must be met.
To "re-make" a will, the same should hold true.
V. REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WmL IN COLORADO
Since the second will in the Bailey case contained an ex-
press clause revoking all prior wills, the court did not reach
the question of what result would ensue if the later will had no
revocatory clause. 46 This comment will conclude with a con-
41 It is possible, though extremely improbable, that the second will dupli-
cates the first because, for example, the testator forgot that he had al-
ready executed a will previously or he believed that a change in cir-
cumstances (such as the birth of a child or a change of residence) re-
quired a new testamentary act. However, such possibilities are so remote
that it is more reasonable to assume that the second instrument did
alter the first in some respect. This assumption relates only to the de-
sirability of the "anti-revival" rule as compared to the other two rules,
and it is not suggested that it be accorded the status of a legal pre-
sumption.
42 "[T]he law views intestacy as normal and requires no safeguards,
whereas experience has shown the necessity of safeguards around testa-
mentary acts." 32 YALE L.J. 396, 398 (1923).
43 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540).
44 See generally Rees, American Wills Statutes (pts. 1-2), 46 VA. L. REV.
613, 856 (1960).
45Ferrier, supra note 38, at 267; 32 YALE L.J. 396 (1923).
4, One would expect this issue to arise far less frequently than the ques-
tion of how to treat the effect of the destruction of a second will with
a revocatory clauze because the great bulk of wills are drawn (at least
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sideration of this issue and attempt to answer the question
posed in the introduction: does the execution of a second will
absent a revocatory cause constitute a statutory revocation?
Some American jurisdictions distinguish between the ef-
fects of subsequent wills which have and those which do not
have a revocatory clause.' 7 If the second will does contain a
clause, then the revocatory effect is deemed immediate and
final at the execution of the document. The theory underlying
this doctrine is that an express clause of revocation should be
regarded independent from the instrument and hence a statu-
tory revocation at once.4 1 On the other hand, if the second will
is merely inconsistent, then the revoking effect is considered
ambulatory and thus cannot operate unless admitted to pro-
bate. This distinction has received a mixed reaction from legal
writers,49 and the majority of jurisdictions advancing the "anti-
revival" theory are said to make no distinction, holding that
no revival of an earlier will can be brought about by the
destruction of a later revoking will, regardless of the presence
or absence of a revocatory clause. 50
The Colorado statute on revocation of wills provides for
revocation "by some other will or codicil in writing, or other
writing, declaring such revocation, executed, declared and at-
tested as provided" by the statute on the execution of wills.5
A literal interpretation of the italicized phrase, "declaring such
revocation," would dictate the use of an express revocatory
clause. Does the phrase apply only to "other writing," and not
to "some other will," thus allowing revocation by the mere
execution of a second will without a revocation clause? Or
does the qualification apply to all three listed instruments alike
and thus seem to require that a second will must have an ex-
press clause of revocation in order to have revocatory effect?
For at least two reasons, the phrase must be said to apply to all
three. First, the phrase is set off by commas as a participial
phrase in apposition, and as such, it modifies all three nouns
preceding it. A second and more significant indicator may be
those drafted by lawyers) according to a fairly routinized pattern and
include a revccatory clause in the preamble as a matter of course. 7
BOwE-PARKER, supra note 1, at 7; 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 614 (1931).
47 See, e.g., Cheever v. North, 106 Mich. 390, 64 N.W. 455, 37 L.R.A. 561,
58 Am. St. R. 499 (1895); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 92 (2d ed. 1953); 2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.54; 28 Ky. L.J.
227 (1940).
48T. ATKINSON, supra note 47, § 92; 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 614 (1931).
4. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 10, at 520 (approving) and 15 HARV. L. REV.
142 (1901) (disapproving).
50 T. ATKINSON, supra note 47, § 92.
51 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963) (emphasis added).
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gleaned from legislative history. Prior to 1947, the statute read
as follows: a will shall be revoked "by some other will or codi-
cil in writing, declaring the same. '52 In 1947, the state legis-
lature amended the statute to include revocation by an "other
writing," adding it followed by a comma.5 3 In view of the fact
that "declaring the same" (the precursor to the more explicit
present phrase, "declaring such revocation") applied to "will"
and "codicil" originally in the statute, it is reasonable to con-
clude that it still so applies today.
In light of the fact that the subsequent instrument, whether
it be a will, a codicil, or an other writing, must "declare" a
revocation in order to meet the requirement of the statute, a
literal reading of the statute would seem to indicate that a
subsequent will must have a revocatory clause to accomplish
the nullification of a previous will. Whether a clause is actu-
ally necessary will depend upon the meaning the courts are
willing to impute to the phrase "declaring such revocation."
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in In re McKeown,54 re-
cently construed this section of the statute, and the opinion sug-
gests that Colorado courts will not favor a strict literal reading
of it (that the phrase demands the use of an express clause
of revocation). A testatrix executed a codicil modifying the
first article of her will. Later, she executed a second codicil
inconsistent with the first but which did not contain a revoca-
tory clause, although it did acknowledge the earlier codicil
by general reference to it. Both were admitted to probate, and
counsel argued that the second codicil could not revoke the
first because it was merely inconsistent with the first and did
not expressly "declare" a revocation of it as directed by the
statute. In rejecting this argument, the court held that to effect
a revocation under the statute, the word "revoke" or any form
of it is not obligatory. It was enough that the express wording
of the second codicil was inconsistent with the earlier one. In
effect, the court concluded that inconsistency is a sufficient
"declaration" of revocation to fulfill the requisite of the statute.5
An additional reason to suggest that Colorado courts may
consider the execution of a second inconsistent will absent a
52 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., C. 176, § 40 (1935).
53 Ch. 341, § 1, [1947] Colo. Sess. Laws 935.
54 28 Colo. App. 49, 470 P.2d 611 (1970).
55 McKeown is not precisely on point since it dealt with two codicils, both
of which were in existence at the time of probate. However, in the
appaals court's willingness to construe the phrase "declaring such revo-
cati, n" more broadly than a strict literal reading would allow, the case
suggests a direction which might lead to a holding that inconsistency is
sufficient to "declare a revocation" within the meaning of the statute.
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revocatory clause a revocation under the statute is implicit
in the fact that Colorado, as do all American states,50 accedes
in the doctrine of revocation by implication.5 7 Since the revoca-
tion statute is mandatory and sets forth the exclusive methods
by which a will can be annulled, one must conclude that
either the courts have acquiesced in allowing this doctrine to
operate contrary to the dictates of the statute or else the
statute is amenable to a construction which permits this type
of revocation. In view of the superiority of constitutionally
valid legislative fiat over the common law, the latter must be
the case.
More compelling support of the idea that the statute can be
construed to allow revocation by implication derives from
Illinois precedent. This issue was faced squarely by the su-
preme court of that state on more than one occasion, and in
view of the fact that the Colorado statutory enactments on wills
were borrowed from that state,58 the Illinois decisions are very
persuasive on this point.5 9 The Illinois statute on revocation
provided for revocation "by some other will, testament or
codicil in writing declaring the same ... ."60 This provision
was interpreted by the court, in two cases,61 to mean that there
could be no revocation by implication in Illinois because to re-
voke a previous will, a subsequent will must contain an ex-
press revocatory clause. In a third decision, Lasier v. Wright,
62
the Illinois Supreme Court declared that it had erred in its
intrepretation of the statute expressed in the earlier cases and
held that the statutory language could and did provide for
revocation by implication, reasoning as follows:
When a testator makes a will absolutely inconsistent with all
other wills and declares it his last will and testament, such acts
of necessity amount to a declaration that all former wills are
revoked. The word "declare," as defined by the lexicographers,
means primarily to make known; to make manifest: to make
clear; to present in such a manner as to exemplify; to disclose;
56 2 BowE-PARUER, supra note 1, § 21.1. See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.
652 (1927); Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 11 (1958).
57 Estate of Lehmer, 144 Colo. 477, 357 P.2d 89 (1960); Whitney
ington, 36 Colo. 407, 85 P. 84 (1906).
58 Keeler v. Trueman, 15 Colo. 143, 25 P. 311 (1890).
59 Colorado is known to have adopted into its realm of statutory
law provisions from the Illinois statutes, and consequently when
the occasion arises, our court frequently gives prime considera-
tion to Illinois precedent when necessary to interpret such a
statutory Provision.
Vandermee v. District Ct., 164 Colo. 117, 121, 433 P.2d 335, 337 (1967).
60 Ch. 148, § 17, [1871-72] Ill. Laws 775.
61 Limbach v. Limbach, 290 Ill. 94, 124 N.E. 859 (1919); Stetson v. Stetson,
200 Ill. 601, 66 N.E. 262 (1903) (dictum).
62 304 Ill. 130, 136 N.E. 545 (1922).
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to reveal. The testator in this case, within the meaning of the
statute, has declared a revocation of his former will by impliedly
saying in every clause thereof that the will he was then execut-
ing was his will and his complete and only will. It was not nec-
essary to use express words in terms declaring such revocation.
The statute makes no such requirement.
63
Revocation by implication realized through inconsistent testa-
mentary provisions is, therefore, a "declaration of revocation"
within the meaning of the statute.
Intent is a purely subjective phenomenon of which the law
can take cognizance only as it is objectively manifested
through overt behavior. Certainly, a revocatory clause is an
unambiguous expression of intent to revoke prior instruments.
In recognizing revocation by implication, courts also treat in-
consistency as a reliable objective manifestation of intent to
revoke. Therefore, under the Bailey "anti-revival" rule, if it
can be shown that a testator executed a later will inconsistent
with an earlier one and then destroyed the second leaving the
first, the testator will be deemed intestate to the extent the
inconsistency can be established. There is, in fact, authority
for precisely this result in England.'"
What might be the result when a will is being offered to
probate and it is shown to the court that the testator had
executed a subsequent will but no evidence as to the contents
of the second instrument is availab]e? In other words, is the
mere execution of a second will, without more, a revocation
under the statute? Probably not. Absent any evidence as to
the contents of a lost or destroyed will, the courts will not pre-
sume that the provisions of it were inconsistent with the first.
6 5
Therefore, with neither a revocatory clause nor inconsistency
shown, the later will cannot be said to have "declared a revoca-
tion" as required by the statute. Hence the mere execution
of a later will, without more, is not a revocation, leaving prior
C3 Id. at 136, 136 N.E. at 552 (emphasis added).
C4 In the Goods of Hodgkinson, [1893] P. 339. Testator made a first will
giving all his property to one person and appointing her sole executrix.
He then executed a second will, without expressly revoking the first,
devising his real property to another person and appointing that person
sole executrix. Subsequently, he cancelled the later instrument. The
court held that the first will had been partially revoked and granted
probate only to such part of the testator s assets as was not comprised
in the second will and declared intestacy as to the rest. "If the whole
of the first will had been revoked by the second will, it would not
have been revived by the cancellation of the second will; and the same
principle applies to the revocation of part of the first will." Id. at 340.
05! In re Wolfe's Will, 185 N.C. 563, 117 S.E. 804 (1923) (there is no pre-
sumption that a later will is inconsistent with an earlier one).
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documents unaffected and still viable. 6  Thus the testator




The Bailey decision stands in lieu of a statutory revival
statement in Colorado, obviating the need for one in holding
that once a will is revoked by a means provided in the statute
on revocation, it cannot be resurrected except through repub-
lication. This holding corresponds to the wisdom of the English
Parliament in the Statute of Wills of 1837 (which continues to
govern in that country today), and it also agrees with the
position taken by at least 12 other jurisdictions in the United
States. More importantly, it is harmonious with the probable
intent of most testators and steadfastly avoids the dangers of
parol evidence in the spirit of the Statute of Frauds.
Bailey also adds substance to the revocation statute in
declaring that the execution of a later will with a revocatory
clause constitutes an immediate and complete revocation of all
prior wills. The revocatory effect of a second will lacking a
clause still awaits resolution. However, the refusal of the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals to impose a technical and literal mean-
ing upon the words of the revocation statute,6" coupled with
the notion that the statute may be interpreted to permit revoca-
ion by implication (or, more specifically, inconsistency is a
"declaration" of revocation), tend to indicate that a will with-
out a revocatory clause might well be considered a statutory
revocation of prior wills to the extent that inconsistency be-
tween them can be established.
Thomas L. Roberts
66Eder v. Methodist Ass'n, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934) (a will not
shown to have been revoked in accordance with the statute on revoca-
tion must be held to be in existence).
67 See Annotations at note 56 supra listing American cases holding that
the mere execution of a second will does not constitute a revocation.
68 In re McKeown, 28 Colo. App. 49, 470 P.2d 611 (1970).
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL COMMON
LAW - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Public Nuisance
Suits Concerning Interstate Water Pollution -
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)
INTRODUCTION
N a recent environmental suit the State of Illinois filed a
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against four cities in Wis-
consin, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee,
and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of
Milwaukee. The plaintiff requested that the Court abate the
public nuisance being caused by the defendants' daily dis-
charge of over 200,000,000 gallons of raw or inadequately
treated sewage into Lake Michigan in and near the Milwaukee
area. The Court's decision, written by Mr. Justice Douglas,
denied the motion and remitted the parties to the appropriate
federal district court for resolution of the controversy.' While
declining to exercise its original jurisdiction, the Court held
that the appropriate forum for the adjudication of the dispute
was a federal district court. The Court further reasoned that
since the issue of a state-created public nuisance affecting
another state is a federal question 2 and that, in the absence of
a specific substantive statutory remedy,3 the federal question
should be resolved by applying the federal common law of
nuisance.
4
The significance of the decision lies in the Court's juris-
dictional mandate and in its acknowledgement of the validity
of federal common law in the adjudication of an interstate
water pollution issue. The purpose of this comment is to ex-
amine the question of jurisdiction and to show how and why
federal common law was held applicable to the resolution of
this issue in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
1 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972).
2 Id. at 98-101.
3 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1160 (1970),
does not create the specific remedy for the abatement of interstate
water pollution; The Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401, 407 (1970), specifically exempts sewage from its control. See
also Note, A Comparison of Texas v. Pankey and Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp. Reveals the Necessity for a Federal Common Law Right
to Abate Interstate Pollution, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 183, 191 (1970) for a dis-
cussion on the problems of existing remedies.




The Supreme Court is granted original jurisdiction in a
suit between a state and citizens of another state by the Con-
stitution5 and federal statute.6 Although original and exclusive
jurisdiction is applicable in a controversy between two states,7
the Court has been reluctant to invoke its original jurisdiction
in cases which are not "appropriate."8 The "appropriateness"
of a case for Supreme Court consideration is determined by the
dual test of unavailability of an alternate forum to decide the
case and inability of that forum to fashion adequate relief. 9
When a state brings an action against citizens of another
state, as in the Illinois case,10 another forum is made available
by virtue of federal statute. Although this statute implies that
the federal district court is the appropriate forum," court de-
cisions have split on the issue. In a recent pollution case similar
to the Illinois case, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,12 the
state supreme court was deemed the appropriate forum. In
contrast to this holding, a 1907 Supreme Court case concerning
interstate air pollution, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,1 3
granted original jurisdiction in a suit by a state against citizens
of another state.
That it is unlikely the Supreme Court will exercise its
original jurisdiction in such cases appears to have been firmly
established by Wyandotte. The Georgia case was decided over
60 years ago, and its usage with regard to the jurisdiction issue
since that time is nonexistent. When the issue was finally
confronted in Wyandotte, the Court adamantly held that it
was not the appropriate forum for these cases. The Court
5 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1970).
7 Id. § 1251 (a) (1). See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369
(1963); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
8 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
9 Id.
10 406 U.S. at 97. Political subdivisions, such as the defendants in Illinois,
are considered citizens of the state.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1970). See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469
(1884), in which the Court held that "we are unable to say that it is not
within the power of Congress to grant to inferior courts of the United
States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by
the Constitution with original jurisdiction." The Court removed this
suit to the federal district court.
12 401 U.S. 493 (1971). See Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Inter-
state Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12
Aiz. L. REv. 691 (1970) for a discussion on the jurisdictional choice
between federal and state courts in connection with this decision and
its impact on interstate pollution cases.
13 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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decided that the Ohio court was equally competent to resolve
the dispute, and, given the awkward nature of interstate pol-
lution cases and the Court's admission that it is hard-pressed
to act competently as a fact finder in original jurisdiction cases,
it felt that a lower court -in this case, the state court-
should decide the dispute.
14
B. Federal Jurisdiction
Assuming, then, that the Supreme Court is not the proper
forum, the issue of where to adjudicate interstate water pol-
lution cases not covered by substantive federal statute must
be evaluated for federal jurisdiction through the diversity of
citizenship 5 and federal question statutes.16 It is important
to note that a state, in an interstate water pollution suit against
citizens of another state, might want to have its own courts
apply its own laws to decide the dispute. However, if the issue
in question involves a federally protected right, the state will
probably be forced to seek relief in a federal forum. Since
there are only two methods of obtaining federal jurisdiction,
diversity of citizenship and the federal question statute, and
the former is inapplicable when a state is one of the parties,I'
a pollution action of the Illinois type must fall within the latter
statute in order to support the Court's holding in Illinois. An
examination of the federal question statute will show how the
decision was made.
1. Federal Question Statute
The federal question statute states that federal district
courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which
the matter in controversy "arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."' 8 Assuming that the monetary
requirement is satisfied, 9 the central issue is whether the
Illinois type of pollution creates an action arising under the
14 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). See 49 J.
URBAN L. 612 (1971) (comment on the Court's assertion of its modern
role in light of Wyandotte); 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 391 (1971) (approval of
plaintiff's choice of forum in Pankey); 25 U. MIAmi L. REV. 794 (1971)
(discussion on original jurisdiction problem in Wyandotte). However, it
should be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Wyandotte stresses
the responsibility of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in this type of
case.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
17 A suit between a state and citizens of another state is not one which
will qualify under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Postal Tel. Cable
Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
19 Id. The federal question statute requires that the matter in controversy




"laws" of the United States within the meaning of the statute.
Obviously, a federal statute which provides a suitable remedy
would enable a state to invoke jurisdiction. However, when a
statute does not exist or does not provide the specific remedy
sought, a state, in order to qualify under the federal question
statute, must prove that the right to be protected is a federal




The notion that the right of a state to be free of interstate
water pollution is a federal right has never been explicitly
stated in a judicial decision or federal statute. The first indi-
cation that such a right existed and had a remedy at common
law came in the 1907 decision of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
The Court held that a state has a legally protected interest to
be free from pollution of its air caused by the citizens of an-
other state.21 The Court reviewed the issue again in Hinderliler
v. LaPlata Co.,22 and, although it did not directly address the
fact that the apportionment of interstate waters was a federal
right, it stated in dictum that the issue was a "question of
'federal common law.' "23
Despite the lack of specific authority on the question of
the state's right as a federal right, it is plausible to argue
that recent federal legislation has designated this right as
federally protected. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
declares that it is federal policy to protect a state's right to
control and prevent water pollution. 24 The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 196925 lends support to the argument that
protection of the environment - including the state's right in
question -is of federal concern and warrants federal protec-
tion.
The most recent and strongest argument classifying this
state right as a federally protected one is found in the Tenth
Circuit Texas v. Pankey opinion. In discussing the earlier
Georgia case, the Pankey court said:
20 Friendly, In Praise of Erie- and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 385, 410 (1964). See Future of Federal Common Law
(Panel discussion, E. Morgan, Reporter), 17 ALA. L. REv. 10, 16 (1964)
(discussion of two ways to formulate federal common law).
21 206 U.S. at 237: "This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its
capacity as a quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an inter-
est independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain."
22 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
23 Id. at 110.
24 33 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
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The source or basis for such a quasi-sovereign ecological
right . . . was not discussed, but the right apparently was re-
garded as having existence in the common law .... While the
case cannot be said to have recognized the right as in itself
having a federal source, the Court's holding that a State is en-
titled to federal judicial protection of it from violation by out-
side sources would at least cause it to have a status of direct
protectability and justiciability in relation to the Constitution.
[We think the legal concepts and developments which
have occurred since [Georgia] would presently call for it to be
viewed as one which is within the purview of the [federal
question] statute as being a right entitled to have existence
under federal common law. 26
Thus, it can be said that the state's right, if not technically a
federal right, has at least a sufficient quantum of federal
recognition to qualify as a federally protected right.
b. Federal Common Law
Since the state's ecological right concerning interstate water
pollution appears to be federally protected, an infringement
upon that right in the form of a public nuisance should be
adjudicated by federal law. As in state courts, the federal
forums recognize two kinds of law: statutory and common.
In the absence of a statutory remedy, a federal court can
create federal common law in fashioning an appropriate remedy.
Federal common law as a legal doctrine can be traced
back to the 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson,27 which held that
federal courts exercising diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
were free to create common law as applied to a state. 28 In spite
of the celebrated ruling in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,2 9
which stands for the rejection of the concept of a general
federal common law, the Court's ruling on the same day in
Hinderliler v. LaPlata Co. gave rise to what has been called
specialized federal common law.
30
Of significance in these cases is the tendency of the federal
courts to recognize federal common law only when there is
a federal right involved. The plaintiff's right in Erie was a
personal right protected by state law; under the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction exercised by the federal court in the
ease, that right was properly adjudicated under state law.
26 Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
2741 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842).
28 Id. at 18.
29 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30 Friendly, supra note 20, at 405: "The clarion yet careful pronounce-
ment of Erie, 'There is no federal general common law,' opened the
way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialized federal
common law."
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In contrast, the right in Hinderliler was the right of the state
in connection with the apportionment of water in interstate
streams. The Court's dictum stating that a controversy involv-
ing this right of a state is a question of federal common law
is justified independently of the holding in Erie.
The tendency to recognize specialized federal common law
is borne out strongly in the decision of Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States.3 1 The Court there held that since the rights of
the federal government are governed by federal law, the courts
can fashion federal common law in the absence of an applicable
federal statute.32 This trend was further clarified by the decision
of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 33 in which it was held that
a federal court can create federal common law if a federal right
is at issue.
34
Once it is established that federal common law offers a
cause of action where a federal right is involved, it is still
necessary to show that federal common law comes within the
meaning of the federal question statute. The first indication
that it could be so considered appeared in the dissent in
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. 35 Mr. Justice
Brennan stated that since causes of action based on admiralty
law are created by federal common law, these cases come under
the "laws" of the federal question statute.
36
The breakthrough on this issue came in the decision of
Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co.3 7 The Second Circuit held that, in the absence of a statu-
tory remedy,"8 not only are claims for negligence and breach
of contract with regard to interstate communications services
governed by federal common law, but that the word "laws"
in the federal question statute should be construed to include
laws created by federal judicial decisions as well as those
created by federal legislation. 39 Thus, Brennan's theory as
31 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
32 Id. at 366, 367.
33 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
:34 Id. at 456.
35 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
31" Id. at 393. Mr. Justice Brennan al,-o cites Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955): "[I]n the absence of controlling
acts of Congress this Court has fashioned a large part of the existing
rules that govern admiralty."
37 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
:38 Id. at 491. The court held that federal legislation had pre-empted the
field of interstate service by communication carriers, but "[w]here
neither the Communications Act itself nor the tariffs filed pursuant to
the Act deals with a particular question, the courts are to apply a uni-
form rule of federal common law." Id.
31) Id. at 492.
VOL. 49
stated in his Romero dissent became the majority view in Ivy
Broadcasting, and federal common law based on federal rights
outside the admiralty area came within the meaning of the
statutory language.
Having proved that federal common law is deemed to have
existence within the meaning of the federal question statute,
all that a state involved in an interstate water pollution dis-
pute must do is look to the decision in Texas v. Pankey40 for
the definitive opinion sanctioning federal common law and
federal jurisdiction in this area. In Pankey, the state sought
to enjoin the defendants, citizens of New Mexico, from using
a certain pesticide which was threatening to pollute an inter-
state stream and affect the plaintiff's use and enjoyment
thereof.41 The court held that the public nuisance involving
the ecological rights of the state are to be adjudicated under
federal common law, and therefore, federal jurisdiction of the
district court could properly be invoked under the federal
question statute.42 Thus, given Pankey and the preceding cases,
one should be able to prove that the state's right is a "federal
right" protected by federal common law to be created by a
federal district court.
II. THE Pankey-Wyandotte CONFLICT
The appropriate forum and federal common law issues
connected with federal jurisdiction appeared to be well set-
tled by Pankey. But the Supreme Court's decision of Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. created confusion and despair among
environmentalists with regard to interstate water pollution. Not
only did the Court, in its refusal to exercise original jurisdic-
tion,43 remit the parties to the state court for adjudication of
the issues, but it also implied disapproval of the validity of
federal common law to govern a fact situation similar to that
in Pankey.
44
Federal jurisdiction was not granted in Wyandotte because
the Court did not think the state's right was a federal right
or the public nuisance issue one to be adjudicated under federal
common law. The Court stated that the public nuisance issue,
40 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
41 Id. at 238, 239.
42 Id. at 240.
43 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). The Court's
concern with its primary responsibility as an appellate tribunal and its
fear of possible abuse of the opportunity to resort to its original juris-
diction in suits of this nature prompted the exercise of its discretion to
deny original jurisdiction. See note 14 supra.
44 The only significant difference between the two cases is that in Wyan-
dotte the interstate waterway was Lake Erie.
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being involved in local law, could more properly be resolved
by the Ohio Supreme Court, especially since no important prob-
lems of federal law were involved.
45
The conflict between Pankey and Wyandotte becomes most
confusing when one considers that the Court in Wyandotte dis-
missed the federal common law issue in a dictum footnote:
[Tihis particular case cannot be disposed of by transferring it
to an appropriate federal district court since this [diversity of
citizenship] statute by itself does not actually confer jurisdic-
tion on these courts . . . and no other statutory jurisdictional
basis exists .... Nor would federal question jurisdiction exist
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. So far as it appears from the present
record, an action such as this, if otherwise cognizable in fed-
eral district court, would have to be adjudicated under state
law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).46
The Court did not explain its decision with regard to the no-
tion of the state's federally protected right. Although Pankey
was not specifically overruled, the Court's pronouncement that
state law should govern the dispute created an irreconcilable
conflict 47 with the Pankey holding on both the federal right
and federal common law issues.
III. THE CONFLICT RESOLVED
The conflict that the Pankey and Wyandotte decisions cre-
ated has been resolved by Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
A. The Appropriate Forum
The Court resolved the issue of the proper forum for ad-
judication of a public nuisance suit concerning interstate water
pollution by construing article III of the Constitution
48 and
the federal question statute
49 to declare that original juris-
diction will be declined where another court has the authority
to decide the dispute.5 0 While apparently following the rationale
in Wyandotte with regard to the problems inherent in original
jurisdiction, the Court stated that the federal district court is
the proper forum if the defendants can be sued in a federal
court.51 Thus, the holding in Wyandotte that federal courts
would not exercise jurisdiction in this type of suit was revised.
B. Federal Common Law
Having selected the appropriate forum, the Court then
45 401 U.S. at 498-500.
46 Id. at 498.
47 For a discussion of this conflict, see Note, Federal Common Law and
Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REv. 439 (1972); Note, supra note 3, at
186-98.
48 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
50406 U.S. at 93-94.
51 Id. at 98.
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held that the public nuisance involves a federal right to be
adjudicated by federal common law- the prerequisites neces-
sary to invoke jurisdiction under the federal question statute.
The Court cited Georgia and Hinderliler to imply that
the state's ecological right can effectively be classified as a
federal right.52 Being cognizant of the trend in recent federal
environmental legislation of declaring the national environment
to be federally protected, the Court merely clarified the con-
cept of the state's right as a federal right and overruled the
basis upon which Wyandotte was decided.
With the federal right issue resolved, the Court sanctioned
the Pankey rationale on the federal common law issue and
cited Ivy Broadcasting and Pankey as authority for its ruling.
The Court stated that when the state's right is infringed upon
by public nuisance, the dispute is to be governed by "the ap-
plicable federal common law [depending] on the facts peculiar
to the particular case."
'53
The Illinois case thus resolved the conflict between Wyan-
dotte and Pankey by adopting a portion of each decision. From
Pankey the Court took the holding which validated federal
common law, and from Wyandotte it accepted the decision to
avoid original jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Illinois was aware of the temporary nature
of its decision:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal
regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common
law of nuisance. But until that time comes to pass, federal
courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits
alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.
5 4
However limited this decision may be, it represents a clear
statement of principles of law and procedure which will have
a significant impact on future environmental litigation.
A. The Decision and the Role of Equity
The traditional remedy for a public nuisance is an in-
junction; yet, the Court's final remedy in Illinois is less than
unwavering: "There are no fixed rules that govern; these will
be equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chan-
cellor will largely govern. ' 55 A court sitting in equity will
undoubtedly take into consideration the economic and political
52 Id- at 104-05.
53 Id. at 106.
54 Id. at 107.
55 Id. at 107-08.
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aspects of the controversy before it. There is the possibility
that the flexibility of injunctive relief may, in some instances,
weaken the impact of a pro-environmental verdict.56 It is
equally possible that equity may fashion remedies more appro-
priate than an injunction.
B. Impact of the Decision
The Illinois decision stands for the fact that federal com-
mon law will be used or created to resolve this aspect of inter-
state water pollution. The need for a relatively uniform body
of law, consistent with the avowed federal policy of protecting
the environment, is potentially satisfied by this decision. There
may be some concern over the ability of a court to decide the
complex issues involved in litigation of this nature,57 but most
commentators have faith in the role of the courts in this area.58
Future litigation will indicate the true measure of a court's
capacity to deal with this type of suit.
The most encouraging aspect of Illinois is the specificity
with which the Court lays down the mandate of federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction and the use of the appropriate theory
of law. How much litigation this decision will precipitate is
unknown, but if a state is harmed by interstate water pollu-
tion and seeks a remedy, that state is now assured that its prob-
lem is of enough importance to the well-being of the national
environment to be dealt with as a federal question and to be
resolved by federal common law.
Richard A. Sherman
56 The Court may have been wary of the adverse effects of an absolute
injunction similar to the one issued in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907), where it was stated that the "possible disaster to
those outside the State must be accepted as a consequence of her stand-
ing on her extreme rights." Id. at 239. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 309, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970)
(example of the flexible nature of injunctive relief in a nuisance case).
57 For a discussion of the limitations of the courts, see Note, The Role of
Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1970).
58 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 473, 566 (1970): "[T]he courts,
in their own intuitive way - sometimes clumsy and cumbersome -
have shown more insight and sensitivity to many of the fundamental
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COLORADO ESTATE PLANNING
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(includes postage and handling) to:
Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc.
200 West 14th Avenue
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Natural Gas Purchasing and Exploration
and Federal Power Commission Regulatory Practice
Gas Supply and FPC Regulatory Section of the Corporate Law
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young attorney with 1-3 years experience in Oil and Gas Law
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Please forward resume and salary requirements to:
Mr. C. W. Baker, Corporate Staff Employee Relations,
Northern Natural Gas Company, 2223 Dodge Street,
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